Giustina Monti, Timaeus, Aristotle, and Polybius’ degrees of truth, 1-22

Keywords: Aristotle; autopsy; Lokroi Epizephyrioi; Polybius; Timaeus; truth

Abstract: Polybius uses the criticism of historians to prove his statements and his historical interpretation. It is, above all, his apodeictic method that requires it: by placing under investigation others’ mistakes, at the same time he has the opportunity to highlight what a historian must not do and enucleate the canons of the right historiographical method. This article will focus on Polybius’ historiography in relation to truth and the criticism of the historian Timaeus. It will also show that Polybius’ notion of truth appears to be multifaceted and it becomes a whole and unbroken essence only when a proper historian deals with it after taking all the required steps corresponding to the phases of historical science.

Lara O’Sullivan, The Athenian naval campaign and the failure of the Lamian War: a re-evaluation, 23-41      

Keywords: Lamian War; Athenian navy; Amorgos; Cleitus; Athenian grain trade

Abstract: This paper seeks to question a number of long-standing suppositions about Athens’ performance in the Lamian War (323-322 bce). It has often been maintained that Athens suffered significant naval defeats (particularly at Amorgos), such as to destroy Athenian sea-power; it is further supposed that this failure by sea ultimately cost Athens the war itself. Close consideration of the literary traditions and inscriptional records suggest that these assumptions are ill-founded. It is posited here that aims of the naval sphere and its nexus with the land campaign can be understood differently, and that the explanation for Athens’ failure can be found in Diodorus Siculus, who provides our main literary treatment of the war. The absence of Athens’ key allies (notably the Aetolians) at a critical juncture in the land campaign, combined with the Greeks’ misapprehension of the Macedonian appetite for a truce, were the vital factors in Athens’ downfall.

Davide Morelli, Le relazioni diplomatiche fra i Romani e i popoli dell’Abruzzo antico fra IV e III sec. a.C., 42-59

Keywords: Pre-Roman Abruzzi, Marsi, Paeligni, Marrucini, Frentanians, Vestini, Roman diplomacy, Romano-Italic relationships

Abstract: The article examines the sources concerning the diplomatic relations between the Romans and the pre-Roman populations of Abruzzi at the turn of the 4^th and 3^rd centuries BC. From the alleged war between the Marsi and the Romans to the agreements of 304 with the Frentani, Marsi, Marrucini and Paeligni, from the Marsic revolt in the area of Carseoli to the treaty with the Vestini in 302, the attested diplomatic relations seem to indicate voluntary collaboration. This feeling is strengthened by other clues, such as the inscription of Caso Cantovios and the heroism of the Frentanian Oblacus in the Roman army at Heraclea. These agreements ultimately represented one of the greatest Roman diplomatic achievements and contributed to the formation of the inexhaustible army that led to the conquest of the Mediterranean.

Marcaline J. Boyd, Not Stratēgos Autokratōr (?) Some notes on Clearchus’ Rise to Power at Heraclea Pontica, 60-76

Keywords: tyranny, stratēgos autokratōr, summum imperium, arbiter, Justin, Black Sea

Abstract: It is generally believed that Clearchus I, tyrant of Heraclea Pontica (364/3–352 BCE) came to power as stratēgos autokratōr “general plenipotentiary.” This widely held view is based upon a statement in Justin’s epitome of Pompeius Trogus’ Historiae Philippicae that says Clearchus was granted summum imperium by the demos. This paper shows that the equivalence of Justin’s summum imperium with the Greek stratēgeia autokrateira is a modern construction. It will, furthermore, demonstrate that the ancient sources cannot support the certain correspondence between summum imperium and stratēgos autokratōr. Ancient literary testimony, however, describes Clearchus as an arbiter and paints a clear picture of stasiotic struggle preceding his tyranny suited to this role. Thus, while modern scholarship has tended to emphasize the military character of Clearchus’ coming to power, this paper examines Clearchus through a new lens to call attention to the tyrant as a mediating figure. In this respect, Clearchus from the Black Sea turns out to be in good company among other Greek tyrants who exploited internal stasis to achieve personal power.