Contents

1 Hans Beck and Fabienne Marchand, Preface
2 Chandra Giroux, Mythologizing Conflict: Memory and the Minyae
21 Laetitia Phialon, The End of a World: Local Conflict and Regional Violence in Mycenaean Boeotia?
46 Hans Beck, From Regional Rivalry to Federalism: Revisiting the Battle of Koroneia (447 BCE)
63 Salvatore Tufano, The Liberation of Thebes (379 BC) as a Theban Revolution. Three Case Studies in Theban Prosopography
86 Alex McAuley, Kai polemou kai eirenes: Military Magistrates at War and at Peace in Hellenistic Boiotia
109 Roy van Wijk, The centrality of Boiotia to Athenian defensive strategy
138 Elena Franchi, Genealogies and Violence. Central Greece in the Making
168 Fabienne Marchand, The Making of a Fetter of Greece: Chalcis in the Hellenistic Period
189 Marcel Piérart, La guerre ou la paix? Deux notes sur les relations entre les Confédérations achaïenne et béotienne (224-180 a.C.)
Preface

The present collection of papers stems from two one-day workshops, the first at McGill University on November 9, 2017, followed by another at the Université de Fribourg on May 24, 2018. Both meetings were part of a wider international collaboration between two projects, the Parochial Polis directed by Hans Beck in Montreal and now at Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, and Fabienne Marchand’s Swiss National Science Foundation Old and New Powers: Boiotian International Relations from Philip II to Augustus. The collaboration was further facilitated by a Swiss National Science Foundation Short Visit Fellowship that brought Fabienne Marchand as a Visiting Professor to McGill University in the fall of 2017.

Famously dubbed, according to Plutarch, the “Dancing Floor of Ares” by the 4th century Theban general Epaminondas (Plut. Life of Marcellus 21.2), the region of Boiotia hosted throughout Antiquity a series of battles that shaped the history of the ancient world, such as the battle of Plataia – which ended the Persian Wars in 479 – and the battle of Chaironeia, won in 338 by the Macedonian king Philip II and his son Alexander the Great over a coalition of Greek states. The present volume is devoted to different dances of Ares. Rather than discussing seminal battles through the lens of military history, it investigates regional conflicts and local violence in Central Greece, with a particular focus on the region Boiotia, through the complementary approaches, conceptual approaches and synergies offered by the two research projects. This double perspective allows us to explore the crucial role played by conflict in the shaping of the Boiotian experience. At the same time, the region’s relations with various foreign powers (the Achaian koinon, the Macedonian kings, the Romans among others) as well as with its neighbours, such as Athens, Lokris, and Euboia, become visible. Organised as a series of thematic studies involving mythology, genealogy, federalism, political institutions, and geopolitical strategies, our inquiry starts with the Mycenaean period, and runs down through the Classical and Hellenistic periods to conclude with the involvement of the Romans in Central Greece.

The Montreal workshop received funding from the Anneliese Maier Research Prize that was awarded to Hans Beck by the German Humboldt Foundation, as well as from the John MacNaughton Chair of Classics, which he held at McGill University at the time. The Fribourg workshop was supported by the Université de Fribourg Fonds du Centenaire and the Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines. The respective teams of research assistants in Montreal and Fribourg did a magnificent job to turn both workshops into a wonderful experience: Corey Straub, Cyrena Gerardi, Emilie Lucas, Daniel Whittle, and Roy van Wijk. As the papers were prepared for publication, we received insightful comments from the anonymous peer-reviewers. Tim Howe offered helpful advice to improve the manuscript of this first volume in the new AHB Supplement Series. To all we offer our heartfelt thanks.

Fabienne Marchand and Hans Beck

May 2019
The Liberation of Thebes (379 BC) as a Theban Revolution.
Three Case Studies in Theban Prosopography

Salvatore Tufano

Abstract: The paper aims to suggest that Boeotian elites in the first half of the Fourth Century BC did not change dramatically: despite political innovations and the fall of the classical koinon in 386, in fact, it appears that the same families played central roles in Theban and Boeotian politics in the new institutions in place after 379. It is therefore possible to compare the situation with Ronald Syme’s reading in his Roman Revolution (1939), because a study of the families shows that the new Boeotian koinon of Epameinondas and Pelopidas, in fact, was still centred on the same aristocratic class. In order to demonstrate this, three characters are investigated: Leontiadas and Androkleidas, who were politically active in the Nineties and in the Eighties of the fourth century BC; the third character is Krattidas, and shows the advantages of a renewed interest in Theban prosopography, in light of the recent documentary acquisitions. The study of prosopography, as a consequence, highlights the trends in Theban politics at that time.

Keywords: Boiotia, Thebes, Internal Politics, Leontiadas, Androkleidas, Krattidas, Fourth Century BC.

A Prosopographical Perspective on the Years of the Hegemony.

Polybius was not a great admirer of the Boeotian constitution in the years of the Theban hegemony.² In a short excursus of the twentieth book (XX 4-7), he lingers on the slow decline which had characterised the history of the region since the μεγάλην...καὶ δόξαν καὶ δύναμιν reached at Leuctra in 371 BC (XX 4.2).³ Polybius is consistent in holding this view: already in the Sixth Book (43-4), he briefly comments on the weakness of the constitution of Thebes in the years of Epameinondas of Pelopidas. In these chapters, the author observes that the successes of Thebes depended on the virtue of one or at most two men (διὰ τὴν ἐνὸς ἄνδρος ἄρετὴν ἡ καὶ δευτέρου, VI 43.4), “[f]or the successes of the Thebans at that time were due not to the form of their constitution, but to the high qualities of their

---

¹ I would like to thank the audience and the organizers, Prof. H. Beck and F. Marchand, as well as the anonymous referees, for their useful observations on this paper. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are mine. All epigraphic abbreviations are those from SEG.

² Pol. VI 43.2, tr. E.S. Shuckburgh: “I am convinced that little need be said of the Athenian and Theban constitutions: their growth was abnormal, the period of their zenith brief, and the changes they experienced unusually violent. Their glory was a sudden and fortuitous flash (ὡσεὶ ἐκ προσπαθίαν τινὸς τύχης σὺν καιρῷ λάμψανος), so to speak”.

³ On the literary character of these paragraphs, see Müller 2013.
leading men (ἡ τῶν προεστῶτων ἀνδρῶν ἀρετή)”. He offers a convinced personalistic reading of Theban politics, as one actually managed by its leaders.

This interpretation, however, only partially renders the variety and the contributions by other politicians who we know were active in Boeotia during these years. Political conflict within Boeotia, and in particular, in Thebes, seems to have been not uncommon in these years. This is just another aspect of that perennial inner unrest which characterizes Boeotia through its entire history until the classical period. Between the Fifth and the Fourth Centuries BC, different sources suggest that a divided memory existed on the extent of the alignment with the Persians during the Persian Wars; in other words, there was not a common regional recollection of this event and the responsibility for this was assigned to the role of different factions which had governed Thebes in the early Fifth Century BC.

The present investigation concentrates on one particular aspect concerning the inner political life of Thebes. An analysis of the prosopographical profiles of three eminent politicians aims to assess the impact and influence of these Theban personalities in the Boeotian history of the early Fourth Century BC. In the constitution of these years, civic conflicts necessarily developed into regional conflicts.

The Boeotian constitution which developed in the years after the liberation of the Theban Cadmea (379 BC) was not a democratic constitution. The koinon of the years 378-35 BC included an eponymous archon, seven boeotarchs, and an assembly held in Thebes, with the consequence that participation from citizens of other Boeotian cities was limited; it could be that, until 335 BC, all the boeotarchs were Theban, but there is no way to positively assert whether this was a constitutional demand, or, possibly, the consequence

---

4 Pol. VI 43.5, tr. W.R. Paton. Polybius continues to claim that the death of Epameinondas and Pelopidas had coincided with the end of the Theban strength (6); The Theban constitution proved as weak as that of the democratic Athens, because Thebes was subsequently ruled by its mob, “brought up in an atmosphere of violence and passion” (44.9). This association of the Theban hegemony with the virtues of Epameinondas and Pelopidas had already been expressed by Eiphorus (RNJ 70 F 119): his focus on Epaminondas was reprised by Diodorus (XV 79.2) and, partially, by the same Polybius in the aforementioned passage. This precedence confirms the literary dimension of the view of the historian on Thebes; at the same time, the cursory remarks on the evolution of the Theban constitution do not aim, in Polybius, to simply praise Epameinondas or Pelopidas as part of a long tradition.

5 See a recent survey in Beck – Ganter 2015.

6 Hdt. IX 87-8; Thuc. III 62.5 and IV 92.6; Diod. XI 4.7; Plut. Arist. 18.7; Paus. IX 6.2. On this divided memory, see van Wijk i.p.

7 Rhodes (2016: 59) defined the constitution of these years an ὀλιγαρχία ἱσόνομος; there are not clear observations on the democratic character of the koinon, in the contemporary sources, and the effective management of internal and external politics, with the strong influence of the boeotarchs, contradicts the view that it was a substantitally democratic regime (for this view, see, among the others, Busolt 1920-6: 1424-5 and 1428; Larsen 1968: 75-8; Beck – Ganter 2015: 148-9). Interestingly, the Thebans who were forced to flee from Thebes in 382 and returned in 379 BC try to rally the Thebans, after assassinating the members of the pro-Spartan government, with these words: “[A]ll the Thebans, both cavalrymen and hoplites (πάντας Θηβαίους, ἱππάς τε καὶ ὅλιγας), should come out” (Xen. Hell. V 4.9; tr. R.F. Buxton). This association of cavalry and hoplitic elements was underlined by Buxton (2017: 28-9 and n.18), who suggests that these elements hint at an oligarchic form of power. The passage can also be read as an oligarchic self-presentation of the Theban society: these constitutional changes need to secure the support of exactly those elements (cavalry and hoplites), which stress the oligarchic nature of the government, both before 382 and in the new spirit of 379.

of a system where the election was more the result of the decision of Theban voters than of people from the other territorial subunits.\(^9\)

It is therefore interesting to focus on a selection of characters who have not attracted as much attention as Pelopidas and Epameinondas. The interest in these two generals, indeed, is the result of a later tradition, which probably developed only after the publication of the works of Ephorus and Callisthenes. On one hand, the later complimentary biographical tradition does not find direct echoes in the contemporary sources, according to a study by Shrimpton of fourth-century literature.\(^{10}\) On the other hand, we have hints that other influential politicians were active in the years of the Theban hegemony of the Seventies and the Sixties. If, moreover, we agree that, despite the constitutional change, a substantial oligarchy was still in power despite the dissolution of the koinon in 386 and the Spartan occupation of the years 382-79 BC, we can also improve our knowledge of the political events of the previous years (386-79 BC).\(^{11}\)

Two useful instruments to identify the names of those who led Thebes along Epaminondas and Pelopidas are the Theban magistrates’ coins, which offer legends with names often otherwise unknown,\(^{12}\) and an inventory of all the characters mentioned in Plutarch’s On the daimonion of Socrates and in his Life of Pelopidas.\(^{13}\) Xenophon and Diodorus are generally poor in details on the Theban politicians of these years, even if they still represent fundamental sources which will be used to complement, contrast and enrich the present prosopographic perspective. Thenceforth, a cautious use of Plutarch helps contextualize their information.\(^{14}\)

Upon consideration of the aforementioned sources, three characters of the upper echelon of the Theban elite seem to stand out as interesting case studies. The first three men, Ismenias, Leontiadas and Androkleidas, were active in the struggle which was already consuming Thebes in 395 BC, according to the historian of Oxyrhynchos (20.1 Chambers). The other chosen example, Krattidas, was a politician coterminous with Epameinondas. If there is anything in common among such disparate personal careers, it is their common belonging to that club of βέλτιστοι και γνωριμώτατοι τῶν πολιτῶν (H.Ox. loc. cit.) which represented the social source of all these Theban politicians in a profoundly oligarchic system: this remained so (1) until 386 BC, when the Classical koinon ceased its existence.

---


\(^{10}\) Shrimpton 1971.

\(^{11}\) Such a re-evaluation of these figures aims at providing a systematic update of the remarks on these other leaders which can already be found in the Theban prosopography by S. Koumanoudis (1979) and in the reference histories of the region (see in particular Buck 1979; Buckler 1980; Buck 1994; Beck – Ganter 2015). Besides, a useful scholarly source is the suggested list of boeotarchs in the years 371-62 BC published by D. Knoepfler (2005b: 84-5): this chart offers an attempt to systematise the sparse information of our sources on the composition of this board, and is a first example of what, from another angle, this study aims to be.

\(^{12}\) On these magistrate coins, see as starting points Hepworth 1998 and Schachter 2016b.

\(^{13}\) There is no space here to return to a much discussed topic such as the use of historical sources in the biographies of Plutarch, on which I refer to Schettino 2014 as a starting point. Less obvious is this use, perhaps, in the essays of the Moralia, since each of these essays deserves a single discussion (on the On the Daimonion of Socrates, see infra at n.51 for its value as a recipient of historical traditions on Thebes). The deluge of fourth-century historiography forces us to recur to Plutarch as an intermediary source, with due caution, given the different aims of his work as a biographer and as an imitator of Plato.

\(^{14}\) The present study is actually part of an ongoing research of the author on all these politicians who possibly contributed to the political debate in Thebes and in Boeotia in the years between 404 BC and 362 BC.
under the conditions of the Peace of Antalkidas; (2) in the four years before 382, when the party of Leontiadas had to recur to external help to proclaim its supremacy in the internal administration over Ismenias and his men;\(^\text{15}\) (3) in that interregnum of the years 382-79, when Thebes was occupied by a pro-spartan government, but nothing speaks against a substantial survival of the main political offices; finally (4), in the great koinon which was born in 379/8 and would die with Thebes in the Thirties. The likely continuity of activity of the figures under scrutiny and reasons of space restricted the choice of the current prosopographical investigation to three case studies (Leontiadas, Androkleidas and Krattidas): the career of Ismenias has been carefully described elsewhere,\(^\text{16}\) whereas we incline to discuss in future studies further significant members of the Theban elites in the middle Fourth Century BC.

In sum, this is a selective survey of the oligarchic elite which controlled Thebes in the first half of the Fourth Century BC. As these few portraits might show, this was as much a constitutional revolution as the birth of the Roman empire through Augustus, according to Syme’s classical reading in his *Roman Revolution* (1939): a family emerged over the others and imposed the seeds of what would gradually emerge as a new political reality, but in fact the previous one, the Roman republic, had already been mortally wounded in the internal struggles of the Sixties and the Fifties.

Syme’s views have been challenged, and one cannot contend either that they still preserve their complete validity as to the reconstruction of Roman history, or that the Roman nobilitas of the First Century BC could be entirely assimilable to Fourth Century Theban aristocracy.\(^\text{17}\) However, we can only better appreciate the actions of men as Caesar or Pompeius while checking on the composition of their amicitia:

> The career of the revolutionary leader is fantastic and unreal if told without some indication of the composition of the faction he led, of the personality, actions, and influence of the principal among his partisans. In all ages, whatever the form and name of government, be it monarchy, republic, or democracy, an oligarchy lurks behind the facade; and Roman history, Republic or Imperial, is the history of the governing class (Syme 1939: 7).

For these reasons, this is then an essay of study, from a prosopographical point of view, on the political climate of Thebes in the years of the hegemony. Especially worth of consideration are the profiles of Androkleidas and Krattidas, which exemplify what we (do not) know on the influential Thebans of these years, and whose actions have possibly been lost, together with the loss of other important sources on these years, such as Plutarch’s *Life of Epameinondas*.\(^\text{18}\)

\(^{15}\) Cp. Xen. *Hell.* V 2.25: Leontiadas approaches the Spartan Phoibidas, while Ismenias does not, διὰ τὸ μίσος τῶν Λακεδαιμόνων.

\(^{16}\) Landucci Gattinoni 2000 and Lenfant 2011.

\(^{17}\) On the reception of this text, see Traina [n.16] and For a possible further example of this continuity, see Tufano 2020.

\(^{18}\) Cf. what Knoepfler (1989: 48) observes on Daitondas: “Si la biographie de ce dernier [Épameinondas] par Plutarque n’était pas perdue, on y aurait peut-être trouvé une mention de notre Daitondas [...]. À défaut, il est intéressant de constater que la *Vie de Pélopidas* mentionne plusieurs des personnages qui furent les collègues de Daitondas lors de sa première ou de sa seconde béotarchie, preuve
Leontiadas, or the Banality of Evil.19

In the fifth book of the Hellenika, Xenophon tells of the Spartan occupation of the Cadmea in August 382, during the celebration of the Theban festival of Thesmophoria.20 Phoibidas, a Spartan commander, was on his way to Olynth, where the Spartans had been summoned by the Olynthians: these had asked them support to preserve their autonomy, menaced by the signs of the birth of a new confederation. A curious detour characterised the march of the Spartan army to the citadel of Thebes: scholars have observed how Phoibidas’ march curiously followed a path which was not direct to the North.21 Was it really a coincidence or the fault of the Theban betrayers, that Phoibidas was so close to Thebes when Leontiadas and other men called on him to occupy the city and prosecute Ismenias? A combined study of the sources and the likely responsibility of no less than the Spartan king Agesilaos suggest that the plan to occupy Thebes had been in Phoibidas’ mind from the very beginning of the expedition: at this stage, it cannot be ascertained whether there was a real plan to actually revive a federal union in Boeotia.22 Thebes was soon occupied and Ismenias, the main representative of the group which contrasted Leontiadas, was put to trial and condemned under the charges of having medised and having constantly sought war for Thebes.23 The black picture of Leontiadas which resulted from these events, especially in the version provided by Plutarch in his On the daimonion of Socrates, is something we should possibly reconsider, under closer scrutiny of Leontiadas’ family and previous career.

Leontiadas’ family occupies prestigious positions throughout Boeotian and Theban history, from the beginning of the Fifth Century BC: already in 480 BC, in fact, we learn that a Leontiadas (I) was in charge as a commander.24 A son of this Leontiadas, Eurymachos, is mentioned by Thucydides in the episode of the siege of Plataia at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War: the Plataian betrayor Naukleides was in cahoots with the Theban Eurymachos, son of Leontiadas (-es)25 and ἄνδρος Ἡθαίων δυνατωτάτου (Thuc. II 2.3). The que la plupart de ces magistrats – et pas seulement les plus célèbres d’entre eux – jouèrent un rôle dans l’histoire du temps”.


20 Xen. Hell. 5.2.29.

21 On these events, see Hack 1978 and Buckler 1980: 15-6.

22 That the Spartans had been aware from the outset of the plan is explicitly said by Diodorus (XV 20.1-2). The view of an explicit Spartan responsibility is endorsed, among the others, by Hack 1978: 223-4; Buckler 2003: 203; Buckler 2008a. One should also recall, however, that our sources suggest an internal division, in Sparta, as to the policy to adopt with Thebes (see sources and commentary in Cawkwell 1976: 78-80).

23 On Ismenias, see Landucci Gattinoni 2000 and Lenfant 2011; on the trial and on its legal basis, cp. Tuci 2013.

24 Hdt. VII 233, on which see infra in text.

25 The personal noun presents numerous variations in our sources. The one mostly followed by secondary scholarship is Λεοντιδής, used by Xenophon in his Hellenika and by the author of the Hellenica of Oxyrhynchus (but cp. already Hdt. VII 233.1 on the grandfather Λεοντίδης). This form is the Attic-Ionic adaptation of the original Boeotian form ending with –δας (cp. e.g. Koiratadas and Aminadas). On the other hand, the manuscripts of Plutarch’s On the daimonion of Socrates always have Λεοντίδη (cp. Λιοντίδας on SEG XXXIII 368 from Chaeronea), whereas the Lives opt for the form in –δας (Pel. 5.2; 6.2-3; 11 and passim; Ages. 23.7;
frequency and the stress on the personal names in this part of the Histories is a strategy, according to Hornblower (2010), through which the author aims at correcting the previous cursory notes of Herodotus on the same matter. The specific case of Eurymachos betrays, moreover, an additional nuance, since it sheds an ambiguous light on what Gomme defined “a long and mischievous family”.

Two generations before the Leontiadas who invited the Spartans, and one before his father Eurymachos, (jointly) responsible for the occupation of Plataiai, their ancestor Leontiadas (I), himself son of a Eurymachos, led the Theban unit present at the Thermopylai (Hdt. 7.233, tr. R. Waterfield):

The Thebans […] fought for a while alongside the Greeks against the Persian forces because they had no choice in the matter. However, as soon as they saw that the Persians were gaining the upper hand, they seized the opportunity afforded by Leonidas and the rest of the Greeks charging off to the hill to part company with the others. Then they held out their hands in surrender and approached the Persians. […] However, things did not go perfectly for them; some of them were killed as they were approaching the Persian lines, and at Xerxes’ orders quite a large number of them, beginning with their commander Leontiadas, were branded with the king’s mark. This was the Leontiadas whose son Eurymachus, many years later, was murdered by the Plataeans after he and the four hundred Thebans under his command had captured their city.

This version was actually different from the local one, when one reads the local historian of the early Fourth Century BC Aristophanes of Boeotia (BNJ 379 F 6): Plutarch, his witness, claims that Aristophanes had recorded a different name for the commander of the Theban unit, Anaxandros. Thucydides, nonetheless, ignores or does not consider this alternative and follows Herodotus on the presence of Leontiadas on the spot: in fact, Aristophanes might have mentioned Anaxandros on another ground and agreed with Herodotus. Plutarch might have wanted to read in Aristophanes a convenient witness, despite the different original context of Aristophanes. It thus seems certain that

24.1). From the root λεοντ- we have 11 anthroponyms in Boeotia (Vottéro 1993: 347); the difference between the suffixes -άδας and –(ι)δας consists in the fact that–άδας is rarer and generally enters compound names of praise, in toponyms and in personal names derived from toponyms (Vottéro 2017: 613-4). It is then likely that the original Boeotian form was Leontiadas: in this case, the return of the personal noun, in itself not a rarity, might betray a specific will to stress the noble origins of the family.

26. Plut. de Hdt. mal. 33,866f-867a: “The barbarians killed some of the men who went towards them”, as he himself states, “but branded most of them, following Xerxes’ orders, with royal brands, starting with the commander Leontiades.” Now, at Thermopylai the commander was not Leontiades, but Anaxandros, as Aristophanes recorded, on the basis of the archontal memories. So did Nikander of Colophon, nor is any source, before Herodotus, aware of Thebans branded by Xerxes.

27. Anaxandros might be related to a namesake descendant active in Lesbos in the last phase of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. VIII 100.3: see Schachter 2012 ad BNJ 379 F 6). The existence of the boeotarchia at this stage, as argued in Tufano 2019, might explain these multiple versions on the name of the Theban commander.

28. This thesis is argued with more arguments and parallels in Tufano 2019: 256-259.
Leontiadas I, the grandfather of the Leontiadas of the Fourth Century BC, was at the Thermopylai and sponsored the betrayal of his unit on that occasion.

The son of Leontiadas I, as seen before, subsequently primed in the siege and in the attack of Plataiai of 431 BC; Leontiadas II was apparently just following this tradition of realist policies and perhaps one might agree with Gomme in underestimating the influence of Eurymachos in Thebes. He could have been “a man as powerful as any man in Thebes” (Gomme ad Thuc. II 2.3) and not the most influential; Thucydides, nevertheless, was anticipating the negative tradition on the family and, in his repraisal of Herodotus, wanted to stress the external negative perception of their actions.

A recurrent tendency of the family seems to have been the support of Sparta and of its foreign policy:99 with reference to Leontiadas I, it has been tentatively suggested that this man might have enjoyed an official xenia with the Spartan king Kleomenes.100 The behavior of Leontiadas at Thermopylai, when he surrendered to the Thebans, might be unrelated with the private connections of the family: on the spot, divergent and more urgent agencies had to be defended, such as the overall alignment of Thebes to the other Greeks. Albeit unsupported by our sources, the suggestion might not be totally unlikely; another Theban family, that of Ismenias, seems to have pursued a constant policy in the Fourth Century BC, because they sent their own members twice to the Persian court. This decision, in all likelihood approved by the rest of the city, must have also depended on a specific familiarity with the Persian court.101 On the opposite side, the family of Leontiadas II, antagonist of Ismenias, may have maintained their Spartan association on the same grounds of the previous century.

His group was actually accused of λακωνίζειν and, since the Theban parties found a parallel in the single Boeotian cities, the same accusation was levied on parallel groupings in other cities.102 Conversely, it is interesting that the men of Ismenias could not be accused, according to the historian of Oxyrhynchus, of a proper ἀττικίζειν (20 Chambers: we ignore, however, what would be a better label, according to the same author, for a lacuna in the papyrus).103 A series of events would actually indicate that these men could only rely on relatively recent grants of help.104

---

99 One wonders whether these ties explain the presence of a Spartan ambassador named Boiotios, who was at the court of Darius II in 407 BC (Xen. Hell. I 4.8): see, for this hypothesis, Schachter 2016a: 67-8.
100 Schachter 2004.
101 See a reconstruction of these links in Lenfant 2011.
103 See a list of the suggested integrations and a new suggestion in Beresford 2014.
104 When the men of Ismenias took refuge in Athens, in 382 BC, they benefited from the hospitality of private citizens who had been helped by the Thebans in the past. The Thebans had helped the Athenians who were fleeing from the Thirty Tyrants in 403 BC (see Lys. F.F 286-7 Carey; IG II 37; Plut. Lys. 27.3). The recollection of the Theban help on that occasion offered a constant counterweight to the memory of their medism during the Persian wars (cp. Steinbock 2012: 211-79). Dinarchus still recalls, ca. 323/22 BC (in Dem. 25), the fame of a specific hospitality decree voted in Thebes for the Athenians; the act breached the panhellenic prohibition, issued by Sparta, to host the Athenians. According to the same source, more than a decree was actually issued to secure the solidarity, including a fine against any Theban who would refuse to give hospitality to an Athenian. However exaggerated, the tradition confirms the loss of influence of the pro-Spartan groups, in Thebes, but also suggests that the institutions did not publicly invest in this act, leaving the private families to bear the weight of the decision. The impression is reinforced by what Justin claims...
These two groups had different foreign policies and it has been assumed, from Cloché (1918) onwards, that Leontiadas II had actually succeeded to control the Boeotian League for a long time, at least from the last decade of the Fifth Century BC until 395 BC. This year refers to the chronological setting of a passage of the Hellenika of Oxyrhynchos, which is the main proof of this long influence of the group:

At that time and for a little while before, the party of Ismenias and Androkleidas held power both among the Thebans themselves and in the council of the Boiotians; but earlier the party of Astias and Leontiades was superior, and for quite a long time held power over the city, too.\(^{35}\)

The period of transition between the two groups has been variously dated: a general consensus, however, exists on the years between 404 and 395 BC, with the Theban help to the Athenian democrats as a terminus post quem.\(^{36}\) The outbreak of the Corinthian war, seen as the official start of a war against Sparta, would thus be the final, official point of no return against a substantial pro-Spartan leaning of Thebes and the Boeotians during the Peloponnesian war. Such a reading might be confirmed by the growing detachment of the Boeotians from the military actions led by Sparta after 404 BC:\(^{37}\) Agesilaos was not allowed to sacrifice in Aulis, in 396 BC, before his departure for Asia Minor was just one of a series of acts of detachment whereby the Boeotians continued to look for “weitgehende Freiräume für die eigene Agenda”.\(^{38}\) However, one cannot completely rewrite a history of these years only through a personalistic reading of Theban politics: this method, followed in the present paper, actually also shows that politicians alone, without further political support, could not influence on their own the foreign policy of a federation. Moreover, we possess an important witness on the actual political dynamics of the Boeotian koinon of these years, which shows us from a close distance what were the actual spaces of manoeuvre of the politicians until 386 BC.

In 420 BC two Spartan ephors had approached the Boeotian ambassadors in Sparta and suggested Thebes break the Peace of Nikias by forming an alliance with Argos (Thuc. V 36). The ambassadors then returned to Thebes and reported the plan to the boeotarchs, who endorsed this perspective and presented the line of action to the four federal councils (38).

35 Hell. Oxy. 20.2 Chambers, tr. R.A. Billows: ἐδύναντο δὲ τότε μὲν καὶ ἕτει μικρῷ πρῶτερον οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἰσμηνίαν καὶ τὸν Ἀνδροκλείδαν [...] ἐμπροσθεν δὲ προείχον οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀστίαν καὶ Λεωντιάδη, χρόνον δὲ τῖνα συχνὸν καὶ τὴν πόλιν [...] εἶχον.

36 See a state of the art in Lérida Lafarga 2007: 613-5. The Hellenika of Oxyrhynchos actually claim that this support to the Athenian exile was the basis of the allegation against Ismenias and his men of being "pro-athenian" (20.1 Chambers: ξι [ἀθηναῖοι] ἐγένοντο ὡς ἔργον ἔπροθυμον πρὸς τὸν δήμον [...]) and Gehrke (1985: 174) suggested that the group of Leontiadas II had already risen to power in 447 BC.


The councils, nonetheless, did not ratify the alliance and stalled the plan, thus impeding the achievement of the will of the boeotarchs. The stop could be read as a temporary failure of the group of Leontiadas, generally successful in defending its Spartan agency;\(^{39}\) on the other hand, the almost constant absence of personal names for Boeotian and Theban characters in the books V and VI\(^{40}\) is interrupted for exception like Pagondas, who is recorded in the Fourth Book (92) for an important speech to his fellow Boeotians. This *argumentum e silentio* and chronological reasons hinder the possibility that Leontiadas was politically active in these years. And yet, even if he had been, the opposition to the will of the boeotarchs by the federal councils is a telling example of the limits of an equation of the political agenda of a family and that of a political institution.

The system accepted, in other words, a resistance to the leading elites of the Theban βέλτιστοι καὶ γνώριμοι (H. Oxy. 21.1 Chambers): this ability of counteracting the military and civil powers of the boeotarchs will probably have been stronger under a constitution, such as that of these years, where the presence of elements from other cities counterbalanced any Theban over-imposition. With reference to the *stasis* which was consuming Thebes in 395 BC, one cannot theoretically exclude that the family of Leontiadas had already lost its influence in 404/3 BC, only because the Thebans had passed some measures in favour of the Athenians: assumed that Leontiadas opposed to this, the Boeotian constitution consented the approval of measures contrary to the will of the leading boeotarchs.

We reach the same conclusion also by concentrating on the facts and the prelude of the definite fall of Ismenias in 382 BC. Both Leontiadas and Ismenias were polemarchs in that year, when the Spartan Phoibidas arrived.\(^{41}\) With the Peace of Antalkidas and the disappearance of the task of the boeotarchs, the loss of the federal institutions had conveyed a new meaning to the polemarchs of Thebes: even if we ignore the exact procedures of elections for the years 386-2 BC,\(^{42}\) finding two opposite characters as Ismenias and Leontiadas in the same place suggests a system which allows for an institutional opposition.

Leontiadas had therefore to go behind Ismenias’ back in order to elicit the intervention of Phoibidas: he planned a secret encounter (Xen. *Hell.* V 2.25) and had to wait for a moment of weakness – a real betrayal – to let the Spartans in (29). This line of action was politics through other means: where the common debate between groups had failed, Leontiadas was resorting to the extreme measure of a coup. A shadowy line had been followed already by Ismenias in 395 BC to facilitate the outbreak of a war between the Lokrians and the Phokians;\(^{43}\) the bribery motif and the use of indirect strategies to start the war are another

---


41 Xen. *Hell.* V 2.25. The author describes a city characterized by an internal strife, a *stasis* (στασίς ἀναχώρητης τῶν ἰκτησιάων), but this needs be no more than the generical context ot the political climate. It is hard to accept that there was “a deep factional fissure” (Buxton 2017: 23 n.6). Since the polemarchs were elected (see subsequent n.), both Leontiadas and Ismenias had been in rule from 1. Boukatios (December/January).

42 There were three polemarchs, in Thebes, from the beginning of the history of this board (see Roesch 1965: 162-78). We learn that they were elected from Xen. *Hell.* V 2.32 and they could also be reelected. In these years, internal politics in Thebes did not sensibly change because of the Peace of Antalkidas (Hack 1978: 218-9).

43 On the different versions of this episode, see Valente 2014 and Occhipinti 2016, with the respective reviews of Tuplin 2015 and Tufano 2017.
indication of a necessary acceleration in the implementation of foreign policy, which was being forestalled and impeded by the other men in charge. Theban internal politics of these years thus appears as a scenario where groups of different agendas could also coexist in the same board; another interesting fact is that Ismenias, one of the strongest sponsors of the Corinthian war which had led to the fall of the Boeotian koinon, was still there, elected as a polemarchos – apparently, what one would describe in modern terms as a political failure (the loss of a war), had not impeded the man in proceeding to a successful career.

After the fake trial of Ismenias and the rise to power of the λακωνιζόντες, Leontiadas became, with Archias, one of the symbols of the new local government, described by the literary sources as a choral tyranny. 44 Formally, however, the offices of the city did not change; moreover, while many men who had opposed Leontiadas fled to Athens, 45 other allies of Ismenias remained in town, like Galaxidoros. 46 The murder of Leontiadas, in 379 BC, was part of a more general attack on the men responsible for the sudden acceleration imposed on Theban politics; as such, it was not a personal vendetta, but a necessary action of the opposing members of the elite. Under those conditions, military action was the only feasible instrument to express the refusal of that military oligarchy. 47 Ismenias had endorsed, as opposed to the international aspirations of Leontiadas, what one might see as a conservative program; 48 the ideas of his group were still not shared by the entire population, however. The family of Leontiadas would still appear in the higher echelon of the society, as another proof of the substantial continuity of the composition of the Theban elites.

44 Cp. Plut. Pel. 5.2.6.2 and Nep. Pel. 1.4; other sources are mentioned by Gehlke 1985: 177 and n.79. It seems that already Xenophon aims at a number of analogies between the Theban pro-Spartan government and the Thirty Tyrants of Athens. This similarity prompts the idea of the establishment of a tyranny in Thebes; see an analysis in Buxton 2017: 25-9.

45 See infra on Androkleidas.

46 On Galaxidoros, see Xen. Hell. III 5.1 with Koumanoudis 1979, n.379; Buckler 1980: 38-9; Cook 1988: 60 n.12; Buck 1994: 12 and 77; Wälchli 2003: 93-106; Schachter 2016a: 261-2, 266 and n.59; Schachter 2016b: 180-1 n.61. Galaxidoros is also mentioned in the On the Daimonion of Socrates (Plut. Gen. Socr. 577A, 579E, 580F, 581E, 588B-C; 594B); the dialogue is stylistically indebted to the Platonic dialogues and is not often used as a historical source, despite the generally reliable picture it provides of the liberation of Thebes in 382 BC. Moreover, it only presents one anachronism, at 583F, and we have reasons to believe that, for this dialogue and for the corresponding sections of the Life of Pelopidas, Plutarch drew on historical sources well-versed in Boeotian history, such as Callisthenes of Olynthus, if not Aristophanes of Boeotia himself; see on this Riley 1977, on the importance of being historically accurate in this essay, and Cawkwell 2010: 101-2). Galaxidoros was one of the leading figures of the group of Ismenias. According to Xenophon (loc.cit.), he was bribed by the Persians in 396 BC. Plutarch does not confirm Xenophon on this allegation, and presents Galaxidoros in another context: in the On the Daimonion of Socrates, Kaphsias, the main narrator and brother of Epameinondas, meets Galaxidoros in December 379 BC. Kaphsias is one of the conjurors who are planning to kill Leontiadas and the other λακωνιζόντες. In the following dialogue, Galaxidoros offers his view on the daimonion of Socrates: this would not be a divine entity, because Socrates was not affected by δεισιδαμονία, “superstition” (on the position of Galaxidoros and on his contradictions, cp. Babut 1988; Donini 2003: 247-9; Wälchli 2003: 93-106). Later on, Galaxidoros does not distinguish himself in the action; perhaps, in general he had been authorized to remain in Thebes on the same grounds of Epaminondas. Plutarch claims that Epameinondas had been authorized to stay in Thebes because he was judged διὰ μὲν φιλοσοφίαν ὡς ἀδύνατον, διὰ δὲ πενίαν ὡς ἀδύνατον (Pl. 5.4).

47 An isolated tradition actually claims that Leontiadas was the last man to be killed during the attack on the government (Σ Aristid. Panath. 111.16 Dindorf).

This continuity is shown by the career of the son of Leontiadas, Promenes (possibly, in Boeotian, Promeneis). This man and his sons, Hippolaos and Leontiadas (III), received the renewal of the proxeny by the Delphians in 324/3 BC (FD III 1.356 l.2: Δελφοὶ ἀπέδωσαν προξενίαν).\(^{49}\) The necessity to renew the proxeny might depend either on the previous removal or on the need to mention this status once again; this means that the proxeny had been lost as a right or that the document testifying it was now unavailable. The moment of the destruction could coincide with an episode of the Third Sacred War, when perhaps the Phokians destroyed the decree;\(^{50}\) another possibility entails the destruction of Thebes of 335 BC, always assuming that the document had been destroyed.\(^{51}\) What one can claim with certainty is the political weight of the Delphian act and the influence of the family.

This strong connection between the family and Delphi and the rarity of the name Promene(i)s\(^{52}\) allows us to include in our dossier a further document on the later history of the family of Leontiadas. It is an epigram by an otherwise undated poet, Perses of Thebes; the text mentions the dedication of three antlers by Gyges, Dailochos and Promenes, sons of Leontiadas:

These three heads of Maenalian stags
with vast antlers hang in your portico, Apollo.
They were shot horseback by the hands of Gyges,
Dailochos and Promenes, the children of valiant Leontiades.\(^{53}\)

This text is actually our only possible source to date Perses; even if the association of this Apollo with Delphi is not explicit, other dedicatory epigrams from the same context seem to support the collocation.\(^{54}\) The three hunters had caught the antlers in Arcadia and the horseback hunting ([ε ξ ἵππων, v.3]) confirms their wealth. Despite Gow and Page’s warning that no clear indication would contrast a date in the Third Century BC, the personal names would still invite the consideration of a collocation in the late Fourth Century BC. Since the son of Leontiadas II, Promeneis, had had two children (Hippolaos and Leontiadas III), the father of the epigram might be Leontiadas III. Alternatively, the Promeneis of the epigram might be the same Promeneis of the inscription, i.e. the son of

---

\(^{49}\) For the possibility that these men were descendants of Leontiadas II, see already Syll.\(^{1}\) 300.

\(^{50}\) So Syll.\(^{1}\) 300; Schachter 2016a: 78 and n.41.

\(^{51}\) After 335 BC: Gullath 1982: 120-1. The use of renovating the proxeny is not rare: it aimed at reinforcing it and at consolidating the networks through these personal ties (Mack 2015: 148-89).

\(^{52}\) The aforementioned inscription and the following epigram are the only two attestations of a Theban Promenes. The name is otherwise attested, as documented by the LGPN (vols. I; II; III B; V A), in Thasos, in Athens, in Kephale, in Kolonos, in Kytheros, in Ephesus and in Apollonis. In total, there are 15 men with this name, but only the two attestations in Thebes connect a Promenes with a Leontiadas.

\(^{53}\) AP VI 112, tr. W.R. Paton.

\(^{54}\) Cp. Ael. NA X 40 and XI 40; Gow – Page 1965 II: 447. Pontow (in Syll.\(^{1}\) 300) suggested that Dailochos and Promeneis had spent a period of exile in Arcadia and reached Delphi after the refoundation of Thebes in 316 BC. The reference to Arcadia might be understood, however, in a different way. Our small dossier of texts on the dedication of antlers (Ael. NA X 40; XI 40; Suid. ss. v. ἄφατοι and Μαιναλίων) actually links this habit with Arcadia. For instance, Aelian recalls the hardship of these horns, capable of bearing the hardship of the waters of the Arcadian river Styx; the Suidas mentions another river, always in Arcadia. The Arcadian context seems thus to be more associated with the original votive than with the specific circumstances of this dedication.
Leontiadas II.\textsuperscript{55} This alternative would, however, raise suspicions about the proxeny decree, which states that only one of the sons of Leontiadas II had been granted the proxeny by Delphi (FD III 1.356, ll.3-4: τὸν πρὶν δεδομέναν Προμένει Λεοντιάδα): why would only one son receive the proxeny again, with his children, and Gyges and Dailochos not? It remains safer to assume and accept that the epigram represents, for us, the last document of a dossier on the good relationships between the family of Leontiadas and Delphi in the last quarter of the Fourth Century BC.

The family of Leontiadas appears in many crucial moments of Boeotian history, from the Thermopylai to the Thebes rebuilt in 316/5 BC. This frequency does not mean that they were more important than other groups in Thebes, but shows the continuity of the composition of the Theban elites from a close angle. The interplay of opposition and participation in Theban politics allowed for the substantial survival of these groups, regardless of constitutional changes: internal opposition, in other words, resulted in conflicts which did not stop the careers of these families forever. While this had been suggested for Ismenias, the family of Leontiadas seems to confirm this trend from a new angle. This seems to be the lesson for the next character under scrutiny, Androkleidas, as well.

\textbf{Androkleidas and the Athenian side of Theban politics.}\textsuperscript{56}

Androkleidas is one of the main characters of the conservative line of Theban politics, in the first quarter of the Fourth Century BC. In the \textit{Hellenika of Oxyrhynchos},\textsuperscript{57} he is singled out as one of the main leaders of the group of Ismenias. In particular, two events elicit the attention of our sources: on the one side, the accusation of bribery by Timokrates of Rhodes, at the beginning of the Boeotian war;\textsuperscript{58} on the other side, his murder in Athens.

We have three sources on the names of the bribed Thebans: Xenophon (Hell. III 5.1),\textsuperscript{59} Plutarch (Lys. 27.1),\textsuperscript{60} and Pausanias (III 9.8).\textsuperscript{61} These sources place the bribery episode before the event which immediately preceded the war, a fight between the Lokrians and the Phokians (cp. supra on this fight); this context had been unclear to the same contemporary sources of the Fourth Century.\textsuperscript{62} This fact, and the very nature of the act

\textsuperscript{55} Homolle 1898: 613-4. This hypothesis would imply that only one of the sons of Leontiadas II had been granted the proxeny by Delphi (FD III 1.356, ll.3-4: τὸν πρὶν δεδομέναν Προμένει Λεοντιάδα), possibly because his brothers Gyges and Dailochos had died. Moreover, if one were to date Perses to the Third Century BC by rejecting every link with the inscription, Gyges, Dailochos and Promeneis would become characters not even related to Leontiadas II.


\textsuperscript{57} Hell.Oxy. 20.1-2.21 Chambers.

\textsuperscript{58} The definition of “Boeotian war” refers to the first two years of the Corinthian war (395-4 BC) and is only applied, among the ancient sources, by Diodorus (XIV 81.3; XV 28.5) and Plutarch (Lys. 27.1).

\textsuperscript{59} ἕκεινος δ’ ἐλθὼν δίδωσιν ἐν Θῆβαις μὲν ἄνδροκλείδα τε καὶ Ἰσμηνία καὶ Γαλαξιδώνῳ.

\textsuperscript{60} τῶν περὶ ἄνδροκλείδην καὶ ἄμφιθεον χρήμασι βασιλικοῖς διαφθαρέντων.

\textsuperscript{61} οἱ δὲ τῶν χρημάτων μεταλαβόντες [...] εἶναι λέγονται [...] ἐν Θῆβαις δὲ ἄνδροκλείδης καὶ Ἰσμηνίας καὶ ἄμφιθεμις.

\textsuperscript{62} See the cautious remarks by Tuplin 2015, useful also on the vexed issue of the relationship between Xenophon and the historian of Oxyrhynchos.
which elicits suggestions and suspicions, should make us extremely wary of the relationship among these authors. In other words, similarities or differences may not necessarily imply a reciprocal reading.

The *Hellenika of Oxyrhynchos* mention two comrades of Ismenias, Ἀντίθεος and Ἀνδρόκλειδας (20.1 Chambers). This singular combination of the three names,\(^6^3\) even if the context does not refer to the bribery, may be the starting point of the following tradition on a triptych of corrupted men by the Persians. Xenophon, in fact, names Ismenias, Androkleidas, and Galaxidoros; Pausanias has Ismenias, Androkleidas, and Ἀμφίθεμις (III 9.8), possibly derived from the Ἀντίθεος of P.\(^6^4\) Plutarch, finally, only mentions Ἀνδρόκλειδης,\(^6^5\) and Ἀμφίθεος. From these variations, we reach two conclusions: 1) there was a confusion on the third figure, variously identified as Galaxidoros, Amphithemis, Amphittheos, or Anti-theos; 2) Androkleidas is a constant presence.

Plutarch knew generally well the role of Ismenias in these years, but significantly omits his name on this occasion. It might not be coincidental that this chapter of the *Life of Lysander* is probably marked by the use of anti-Theban sources, since Plutarch is deliberately quoting the version of those who blamed the Thebans for the start of the

\(^6^3\) On the idea that these three formed a group, see Bruce 1967: 111-2; McKeechnie – Kern 1988: 161-2; Lérida Lafarga 2007: 611-2; Bearzot 2009: 251; Mackil 2013: 45; Schachter 2016a: 74-6; Schachter 2016b: 180-1 n.61. More often, the author limits his perspective on the duo made up of Ismenias and Androkleidas. This group is always quoted (21.1 and 3-4), with the periphrasis οἱ περὶ + genitive case.

\(^6^4\) The ancient sources recall the name of an Ἀντίθεος (H.Oxy. 20.1 Chambers), who is sometimes identified with the Ἀμφίθεος known to Plutarch (Lys. 27.1; De gen. 577E, 586F, 594D, and 598A-B). Only Pausanias knows an Ἀμφίθεμις (III 9.8: Ἀμφίθεμις). Modern scholarship has variously addressed the relationship between these similar names (see e.g. Cloché 1918: 317 n.1; Koumanoudis 1964-6: 62-3 [= 1999: 73]; Bruce 1960: 76 and n.2; Bruce 1967: 110-1; Koumanoudis 1979: n.109 [Ἀμφίθεμις]; Buckler 1980: 38; McKeechnie – Kern 1988: 162; Valente 2014: 118-9; Schachter 2016b: 74 n.22 and 76). Anti-theos is mentioned in the *Hellenika of Oxyrhynchos* among the supporters of Ismenias (H.Oxy. 20.1: ἠγοῦντο δὲ τοῦ μέρους τοῦ μὲν ἱσμηνίας καὶ Ἀντίθεος καὶ Ἀνδρόκλειδας). On the other hand, Plutarch mentions Amphithemis as a man who was freed during the liberation of the Cadmea. In the reconstruction of the *On the daimonion of Socrates*, Amphithemis had been condemned to death, and his execution was only delayed by an interrogatory (586F). Even on this occasion, then, the man, in light of his friendship with the conjurors, might be included in their political faction: moreover, Plutarch mentions the same name, Amphittheos, as one of the men bribed by the Persians in his *Life of Lysander* (27.1). This passage might be the source of Pausanias, who mentions Ismenias and Amphithemis in the same context. The text of Pausanias raises suspicions on the name Amphitethos (cp. e.g. Valente 2014: 118-9), which is, however, unanimously transmitted. This means that it was likely there from the beginning, possibly used by another source. A possible explanation might consist in a confusion between Amphithemis, a quite rare personal name (six people on the *LGPN* [I; II A; III A; V A], apart from the Theban politician), and the relatively more common name Amphithemis: this was the name of a son of Apollo from a daughter of Minos (Agoitias, BNJ 762 F 2; A.R. IV 1490-9) and, as a personal name, there is almost the same number of people detectable through a research on the *LGPN* (7 in vols. I and V B). This relatively bigger frequency and the influence of Plutarch might explain the genesis of the mistaken form, that could be ancient. We would thus be left with an Antitheos (P) and an Amphitheos (Plut., Paus.), who are also mentioned on the legends of the magistrate coins. These display the same couple, in the two series A1-2 Hepworth (AN-TI) and B3 Hepworth (AM – ΦΙ). This other class of evidence allows to keep the difference between the two historical men and to defend the Ἀντίθεος of the *Hellenika*: we should positively prove that there was only one man, but our sources show a variety which cannot be easily dismissed. Antitheos probably lived before Amphitheos and joined Ismenias in the political fight of the Nineties. Amphitheos, as shown by the relative chronology of the magistrate coins, lived after Antitheos and remained in Thebes after 382 BC. He was one of those political prisoners who, unlike men like Galaxidoros (cp. n. 51), were not allowed to remain free in town (on these political prisoners, see Xen. *Hell.* V 4.14, with Gehrke 1985: 177 and Cawkwell 2010: 104-5).

\(^6^5\) See the relevant entry in *LGPN* III B, 1 and 2.
Corinthian war (27.1: Θηβαίοις ... ἐγκαλούντες). These sources concentrated on the aforementioned refusal to let Agesilaos sacrifice in Aulis and on the Persian gold; these motifs are already in Xenophon, notably careful to focus on the Spartan occupation of the Cadmea, an act with which he strongly disagreed. For these reasons, the absence of Ismenias in this context does raise suspicions on the historical fact that he had not been personally a recipient of the Persian gold.

It seems likely, on the other hand, that Androkleidas had had direct contacts with the Persian envoy sent to Greece, probably on the grounds of the prestige he enjoyed in his group. The fame of Ismenias could have shifted the attention of the sources from Androkleidas to Ismenias, but was not enough to erase these other responsible names. Incidentally, the alleged sum of money distributed by Timokrates (50 talents) was probably meant as a private bribe and not as help to build an army or a fleet. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that this sum could only go, in the single cities, to one or a couple of people, especially in a city like Thebes, where the political divide among the groups was arguably strong.  

---

66 Xen. Hell. V 4.1, tr. C.L. Brownson: “[O]ne could mention many other incidents, both among Greeks and barbarians, to prove that the gods do not fail to take heed of the wicked or of those who do unrighteous things [...]. The Lacedaemonians, namely, who had sworn that they would leave the states independent, after seizing possession of the Acropolis of Thebes were punished by the very men, unaided, who had been thus wronged, although before that time they had not been conquered by any single one of the peoples that ever existed; while as for those among the Theban citizens who had led them into the Acropolis and had wanted the state to be in subjection to the Lacedaemonians [...], just seven of the exiles were enough to destroy the government of these men”. The passage in its entirety shows that Xenophon’s focus on the impiety of the Spartans was actually part of a more general view, where the Spartans did not differ from the other Greeks, in their (dis)respect of religious beliefs (cp. Christesen 2017: 391 n.31; see Buxton 2017 for a reading of the passage as an interpretive reflection on the stasis).

67 The debate on the real goals and the use of the Persian gold entails a reappraisal of the causes and the dynamics of the outbreak of the Corinthian War, which lays beyond the aim of the present contribution (and will possibly remain an open question, even if new relevant discoveries occurred: Tuplin 2015: cxvii). In fact, Xenophon (Hell. III 5.1-2) and P (H.Oxy. 10.2-5 Chambers) disagree both on the identity of the Persian satrap who sent Timokrates of Rhodes to the Greek cities (Xenophon: Tithraustes; P: Pharnabazos) and on the real influence of this mission (Xenophon claiming that the money was responsible for the outbreak of the war, whereas P sees it as arriving at a time of general discontent with Sparta; there are, however, attempts to reconcile the narrations, as e.g. Rung 2004). The Persian satrap is more easily identified with Pharnabazos (396 BC), because a dispatch under the rule of Tithraustes, who entered his office in the late summer of 395 BC, would contrast, in Xenophon, with the observation that the war in Greece had already started (Lewis 1977: 142 n.47; Cook 1990: 69 n.1; Schepens 2001: 1214-5; Schepens 2012: 215). P does not utterly deny the historicity of the arrival of the money, but simply considers it as one of the causes, and not as the main one (Schepens 2012: 226; it would thus be a “Thucydideanism”, according to Occhipinti 2016: 32-3; for a polygenetic reading of the causes of the war, see also Fornis 2007); this interpretation seems reasonable and makes sense of the contraposition with the other tradition alluded by P, which may coincide with the version of Xenophon or with an oral tradition (written sources: Meyer 1909: 49; Occhipinti 2016: 33; oral sources: Busolt 1908: 283-4; Schepens 2001: 1218; Schepens 2012: 237; Valente 2013: 56). Recently, the version of Xenophon has been understood as an echo, particularly favourable to the King Agesilaus, of propaganda aimed at interpreting the Corinthian War as a Persian reaction to the Spartan campaign in Asia Minor and to the battle of Sardis of summer 395 BC (so Schepens 2012 and Valente 2014): Xenophon would be thus forcing the evidence on the actual arrival of Persian money to Greece, to undermine the diffuse criticisms to Sparta and to laud the harsh impact of the Spartans in Asis Minor. Finally, two other difficulties need be mentioned here, in order to recall the impact of this historiographical and historical conundrum on our assessment of the career of Androkleidas. Firstly, the relationship between Xenophon and P is a very troublesome topic, since there is no consensus either on the reciprocal chronological relationship between these two authors, nor on the exact date, between the termini 386 and 346 BC, when the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia were written (on the date of H.Oxy., see the recent commentaries by Bleckmann 2006, Lérida Lafarga 2007 and Occhipinti 2016, with previous
The weight of the man is confirmed by the other episode on which our sources focus, namely his death: Androkleidas fled to Athens with a group of three hundred exiles in 382 BC and was assassinated there, some time after having reached the city.\(^6\) The Spartans – so Plutarch (\textit{Pel.} 6.3) – sent killers to eliminate Androkleidas in Athens. Even if the presence of these hired killers could have implied the death of other fugitives,\(^6\) the focus on Androkleidas may betray, even on this occasion, the peculiar political stance of the man, as a significant member of his political group. When he died, Androkleidas left his immaterial goods (\textit{οὐσία ἀφανής}) to another exile destined to play an important role in the Thebes of the Seventies, Pherenikos.

Our source on the episode is Lysias in his \textit{On behalf of Pherenikos} (\textit{FF} 286-7 Carey), possibly delivered in 380 BC (Blass). The immaterial goods must have been a sum of money, since it is unlikely that, in his short stay as a metic in Athens, Androkleidas could acquire real estate:\(^7\) on the other side, his Theban properties had likely been confiscated and out of reach, at this moment. The friendship between Androkleidas and Pherenikos also allows us to recall an interesting episode concerning Pherenikos: the man was well-received in Athens, because his father Kephisodotos had been one of the kind Thebans who had hosted the Athenians in 404 BC (F 286 Carey).

The trial of Pherenikos and the tragic end of Androkleidas shed light on those private connections which had built the Athenian backbone of the group of Ismenias, as opposed to the Spartan long-lived liaison of Leontiadas and his party. Pherenikos will inherit more than immaterial goods, from Androkleidas: he was the leader of the exiles in 379 BC (Plut. \textit{Pel.} 8.1; the same author, or his source, isolates Pherenikos, with Pelopidas and Androkleidas, among the men who had fled from Thebes in 382 BC: 5.3).

\(^6\) On the measures issued in Athens in 382 BC, see \textit{IG II²} 37 (\textit{SEG} XXXII 47), with the commentary by Gehrke 1985: 176 and nn.75-6.

\(^6\) Plut. \textit{Pel.} 6.3: καὶ πέμψαντες ἀνθρώπους ἀγνώτας, ἀνδροκλέαν μὲν ἀποκτιννύουσι δόλῳ, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων διωμαρτάνουσιν.

\(^7\) On the immaterial goods and on the so-called “invisible economy”, see Cohen 1992: 191-4.
Krattidas, a man with no history.

In one of his articles on the Theban magistrates’ coins, Hepworth (1998) discussed two series of coins dated to the last subgroup in his chronological subdivision (D 3, with a helmet as its unique variety); this relative date was not recently challenged by Schachter (2016b) in his revision of the relative chronology. These coins belong to a group where the legend does not show signs of transition between the epichoric and the ionic script: on this ground, the series was globally dated by Hepworth to the period between 363/2 and 338 BC. The hoard which yielded the ΚΡ-ΑΤ coins is the Myron hoard, in Thessaly, which does not provide clearer indications for a better chronology. What we could fairly admit, until 2009, was that Krattidas could not be one of the three Krattidas from Thespiai who lived between the end of the Fourth Century and the beginning of the third, because the dates of these people are too late.

The situation changed after the publication of a new proxeny decree by E. Vlachogianni (2004-9 = SEG LVIII 447):

Θεός τύχα ἀγαθά;
[K]ραττίδας ἀρχόντος,
[ἐ]δοξε τοῖ δάμοι Πεδ-
[3-4]ον κή ἔμοκριτον
[– – –]Α[– – – –]νδώς
[προξένωσ] κή εὐεργέ-
[τας εἰμεν κή] αὐτώς
[κή γένους] κή ε[Ϊ]με[n]
[αὐτοῖς γάς κή] οἰκίας [ἐπ]-
[πασίν κή ἀτέ]λιαν [κή]
[– ca. 7-8 - – κή] ἁσου[λί]-
[αν - – – – – –.]ΛΣ[– – – –]71

God. Good Fortune. In the archonship of Krattidas. Resolved by the People. Ped—os and Hermokritos, from [?], shall be proxenoi and benefactors, both they and their descendance. They shall have right to own land and houses and immunity and ... asylia.

As shown by the editor,72 the decree is in line with the other proxeny decrees issued in the Sixties of the Fourth Century BC: it starts with an invocation to the Tyche, the indication of the eponymous archon and the specification of the rights resulting from the proxeny. In the final part of the text, not preserved, there must have been the list of the board of the boeotarchs in charge when the decree was issued.

The absence of this final section raises serious problems on the date of the text. The typological similarity with the other proxeny decrees must therefore be combined with the other scarce elements on the proxenoi, in order to know more on the chronological context.

71 ἔπασις is the Boeotian form for ἔγκτησις; BE 2010: no. 276.
The Liberation of Thebes (379 BC) as a Theban Revolution

when Krattidas was an eponymous archon. Vlachogianni and Knoepfler (BE 2010) agreed on the span 368-4 BC, on the basis of the final letters of the ethnic of these men, -νθιως; among the known ethnics, these letters force us to think either of Corinth or of Olynth. In the first case, the inscription should date at least to after 366 BC, because only in that year the Boeotians signed a peace treaty with the Corinthians, the Phliasians, and maybe with Epidauros. In the second case, we should assume a date after 368/7 BC, after the first expedition of Pelopidas in Thessaly: we still ignore how long the Chalcidian League belonged to the Second Athenian League, but we know for certain that 368 marked an important year in the relationships between Thebes and the Chalcidians.

The Thebans represented, for the Olynthians, a useful ally against Athens, which was trying to regain Amphipolis and had sent Iphicrates to study the situation; it may be that the Chalcidians sided with Pausanias, an exiled member of the Macedonian family, and supported his cause against the recently appointed Alexander II. Although this support is not explicit in our sources, we know for sure that the Thebans were thus indirectly engaging against Alexander II, by supporting the Thessalians: Pelopidas expelled Alexander II from Larissa and had Alexander’s brother Philip II sent to Thebes. The successor of Alexander II in 368, Ptolemy of Alorus, was forced to become an ally of Thebes. Given this general scenario, it is easy to imagine why the Thebans might want to reward two Olynthians. This alternative may be likelier than the Corinthian scenario also on another ground: the first name, Πεδ-, may either accommodate for Ped-[iarch]-os, or for a name beginning with Πεδδ- (Peddiaiēs, Peddieus), both options well attested in Thessaly.

Ermokritos is relatively more widespread (eight figures), but the geographical attestations can shed less light on his potential geographic origin.

This proxeny decree may therefore be close, in its spirit, to the aforementioned decree for a Byzantine (IG VII 2408), and illustrate a specific aspect of the foreign policy of Thebes in these years, namely, the attention for the North and the reward of men from important allies in that area.

---

73 Vlachogianni (2004-2009) also considers and excludes, with good arguments, the other possibilities Zakynthos and Akanthos. Fossey (2014: 22) suggests Ἀμαρνθίως, referring to an Eretrian site. However, I agree with Kalliontzis (2016: 251) that, Amarynthos being, at the time of decree, a deme and not an independent polis, the restoration seems unlikely.

74 Xen. Hell. VII 4.10 (= StV II 285). Despite the allegation of Diod. XV 76.3, this was not, probably, a κοινὴ εἰρήνη, since the Spartans, the Arcadians and the Athenians were excluded from this treaty: see Ryder 1965: 137-9 and Jehne 1994: 88-90.

75 See a recent overview in Zahrnt 2015.

76 On these relationships, see Hatzopoulos 1985 and Psoma 2011: 124-32.

77 Aesch. 2.27.

78 Diod. XVI 2.6.

79 Plut. Pel. 27.2-9.


81 See relevant entries on LGPN I (Rhodes, Herieis, Styra); III A (Syracuse); V A (Pergamon, Kalchedon); V B (Hippoukome, Olympos).

82 One wonders whether another important proxeny decree of these years, that for the Macedonian Athenaios son of Demonikos (SEG XXIV 355), also serves this same purpose: the man is known as a member of a naval family (Arr. Ind. 18.3) and has therefore been associated with the naval campaign of Epameinondas (see Hornblower 2011: 255 and Mackil 2013: 421). However, this proxeny decree may also be part of a specific strategy to single out specific communities on purpose; For a broader picture of all the proxeny decrees of the Sixties known before the publication by Vlachogianni (2004-2009), see Mackil 2008: 161-2; a fuller list is provided by Fossey 2014: 43-4. Other cases, such as the proxeny decree for Nobas the Carthaginian (IG VII
When the decree was passed, Krattidas was the eponymous archon. We still ignore what the relationship was between this office, and the one responsible for the issue of the coins (assuming there was one). If we accept that the decree dates to a moment in the central years of the Sixties, it becomes more likely that the coins were later than the decree. If this were not the case, and the coins were actually (slightly) earlier than the decree, the fundamental association would not be lost: it is hard to believe that two namesakes could coexist at such a close chronological distance, even if we sensibly postponed the date of the coins. Given the rarity of the name, it would not be surprising if the Theodoros councillor in Delphi around 325 BC were the son of our same Theban Krattidas (CID II 32, l.23).

Krattidas was a notable man, destined to be, to us, no more than a powerful Theban, until further documentary evidence occurs (which is theoretically likely) or we discover more local texts (which is unfortunately theoretically less likely). In an age without Cicero and in the great deluge of fourth century historiography, Krattidas is a vivid, final reminder of how little we know on the Theban elites of the Theban hegemony.

Three biographies and the history of a city.

The previous profiles provide an insight into three significant members of the Theban elites. The historian of Oxyrhynchus and Aristotle already remarked the fact that Theban aristocracy rested, in the early Fourth Century BC, on estates; the political ideologies cross a common background, where events occur and are played by similar actors. The family of Leontiadas was not expelled for good from Theban politics after 382 BC, because we know that its members could still occupy relevant positions (proxeny) in the second half of the century. Androkleidas, an important member of the opposing group, was killed in Athens, but was personally tied to one of the leading figures of the new Thebes of the Seventies, Pherenikos. When this man, together with Pelopidas and other exiles, liberated the Cadmea, a new constitution could slowly develop. The newly formed board of the boeotarchs was in the hands of an elite whose composition must still be fully assessed: the present picture of Krattidas has aimed to be a first step in this direction, and to be a closer scrutiny on the variety of voices never the subject of an ancient biography of any sort, be it preserved, or lost.

A further consequence of the present investigation lies in the detection of the different strategies which the elites adopted to present themselves, and to defend their line of action against the internal opposition. Apart from Krattidas, on whom we must suspend our

---

2407), may serve different, specific purposes and seem more directly linked with the shipbuilding campaign (Fossey 1994; Mackil 2013: 425).


The federal assembly was still able to control and double check the power of the boeotarchs, as exemplified by a trial which took place in early 369 BC. Epameinondas and Pelopidas came back from a military campaign in the Peloponnes and were charged for extending their office of boeotarch beyond the legal term of one year (ancient sources: Cic. Inv. I 55-6; Nep. Ep. 7.3-8.5; Plut. Pel. 24.1-25.2; Mor. 194A-B; 540D-E; 817E-F; Paus. IX 14.5-7; App. Syr. 212-8; Ael. VH XIII 42; modern treatments: Beister 1970: 75-108; Buckler 1980: 135-42). It can be actually shown that this process was one of the means which the political opposition had in Thebes to control boeotarchs who, as generals, were seen to overtly control the line of action of foreign policy (see Tufano i.p. with previous scholarship).
The Liberation of Thebes (379 BC) as a Theban Revolution

judgement, the careers of these men reveal the ways in which internal rivalries could be displayed. The successes of Leontiadas and the tragic end of Androkleidas show that Epameinondas’ definition of his country as “the dancing-floor of Ares” also had an internal outlook: whenever the Boeotians were not directing their forces and military training outwards, there was a strong potential for an outbreak of internal stasis still into the glory years of Thebes.

Bibliography


Salvatore Tufano


2020: "Un errore antico: nota testuale a Plut. Pel. 35, 2 e a Paus. 9, 13, 6", *RFIC* 120/1, i.p.


van Wijk, R. (i.p.) “From Foes to Friends? The Athenians and Boiotians after the Persian Wars.” In Marchand, F. (ed.) *Boiotia and the Outside World. Boiotian International relations from the Bronze Age to the Imperial Period.*