
Ruth Caston and Robert Kaster dedicate this edited volume to David Konstan, whose body of work on emotions in the ancient world has inspired this book. The contributors to this volume focus on positive emotions in the ancient world. This goes some way to redressing the balance in terms of attention paid to emotions in Greek and Roman literature, which tends to focus on their negative and destructive nature.

The volume consists of an introduction and three distinct parts (‘Hope’, ‘Joy and Happiness’, ‘Fellow Feeling and Kindness’), within which there are eleven chapters. Acknowledgements and a list of contributors precede the introduction, and a list of works cited, a general index, and an index of passages follow the final chapter.

The introduction sets out the principal aim of this volume, which is to begin to rectify the lack of focus on positive emotions in the classical world. The editors’ indebtedness to David Konstan is strongly emphasised. The introduction also contains an overview of each chapter within the volume.

Douglas Cairns opens the volume with his chapter: ‘Metaphors for Hope in Archaic and Classical Greek Poetry’. Cairns provides a thorough treatment of metaphors concerning *elpis* in Homer, Hesiod, the Greek tragedians, and other archaic and classical Greek poetry, including Pindar and Theognis. His premise is that metaphor is often used in Greek literature to express or represent emotional experience, and this chapter explores whether *elpis* has the same kind of metaphorical representation as other emotions. Cairns shows through a range of examples that *elpis* is potentially positive, but is more often represented as ambivalent. *Elpis* can be the antidote to despair in metaphorical usage, but it also carries the implications of its limitations. Cairns also provides examples where the imagery associated with *elpis* implies a negative representation. He then discusses the way in which *elpis* metaphors often imply the nourishing, nurturing and comforting aspects of the emotion in Greek literature, with several pertinent examples from tragedy, Pindar, Plato and Bacchylides, but he also points out that its illusory, transitory and ambivalent nature is present in some of these examples. He concludes that the emotion can be irrational: an affective state with a goal-directed, desiderative aspect, and that ‘what we call ‘hope’ is a distinct and prototypical sense of *elpis* in archaic and classical Greek’. This chapter is an impressive attempt to condense a wealth of evidence in order to produce a coherent picture of the metaphorical representation of *elpis* in archaic and classical literature. Cairns approaches the problem of identifying exactly how the Greeks perceived this emotion with his usual thorough and careful analytical skill, and succeeds in conveying that what we perceive as a positive emotion is not as straightforward in Greek thought.
Damien Nelis’ chapter is next: ‘Emotion in Vergil’s *Georgics*: Farming and the Politics of Hope’. Nelis highlights the presence of key emotions in Books 1 to 4 of the *Georgics*, emphasising the different tone of each book in turn. Book 1 contains contrast between the *laeta* of the Golden Age and the suffering and labour that teaches men skill and gives them knowledge. Book 2 paints a picture of idyllic rural life, later coloured by external threats of exile, storms and hard work. Book 3 represents the intensity of emotion, with didactic lessons regarding the danger of erotic passions for animals and humans alike. Throughout there are parallels drawn between agricultural and political concerns. Emotional parallels abound in Book 4, as Nelis explains. The emotions evoked in Book 4 recall episodes from the previous books in addition to reflecting different sections of the book itself. Nelis argues that emotions are part of the allegorical approach that evokes the political realities of the poet’s world in this text. He states that the evocation of political reality involves the use of pity, fear, envy and hope as there are references in Book 1 to the death of Caesar and to the fragility of hope for the new Caesar’s reign. Nelis asks whether the evidence gleaned from the other levels at which the text operates supports the sense of hope in Caesar in relation to the political situation. He states that this problem will occupy us for many years to come. Nelis’ chapter is a well-paced analysis of Vergil’s representation of emotions in the *Georgics*, the most important of which is hope. The nuance and sensitivity of this analysis is remarkable, and this chapter points to the interaction of positive and negative emotion in this text, which ensures a depth of intensity in Vergil’s representation of emotion in the *Georgics*.

Laurel Fulkerson’s chapter then follows: ‘Torn between Hope and Despair: Narrative Foreshadowing and Response in the Greek Novel’. Fulkerson begins by stating how *elpis* in Greek literature as a whole differs from that found in the novels, in which it is regularly fulfilled. The key point that Fulkerson makes early on is that there is a positive role for *elpis* in the novels, and this is unique in Greek literature. She then focuses on hope in the novels and elsewhere, and Fulkerson states that *elpis*’ function in literature is to offer narrative expectations/potentialities. She isolates some of the key ways in which *elpis* features in the novels, apart from its role in the psychology of the protagonists. Fulkerson then considers how hope is crucial for the protagonists of the novels, tracing its relative importance and frequency in each novel. While each novel has its own approach to this emotion, it is clear that the relative emotional symmetry of an individual novel’s protagonists mirrors the representation of hope in those protagonists. Fulkerson concludes by suggesting that Aristotle’s three definitions of *elpis* (being an emotion for the young, an emotion gained through experience, and an emotion that is a feature of good people) are all borne out in the Greek novels to some extent. Fulkerson’s discussion serves as an excellent starting point for considering positive emotions (other than *eros*, which scholars discuss frequently) in the novels. Her main emphasis on how *elpis* is wholly positive for the novels’ protagonists, and how this is unique in Greek literature...
implies the innovative nature of these texts, something which is supported by much recent scholarship on the Greek novels.

The first contribution to Part 2 is Ruth R. Caston’s chapter, ‘The Irrepressibility of Joy in Roman Comedy’, which opens by stating that joy is an important factor in the plays of Plautus and Terence, and often relates to sex and food. Beyond the ‘comic joy’, which seems to describe physical and impulsive moments in the dramas, Caston states that her concern in this chapter is to consider how certain passages from these comedies offer insights ‘with psychological and philosophical dimensions of this emotion’. There is an inherent tension between joy and pain in the passages discussed by Caston. Plautus uses this tension to parody tragedy, whereas Terence dwells not on the loss of joy but on its presence and immediacy. Another tension that emerges from Terence is that speakers are torn regarding whether or not to share their joy or keep it to themselves. Therefore, Terence explores social relationships in relation to this emotion. Caston notes how philosophers closely connect pain and pleasure throughout antiquity, citing a passage from Plato’s Phaedo as an example, and she shows that this association is a topos for Plautus. Turning to Terence, Caston states that joyful elation and elevation is present in his plays, but in places, this is ethically problematic, such as where Chaerea expresses his joy after he has raped the object of his affections in the Eunuchus. The issue of sharing joy draws attention to the subtleties of relationships and the inherent conflicts of interest present in Terence’s plays. Caston concludes by stating that joy can be divisive in social terms in these plays, and that characters’ reactions to the joys of others at times falls short of what it should be. Caston’s chapter offers an original perspective on the representation of joy in comedy, particularly in the plays of Terence. Her evaluation of how these works offer deep insight into this emotion is crucial to the overall drive of this volume.

Michael C.J. Putnam’s contribution, ‘Horatius Felix’, is unique within the volume as it focuses the literary dimensions of emotional vocabulary, rather than psychological or moral dimensions. He provides a detailed analysis of Horace’s Odes 4.2, exploring the use of felix and audax. Putnam shows how the language and imagery present in this poem recalls Pindar, Sappho and Homer. Putnam states that the poem showcases Horace as a literary critic, demonstrating his felicitas as a poet, which contrasts with the absence of the performance of Iulus’ poem within Odes 4.2. Putnam’s analysis is perceptive and penetrating, but this chapter is so different in terms of emphasis in comparison to the other contributions to the volume that it does not sit easily among them. However, the metaliterary dimension of emotional language and imagery is clearly an important facet of the representation of emotions in classical literature, and Putnam’s contribution certainly provides an insight into how this works in Horace.

Margaret Graver explores Senecan treatments of joy and their place in the heritage of Stoicism in ‘Anatomies of Joy in the Gaudium Tradition’ (Chapter 6). Graver provides evidence showing that joy is distinct from pleasure in the Stoic tradition, acting as a normative (idealised) response to ‘virtuous qualities or activities exhibited
by oneself'. This is echoed in Seneca’s writings. She then moves on to consider whether Seneca views joy as ‘kinetic’ or ‘static’, and proves that he allows space for both views in his writings. However, ultimately, as Graver states, Seneca seems to believe that the mental effect of joy does not motivate or reward virtue – it supervenes virtue or is an adjunct of it: virtue is for its own sake. Graver identifies seven Senecan joys: joy in virtuous activities; joy as a constant state; joy as an adjunct to virtue; joy as a wise person’s response to preferred indifferents; joy that virtuous people derive from companionship; joy of the wise person remembering friends who have died; joy in philosophical study, including self-contemplation. Graver concludes by stating that Seneca’s definitions and explorations of gaudium are part of a larger dialogue within Stoicism as a reaction to the Epicurean/hedonist agenda. His flexibility in terms of defining joy points to an environment in which there was much room for manoeuvre, setting aside basic adherence to the central tenets of Stoic dogma. This chapter provides a window into Senecan approaches to Stoic concepts of emotion, and demonstrates the fluidity of those concepts and the range of possible responses to them.

Christopher Gill provides further discussion relating to Stoicism in Chapter 7: ‘Positive Emotions in Stoicism: are they enough?’ Gill’s central drive in this chapter is to explore, primarily through looking at Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations, the extent to which the representation of positive emotions brings out Stoic ideas about the value of ‘affectively engaged relationships’ with other people. After discussing how the Stoic handbooks identify three ‘wise emotions’ or empatheia and four ‘foolish emotions’, Gill moves on to the sub-division of the wise emotions (as demonstrated by Andronicus), which illustrates their complexity. Gill states that emotions are not the goals of a Stoic life, according to Andronicus, but are by-products of the presence of virtue in the Stoic life, so Stoicism should not be rejected on emotional grounds. In the Meditations, positive emotions are connected more firmly with the process of growth and development (oikeiosis), which is at the heart of a Stoic life. Marcus Aurelius shows that nature and our philosophical appreciation of its essential goodness leads to the acceptance of death, which is the natural end of oikeiosis. M. Aurelius takes joy in thinking about people who share his aspirations towards a ‘life shaped by expression of the virtues’. Gill concludes by stating that the Meditations show us the richness of Stoic life in terms of emotions as well as in other respects. In this chapter, Gill proves that the Meditations offer a view of the value of personal relationships for Stoicism, which in turn points to how emotion is a crucial part of a good Stoic life.

The first chapter in Part 3 is Ed Sanders’ ‘Generating Goodwill and Friendliness in Attic Forensic Oratory’. Sanders states that, by contrast with Aristotle, in the corpus of Attic oratory there is no significant distinction between goodwill (eunoia) and friendship (philia). Although orators often seek eunoia to facilitate their causes, philia appears as an occasional synonym for eunoia, and both can be reciprocal. Demosthenes and Lysias use eunoia, charis and prothumia to arouse reciprocal good
feeling from jurors. Sanders also suggests that the possession of certain virtues or qualities invites goodwill and friendly feeling. Also, those who are ‘metrios’ invite these good feelings and merit justice, according to Isocrates, Aristotle and Demosthenes. Aside from a virtuous character, experience and actions also matter, such as those that show evidence of goodwill towards the city or demos, and large-scale generosity to fellow citizens. Sanders’ chapter demonstrates succinctly how goodwill and friendliness are key to the Attic orators and to the Athenian legal system, taking into account the extensive role of reciprocal emotion and empathic fellow feeling.

David Armstrong’s contribution, ‘Utility and Affection in Epicurean Friendship: Philodemus’ On the Gods 3, On Property Management and Horace Sermones 2.6’, is based on freshly edited texts from Philodemus, and Armstrong begins by identifying three levels of Epicurean friendship. These are: F1 – virtue-, trust-, and mutual utility-based friendship; F2 – more intimate friendship, satisfying our desire for affection and open self-expression, only possible on the basis of firmly established F1; F3 – more intimate friendship, satisfying the desire both we and the gods have for affection and self-expression, apart from the consideration of utility. The latter only operates among the gods and in our relationship with friends who have died. In On the Gods, Philodemus shows how human affection is never independent of mutual obligation except when remembering dead friends. The evidence, according to Armstrong, highlights how F1 must be at the root of human friendship, but we can achieve F3 and be like the gods in remembering dead friends. Conversely, in On Property Management, the emphasis is on Epicurean self-interest and utilitarianism: the text contains pragmatic philosophy aimed at wealth production and maintenance. Horace’s Sermones, being a gift to the lost father from the son, fit into the definition of F2/3. In 2.6 specifically, F1 is present in Horace’s carrying out of his obligations towards Maecenas in Rome, and F2 is present in his praise of the pleasure in conversation on his country estate. Armstrong’s conclusion is that these Epicurean texts show us that F1 and F2 can be separated easily in theory, but in a good human life they ‘neither can nor should be prised apart’. Armstrong’s evaluation of the evidence shows sensitivity to his sources, and his conclusions demonstrate some of the inherent subtleties present in the Epicurean view of friendship.

Gillian Clark’s ‘Caritas: Augustine on Love and Fellow Feeling’ seeks to elucidate Augustine’s views and theories regarding different types of love, using as its starting point one sentence about amor, bona voluntas, and caritas at City of God 14.7. Book 14 is the last of four books on origins. Augustine suggests that love of the self built the earthly city, even to the disregard of God. Love of God built the heavenly city, even to the disregard of the self. These two cities are two communities of rational beings (human beings and angels) existing at all times and in all places. The two intermingle in this mortal life, awaiting separation in the Last Judgment. All are a citizen of one or the other, but we do not know who belongs to which. Clark emphasises that our concept of the will derives from Augustine voluntas, which
belongs to the rational soul, is connected with free choice and responsibility, struggles against libido/irrational desire and is in all our actions, even when we do them unwillingly. *Vitia* (faults) are to be ascribed not to the flesh (which is inherently good as it is created by God), but to *voluntas*, to what one wants and how one chooses to live. Augustine views emotion in the light of Platonism: it is something we undergo, a movement from within us, attributed to the soul, not the body, and it involves choosing. Clark states that Augustine shows how emotions such as desire, fear, happiness and sadness can be good or bad depending on whether the underlying love is good or bad, and that he proves this by means of Scripture. In conclusion, she states that according to Augustine in the *City of God*, humanity should live according to what it wants, not what God wants. In the blessed life lived by the angels, love and joy is present, not desire, fear or sadness. Clark summarises Augustine’s view by stating that ‘in this life [the mortal one] we should desire righteousness, fear sin, and grieve for sin committed on our own behalf and on behalf of the neighbour we are told to love as ourselves’. Clark’s complex analysis of Augustine’s ideas about love and its relation to *voluntas* is an excellent contribution to this volume, illustrating that the *City of God* offered a view of love that built on Platonist ideas, while offering an original perspective on humanity’s relationship with God and with its own emotions.

In the final chapter of this volume, Martha C. Nussbaum addresses the reception of Roman ideas of mercy in Mozart’s *La Clemenza de Tito* in, ‘If You Could See this Heart: Mozart’s Mercy’. Nussbaum provides a brief biography of Titus, which shows that he was cruel, profligate and promiscuous until he ascended to the throne, when he became generous and kindly to all, and she states that these latter aspects are reflected in Mozart’s opera. She also defines Roman mercy, and emphasises the distinction between mercy, which is the inclination towards lessening punishment, and compassion, which is the emotional reaction to the plight of another person. Nussbaum also summarises the monarchical and Judeo-Christian idea of mercy (as present in Shakespeare’s *Merchant of Venice*), in which someone powerful bestows mercy onto someone subordinate or weaker. In the Greco-Roman tradition, particularly in Greek tragedy and Aristotle, this hierarchical mercy is not fully applicable, as motive and intention are relevant to criminal convictions (see Sophocles’ representation of Oedipus, and Aristotle’s *Nichomachean Ethics*): classical mercy is egalitarian, Nussbaum claims. She then goes on to say that Seneca takes into account human vulnerabilities and hardships in his evaluation of mercy. In *De Ira* 2.10, he states, ‘Give a pardon to the human species’. Ultimately, Nussbaum, after offering some analysis of the opera’s emotional dynamics, claims that Mozart is interested in the classical model of mercy, rather than the Judeo-Christian hierarchical model. Its profound reflections on love, control, anger, gentleness and the work of the imagination is ‘utterly Mozartean’ and a fitting tribute to David Konstan, Nussbaum concludes. This chapter is also a fitting close to this volume, providing a new perspective on how positive classical emotion and sentiment
influence the high art of the eighteenth century, and therefore implying that we should pay them more heed in our own age.

The impressive range of literature discussed in this volume illustrates how this holistic focus on emotion in the ancient world has broad potential. While one of the key findings which comes out of many of the contributions is that specific emotions can rarely be viewed in isolation as completely positive or negative, this is not to detract from the success of this project in seeking to explore the ambivalence and subtlety present in classical literature focusing on the emotions. This is a very suitable tribute to David Konstan, whose own work has done so much to promote discussion in the field of ancient approaches to the representation of emotion. This volume does not claim to cover all angles on this highly complex topic, but it serves as an indication of how fruitful this kind of venture can be, and will surely encourage further consideration of the role of positive emotion in the Greek and Roman spheres.

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