
Three-quarters of a century have passed since Werner Pilz observed that the stem *rhētorik-* is not found before Plato, and over a half-century since Pierre Chantraine compiled Greek terms ending in *–ikē* and *–ikos*, many of which appear for the first time in the Platonic corpus.¹ These data have fueled a debate, now going on its second decade, whose origins lie in the very plausible suggestion that the word *rhētorikē* was a Platonic neologism, and the more controversial corollary that the coinedness of the term inaugurated a rhetorical discipline that did not already exist.² The conversation has focused on refining the history of early Greek rhetorical theory in light of these arguments: “how do texts that use the term [rhētorikē] differ from texts that do not?”³ But less attention has been paid to the theoretical underpinnings of the claims: that the development of technical vocabulary, “terms of art” as David Timmerman and Edward Schiappa (T&S) put it in their new book, can herald a recognizable change in attitudes and approaches to a subject.⁴ “What sort of intellectual work,” the authors ask, is reflected in “the emergence of terms of art in rhetorical theory?” (4, authors’ italics) T&S ground their approach to technical vocabulary in Burke’s theory of entitlement and Saussure’s theory of signs, though the connection between technical vocabulary and disciplinarity is left implicit for most of the book. The lack of engagement with Foucault (*Discipline and Punish*) may surprise some readers, especially those familiar with the similar discussion in Schiappa’s earlier work (1999, p. 23). Despite the book’s title, the authors resist using disciplinary categories, seeking instead to demonstrate how passages in which terms of art appear can enrich our understanding of a particular thinker’s approach to his subject.

In three chapters that follow this introduction, T&S examine the technical uses of specific terms of art in the works of fourth century theorists. Chapter 2 outlines a particularly sophist use of *dialegesthai* by comparing the use of the word by Plato and Xenophon, as well as in the anonymous *Dissoi Logoi*, to describe sophistic activities and methods. Chapter 3 treats Isocrates’ technical use of the term *philosophia*, in an attempt to free the term from influential Platonic denotations, which have enshrined *philosophia* and *rhētorikē* as opposing discourses. The authors argue for an Isocratean practice of *philosophia*, which unlike the Platonic cultivates “practical wisdom through the production of ethical civic discourse” (44, 52). Chapter 4 examines the attitudes of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle toward public deliberation, which the authors define as “the

public exercise of speech in a political assembly” (73). While the ultimate aim of the chapter is to treat Aristote’s technical uses of démēgoria and samboulē, the authors begin with a survey of late-fifth and early-fourth century texts (especially Aristophanes and Thucydides) as well as with a discussion of Plato’s disdain and Isocrates’ “ambivalence” (T&S’ term, pp. 88–94) for political deliberation. All three of these chapters rework previously published essays by T, although the degree of reworking varies. Understandably, the authors’ method casts a very wide net, often treating in a single paragraph or subdivision dozens of instances of a particular term, across several different texts written over many decades. While this synoptic approach allows T&S to marshal a tremendous amount of textual evidence, it also sometimes forces them to ignore the deployment of these terms in individual texts and their development over the course of an author’s career: Isocrates’ five uses of the stem philosoph- in his comparatively early treatise Against the Sophists (as a noun at 1, 11, and 21; as a verb at 14 and 18), for example, do not suggest the conceptual complexity that T&S claim, unless combined with his use of the stem over the course of three decades of writing and teaching. The authors’ contention that Isocrates’ use of the word-group philosoph- “was unique in his day” (52) belies the fact that the 43 citations on the page that follows are drawn from over 35 years of engagement with the subject. A similar pattern is evident in the authors’ discussion of the phrase politikos logos in ch.5 (pp.125–6): Isocrates’ three uses of the phrase to describe his activity (Against the Sophists 9 and 20, and Antidosis 260) are separated by three decades; and Plato’s use of the phrase in Phaedrus (278c) is hardly “a passing reference to Solon” (p.125), but contributes to the dialogues concluding definition of the philosophos in contrast to the logographer, the poet, and the legislator (278c–d).

The two remaining chapters push the authors’ claims about terms of art in new directions, to explain the nature of misunderstood texts (ch.5) and to revise our recognition and understanding of implicit/explicit theorization (ch.6). Chapter 5 takes up the pseudo-Aristotelian Rhetoric for Alexander, now commonly credited to Anaximenes, in an attempt to elucidate its “disciplinary status” (116) by focusing on its use of terms of art. Here, the abandonment of disciplinary categorization is made most explicit, for T&S effectively demonstrate that, in fact, “it is possible to classify the Rhetoric for Alexander in relevant respects as Aristotelian, sophistic, and technical, although a superior interpretive strategy might be to abandon such nomenclature altogether” (116, authors’ italics). As Aristotelian, the text shares a technical vocabulary with the Rhetoric, including the names of different “kinds” of speech, the verbs used to describe the processes of invention, and terms for examples and maxims (119–20). As “philosophical”, the Rhetoric for Alexander shares Plato’s interest in defining key terms and his use of neuter abstract nouns (120–1). As sophistic, the text participates in a tradition (“from Gorgias to Isocrates”, 122) that locates the purpose and power of rhetorical training in the public sphere (122–6). Renewing their challenge to disciplinary categories, T&S explain that “our attempts to categorize the text are guided by what we
find to be the ‘essential’ features at a particular point in time” (130–1): “Anaximenes did not call the text’s subject matter rhetoric (rhētorike)” (131), and neither should we.

In Chapter 6, co-authored with Wilfred Major of LSU, the authors turn to the subject of rhetorical arrangement in order to critique the methods of scholars who infer an implicit rhetorical theory from the practice of persuasive speecheaking. The early pages reiterate the authors’ arguments against the use of the word “rhetoric” to describe the teachings of fifth-century B.C. educators and intellectuals: “we believe that cumulatively these studies have made a prima facie case that there is a nontrivial difference between an explicit theory of logos and explicit theory of rhētorike” (140). Because, “an explicit theory of X would, at a minimum, identify X by name” (139; cf. 172), any text which does not use the word rhētorike to describe its contents (as in fact only three authors do, even in the fourth century) cannot be called a “theory of rhētorike”.5 The authors pursue this claim in a discussion of the terms of art used for the parts of a speech, proposing that “an examination of the surviving uses of terms such as prooimion (and its verbal form) and epilogos reveal a significant contrast between earlier, fifth-century uses and later, fourth-century uses” (145). Turning then to fifth-century writers, the chapter examines the formal organization of speeches by Gorgias (153–63) and Antiphon (163–70), concluding that neither author can be shown to have been operating “within an established set of rules and strictures for constructing a speech” (164). The teleological underpinnings of this argument are most apparent when, in closing, the authors compare the apparent lack of established principles of arrangement in Gorgias and Antiphon to those prescribed by Aristotle’s Rhetoric and the Rhetoric for Alexander, in which “we find the canonical quadripartite division finally in place” (169–70, my italics).

Readers from Classics and Ancient History will find in this book an accessible entry to the debate surrounding the significance of technical vocabulary in late-fifth and early-fourth century texts on education; although the authors’ occasional disregard for the specific contexts in which terms of art appear,6 and the many infelicities and inconsistencies in transliterated Greek7 suggest that this book is aimed at an audience

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5 Only Plato, Aristotle, and Alcidamas (15.1) use the word rhētorike. Cole (1991) 121.
6 Let one more example suffice: in ch.2, the authors base their claims that sophistic dialogue (dialegesthai) was “a definable event in space and time” which “sometimes aimed at reaching a decision,” on evidence from Xenophon often drawn far out of context: T&S mention a story in Cyropaedia “of a father who has a son who wants to learn the arts of war” (29), and whom he sends to converse (dialegesthai) with experts in military affairs (Cyr. 1.6.14). This scene illustrates for T&S a connection between the word dialegesthai and a particular subject, which as a form of instruction is treated “as a discrete event” (28–9). It is indicative of the authors’ distance from Xenophon’s text, however, that the anonymous “father” in this episode is Cambyses, and the anonymous “son” is Cyrus, whose education gives Xenophon’s text its title and its chief motive. Again it is disappointing at times that the authors’ desire to present a comprehensive account of the terms has (sometimes necessarily) blinded them to the contexts.
7 Errors in transliterated Greek: p. 80 xrēstos should be chrēstos; p. 92 isogoria should be isēgoria; p. 119 demegorikos should be demēgorikos and epideictikos should be epideiēktikos; p. 120 elenchoi should be elenkhoi; p. 126 eidolon should be eidolōn, and mirion should be moriou (the missing reference in this passage is to Gorgias 463d2); p. 135 protrepo should be protrepo. The authors also write sympher- on pp. 100 and 103 but sumpher- on p. 121. Other misprints include: “Anaxemenes” for Anaximenes (p. 14); citations from Isocrates Against the Sophists 30 and 41 (p. 53) which should refer to paragraphs 18 and 21; “Dionysius of
outside these disciplines. Some of the book’s less practical suggestions, such as leaving
the word *philosophia* untranslated (66), and “abandoning a ‘rhetorical’ framework” (132,
136) will not persuade many scholars and teachers to abandon meaningful English
words in favor of transliterated Greek terms. Nevertheless, the authors’ continuing
cautions against the anachronistic application of terms and categories to earlier texts is a
valuable lesson, deserving serious consideration by anyone approaching the intellectual
heritage of Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.

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*Halicarnassus* italicized on p. 125 as though the title of a text; a typo in a reference to “Gorgias 265c” (p. 126), which should be 465c; the repetition of a quotation from Usher on pp. 142–3 which then
immediately reappears in a block quotation on the same page; and “prooimion” on p. 147 at the bottom
should be italicized.