
The sixteen papers (prefaced with an introductory chapter) of this volume stem from a conference organized at the Royal Holloway University of London in June 2013, which brought together a group specialists in their diverse respective fields, with the aim of exploring the manifold nature of the subject stated in the book's title. The introduction by Ed Sanders, apart from the customary overview of the papers, gives a glimpse into the importance of emotions (pathos) in the art of persuasion, both in the theoretical reflection (rhetorical treatises) and in the practice (oratory, comedy) of the ancient Greeks and Romans. Contrary to what one might expect, however, only five of the presented essays deal with oratory and its immediate vicinity (Carey, Griffith-Williams, Sanders, Westwood, Fragoulaki), while others venture into less obvious domains such as epigraphy (Chaniotis), technical treatises (Winter), non-literary papyri (Dickey), and even magic (Salvo). In fact, forensic rhetoric, probably the first place where one looks for emotive persuasion, is here represented by one contribution only (Griffith-Williams). The essays are followed by a brief general index.

Chris Carey discusses the consistently unflattering image of the establishment painted in Athenian political (mainly deliberative) rhetoric—usually by members of said establishment, who devote considerable effort to alienate both their audiences and themselves from it. Corruption, kleptocracy, oligarchy—the barrage of accusations levelled against the Athenian political leaders en bloc will sound alarmingly familiar to the modern reader. C. examines these motifs using a framework of conceptual antitheses relevant to the Athenian public discourse, such as insider vs outsider (i.e. me vs “them”), mass vs elite (underscoring the establishment’s arrogance, ostentation, conspicuous consumption), and past vs present (the true statesmen of the good old days as opposed to the corrupt politicians of present day).

Brenda Griffith-Williams revisits the rhetoric of inheritance disputes in Isaeus. In a detailed study of two cases (Isae. 7 and 9) she plausibly argues that rational and emotional persuasion are closely bound with each other and the line dividing them is not always clear. For instance a moving story of an orphaned father who turns to his sister for permission to adopt her son (Isae. 7.14) at the same time operates as a calculated argument to forestall the charges of acting under the influence of a woman (the sister) which could have been advanced by the adversary. Both speeches make use of such emotive appeals as a basis or support for logical argumentation (e.g. 9.36–7), and while they remain markedly different in tone (Isae. 7 appears more ordered and structured, while Isae. 9—impassioned and somewhat irregular), pathos as means of persuasion is nevertheless strongly present in both.

Ed Sanders in his essay goes back to deliberative rhetoric: he makes the case for a distinct set of emotions operating in this genre, as opposed to e.g. forensic oratory.
The *Rhetoric to Alexander* draws up a list of six emotions applicable in the latter—S. calls the “forensic emotions”—pity, gratitude and goodwill (on the positive side), and anger, hatred and envy (on the negative). Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* on the other hand supplies the useful distinction between forensic and deliberative genres as pertaining to the past and to the future respectively. On this basis, S. himself comes up with a list of five hypothetical, future-oriented “deliberative emotions” which include: fear, confidence, hope, shame and pride. He next puts this list to a test against the corpus of Demosthenic deliberative speeches (mainly the *Olynthiacks*) and those found in Thucydides.

Demosthenes’ *Letters* (without V and VI) are mined for persuasive emotions by Guy Westwood (who follows the majority of recent studies in accepting them as genuine). The central appeal in these works, as W. rightly observes, is not so much to pity, but to nostalgia. Demosthenes aims at this experience by creating an idealized picture of Athens’ glorious past with himself at the center. While evoking “the good old days” is a common feature in Athenian oratory, tapping into nostalgia in the *Letters* allows Demosthenes to “capitalize emotionally” (78) on his absence from Athens: the temporal “distance between the addressees and the events” (81) of the idealized past becomes analogous to the spatial and social distance of Demosthenes’ exile. The detailed discussion in the two case studies (*Letter II* and *III*), meant to corroborate this otherwise stimulating thesis, is unfortunately not easy to follow and would certainly benefit from further revision.

Angelos Chaniotis turns to inscriptions where he seeks evidence for the mustering of communal emotions. The emotions in question range from hope and gratitude to grief and fear, and they are seen to operate on two distinct axes: the diachronic and the synchronic. The latter is seen in decrees and acclamations, which seek to produce an emotional community focused on a particular contemporary event (e.g. in the expression of gratitude for a benefactor or collective mourning for his/her death). Epigraphic “manifestations of divine power” (103), on the other hand, as well as funerary inscriptions are oriented towards the future, to subsequent generations of addressees, whose emotional engagement they seek to enlist. In both cases the emotional community thus created aims at persuasion, but the communication takes place between unequal partners (citizens—élite, worshippers—gods, mourners—deceased).

Maria Fragoulaki takes up the question of kinship as means of persuasion in Thucydides’ Plataian debate (3.52–68) and Melian dialogue (5.85–113). In both cases negotiating problematic allegiances becomes an issue of life and death for the two peoples faced with extinction. The Plataians, debating the Spartans and the Boiotians, seek an uneasy balance between their blood relationship with the latter, and political sentiment towards Athens. In the Melian dialogue, the eponymous islanders, this time arguing with the Athenians, make their defence on the basis of kinship with Sparta. Despite these similarities, the two cases are markedly different when it comes to the deployment of emotional appeals. While the Plataians are seen to play the powerful
cards of gratitude and pity, the Melians—contrary to expectations—discuss their situation “academically” and “with emotional detachment” (126). F. explains this dissonance chiefly by the fact that—unlike in the Plataian debate—here the interlocutors are not linked by kinship ties, which are more likely to produce “fierce emotions and passionate rhetoric” (129).

Hatred and fear were the emotions inculcated by Sulla’s regime in the cultural memory of the Romans. Alexandra Eckert attempts to flesh out these emotions by reference to K.R. Scherer’s psychological “process model of emotion” and J.C. Alexander’s concept of “cultural trauma”. While E. skillfully demonstrates that such feelings continually resurfaced in many testimonies (spanning different genres and periods, such as Cic. Verr. 2.3; Leg. agr. 2–3; Off. 2.27; Val.Max. 9.2; Sen. De ira; Clem.), and contributed to annulling much of Sulla’s legislative legacy (E. labels this latter process as “working through”), her attempts to pin these phenomena on the theoretical framework she develops may seem somewhat less successful, as they hardly shed new light on the topical fear and hatred of tyranny, to which Sulla’s regime was frequently assimilated.

Taking a well-known fragment from the Laws (657d1–6) as a starting point, Lucy Jackson sets out to examine the persuasive capacity of choral performance, both within the context of Plato’s idealized polity, as well as in the historical city-states of classical Greece. Persuasion in choreia is achieved through emotional responses evoked by the performance itself. They affect both the spectator and performer himself; the latter is cast “into a particularly emotional and malleable state of mind, ready for persuading towards civic virtue” (155), while the former is drawn into a similar state by means of “kinaesthetic empathy,” that is “a powerful emotive connection to a performer based on his previous [motoric] experience of what is being performed” (148). In the end J. argues (drawing from the work of Kowalzig) that Plato’s model presents us with the basis for understanding choral performance as yet another venue of mass persuasion in historical poleis, alternative to the “domain of logos”, i.e. oratory.

Xenophon’s technical treatises aren’t exactly the first place one would think of, when it comes to emotions or persuasion. Jennifer Winter, however, shows that the Cavalry Commander does indeed offer room for the deployment of such phenomena in the instructions and suggestions on how to influence the “actions and morale” of soldiers. The emotions in question are fear, confidence, desire, enmity, and somewhat less predictably, calmness (or mildness) and friendly feelings. Their persuasive potential is fleshed out by reference to the relevant passages of the Anabasis, where they are seen in action, i.e. in the description of actual, historical dealings of an army commander with his soldiers. I am less persuaded by W.’s insistence that in making these arguments Xenophon consciously refers to contemporary rhetorical theory, a hypothesis based on his use of the term “enthymeme” (twice; but only once in the rhetorical sense) and a limited overlap with the emotions analyzed in Aristotelian treatises.
Jayne Knight again discusses working of emotions in unequal power relations, this time however focusing on anger and taking us to Rome. Unlike the Greeks (to which the Athenian orators would have taken great exception), the Romans are said to have been more interested in the use of anger than its restraint: they recognized its “persuasive power (…) in the hands of a competent leader” (185). Curiously enough, the case studies discussed—Augustus’ anger in Ovid’s exile epistles, Seneca’s De ira and De clementia, and finally Augustus, Tiberius and Caligula in Suetonius—are much more about restraining anger than channeling it. Suetonius’ Tiberius and Caligula, both emotionally unstable, are seen to abuse and indulge in it, while its deployment by Augustus is praised precisely because of his moderation. Somewhat disappointingly, less attention is paid in this essay to the persuasive side of the use and abuse of anger, which is rather asserted than argued.

Tears on display, the subject of Judith Hagan’s contribution, are one of the best attested means of emotive persuasion in classical antiquity. Her paper once again takes us to Rome, focusing on Cicero’s rhetorical treatises (De orat. 2.42–53) on the one hand, and on Roman historiography on the other. The former is meant to sketch out the theoretical background, while the latter—to provide concrete instances of the persuasive potential of tears. The historical examples fall into two groups: one, where tears are seen to support verbal persuasion (Tac. Ann. 11.1–3; Cass. Dio 51.12.1–13.2; 70.1.2; Oros. 7.35.15), and the other, where they supplant it (Suet. Nero 43.1–2; Euseb. Vit. Const. 2.72.1; Theod. Hist eccl. 5.18.19). While they certainly corroborate Cicero’s meticulous disquisition on the range of emotions involved in such displays (chiefly pity) and their working—the account of which is to my mind the most rewarding part of this paper—the overall conclusion that tears and the concomitant emotions “had a decisive influence on historical events” (211) may seem to fall somewhat flat.

Matthew Johncock brings the framework of emotion and persuasion to Ovid’s Metamorphoses. Emotional appeals inform a considerable part of interactions between the mythical heroes and heroines in this epic. J. conveniently divides them into three distinct groups, based on the relative status of the parties involved: emotional appeals among equals (such as the judgment of arms in 11.1–398), addressed to superiors (such as Niobe’s imprecati ons in 6.299–300), and to inferiors (such as Jupiter’s address to the Olympian council in 1.182–243). The argument is supported by helpful (despite the unavoidable simplification) tables listing all instances of such events. Taken together emotional appeals in unequal power relations display in Ovid a marked tendency to explicitly or implicitly cast the underdog in more favorable light. Thus, the argument follows, the reader may be guided to “displeasure with power hierarchies” (228), and perhaps even encouraged to seek specific allusions to the rule of Augustus (especially if the Metamorphoses did follow closely on Ovid’s exile).

Requests constitute the most basic form of persuasion: they are usually framed in different sets of formulas, which vary in the degree of politeness. Eleanor Dickey offers an analysis of such formulas and their emotive potential in Hellenistic Greek,
where she looks for evidence of development beyond the more familiar patterns of Classical Attic dialect (which nonetheless serves as a foil to bring out the linguistic differences in later periods). Since Hellenistic literature was consciously “classicizing,” she limits her scope to non-literary papyri. The formulas of request found in them are markedly different from those of the classical sources. Unlike in the latter, the bare imperative in the papyri is less frequent and used only in relation to one’s inferiors. Towards superiors, on the other hand, one made ostensibly polite requests, employing either indirect phrases such as “you would do well if” (kalōs an poiēsais) or entreaties, conveyed with the verb “I beg” (deomai). The latter, which in the Classical period expressed a sense of emotional urgency, and therefore was limited to extreme situations, in Hellenistic Greek became a standard formula of politeness.

Irene Salvo looks for emotions and persuasion in the Greek erotic curses. First she attempts to debunk the traditional gender-based division of emotions of the spells, according to which men sought to arouse erōs (lust) in their targets, whereas women—philia (affection): not only are there too many exceptions to this model (chiefly status-related), but also the distinction itself between philia and erōs is hardly always as neat and clear. She next goes on to examine the “persuasive” strategies employed in the curses (as in PGM 4.1510–1547), which seem to have far less in common with persuasion and more with coercion. S. argues that the line dividing the latter two was rather thin and fuzzy (though Lysias in 1.32 would certainly disagree on that). In the last section S. focuses on the divinity whose help is enlisted in erotic curses: here the strategies of emotional persuasion employed to secure divine intervention, range from appeals to pity, flattery, slander (against the targeted person), and even threats (against the god).

Plautine comedy is a fruitful source for the study of pragmatics and discourse analysis, which provide the theoretical underpinning of Federica Iurescia’s discussion on (deliberately) provoked comic quarrels. The four cases described in detail (Bacch. 775–1066; Amph. 300–462; Mil. 272–595; Cas. 531–620), all having to do with the manipulation of anger and fear, are meant to show that these emotions “induce a state of puzzlement” in the addressed persons and thus turn “them into easier targets for persuasion” (292). The pragmatic framework is meant to flesh out the working of these emotions into conversation, as well as bring to light the significance of the differences in status and characterization between the interlocutors. The conclusions are more than plausible, but I’m not sure to what extent the discussion owes it to the complex theoretical apparatus deployed here.

Catullus’ poetry is the subject of the concluding essay of this volume. The hot-tempered Veronian is put on a shrink’s couch by Kate Hammond (a professional psychologist and a classicist as well), who discusses the details of emotional discourse in his poems, in particular its performative aspect. The affective and cognitive turmoil emerging from Catullan lyric is to some extent reflected in the frenetic discussion, which to a specialist will no doubt offer much food for thought, but for someone who doesn’t know his Catullus inside out may be somewhat difficult to follow. The
conclusion that in Catullus’ hands emotions become “social rather than internal experiences” (311–12) is attractive (despite the slippage in the syntax of the relevant sentence), but the reader, to my mind, ought to be guided to it through a more rigorous analysis.

The volume is nicely produced with only few misprints (e.g. 93: Ephaphroditos; 145 Kwapisz). Each chapter is followed by a dedicated bibliography, which makes for a comfortable reading, all the more that few will be inclined to go through this book from cover to cover, as works such as this inevitably attract only selective interest of specialists in the relevant fields. This interest will no doubt be well-rewarded, even if at times the reward itself—a bit hard to earn.

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