

The Athenian naval campaign and the failure of the Lamian War: a re-evaluation*

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Abstract: This paper seeks to question a number of long-standing suppositions about Athens' performance in the Lamian War (323-322 bce). It has often been maintained that Athens suffered significant naval defeats (particularly at Amorgos), such as to destroy Athenian sea-power; it is further supposed that this failure by sea ultimately cost Athens the war itself. Close consideration of the literary traditions and inscriptional records suggest that these assumptions are ill-founded. It is posited here that aims of the naval sphere and its nexus with the land campaign can be understood differently, and that the explanation for Athens' failure can be found in Diodorus Siculus, who provides our main literary treatment of the war. The absence of Athens' key allies (notably the Aetolians) at a critical juncture in the land campaign, combined with the Greeks' misapprehension of the Macedonian appetite for a truce, were the vital factors in Athens' downfall.

Keywords: Lamian War; Athenian navy; Amorgos; Cleitus; Athenian grain trade

'Athens lost the Lamian War at sea. That is now generally agreed.' Thus Bosworth, in the opening of his 2003 piece entitled 'Why did Athens lose the Lamian War', sums up the *communis opinio* which stretches back to such luminaries as Droysen and Beloch.¹ Particular emphasis is often placed on a naval defeat suffered by the Athenians at Amorgos; that loss is deemed by some as a counterpart to the battle of Salamis, with Salamis forging the foundation of Athenian naval power and Amorgos marking its total destruction. In this estimation of the importance of the naval realm to the outcome of the Lamian War, fought against Macedonian hegemony by a coalition of Greek states spear-headed by Athens in 323-322 BCE, there has been little shift in the two decades of scholarship ensuing since Bosworth's piece.² Despite the fact that Diodorus, our main narrative authority for the war, betrays no apprehension that the events at sea turned the tide of the Greeks' fortunes, this entrenched notion that the war was lost at sea is in many ways unsurprising: the performance of the Greek allies by land was generally creditable. In contrast to the victories won against

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¹ Bosworth (2003) 14; Beloch (1925) 73; Droysen (1877) 68. So too Ashton (1977) 2 n. 12: 'There is virtual unanimity that the defeat near Amorgos marks the end of Athens' era of greatness' (and he cites at n.12 a selection of similar views published to that date). A disastrous naval campaign is posited also by Schmitt (1992) 120 in his extensive treatment of the war; of the naval campaign, he summarises thus (141): 'Wie unsicher unsere Kenntnis über die Einzelheiten des Seekrieges sein mag, fest steht, daß die athenische Flotte unter erheblichen Verlusten unterlag.'

² See for example Harding (2015) 56; Walsh (2018) 303. Dissenting voices are few, although see Burckhardt (1996) 139; Green (2003) 2 and (on the sea battle at Amorgos in particular) Heckel (1992) 185-86. Wrightson (2014) 529 does not believe that the defeat at Amorgos necessarily incurred significant ship losses but nonetheless regards it as the action which cost the Greeks the war because of their loss here of the 'strategic initiative'.

Antipater or his allies in Boeotia and Thessaly, it is maintained that at sea Athens sustained such significant ship losses that the Athenian navy was fatally undermined and could not supply the city by sea in the (putative) event of a siege; further, that it failed in its objective of preventing crossings into Europe by Antipater's fellow Diadochoi, Leonnatus and Craterus, whose provision of additional troops served to reverse the numerical advantage in land power that the Greek forces had originally enjoyed over Antipater, and so ultimately undermined the prospects of Greek success by land too.³

It is the purpose of the following discussion to subject these premises to close scrutiny, and to suggest that these common conceptions of the Lamian War are much less securely founded than is usually conceded. My aim is not to deny that the Athenians and their Greek allies, who may have been unable to match the fleet of 240 ships under the Macedonian Cleitus, suffered naval defeats.⁴ While the narrative of the naval campaign is heavily reliant on a perilously brief notice in Diodorus, which leaves unclear much about the locations, numbers and sequence of engagements by sea, and which may not be a synopsis of the whole naval war, the sparse evidence for the naval realm points to a number of Athenian defeats. Diodorus' cursory note opens with a statement of Macedonian dominance in the Aegean in the spring of 322 and subsequently catalogues only Macedonian victories under Cleitus:⁵

καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐν τοιαύταις εὐημερίαις ὑπῆρχε. τῶν δὲ Μακεδόνων θαλασσοκρατούντων οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πρὸς ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις ναυσὶν ἄλλας κατεσκεύασαν, ὥστε γενέσθαι τὰς πάσας ἑκατὸν ἑβδομήκοντα. τῶν δὲ Μακεδονικῶν νεῶν οὐσῶν διακοσίων καὶ τεσσαράκοντα τὴν ναυαρχίαν εἶχε Κλεῖτος. οὗτος δὲ ναυμαχήσας πρὸς Εὐετίωνα τὸν Ἀθηναίων ναύαρχον ἐνίκησε δυσὶν ναυμαχίαις καὶ συχνὰς τῶν πολεμίων νεῶν διέφθειρε περὶ τὰς καλουμένας Ἐχινάδας νήσους.

³ At the outbreak of war, the Athenian general Leosthenes already had at his disposal up to 8000 mercenaries and 7000 Aetolians (Diod. 18.9.1-3, 5) before the Athenian forces (5500 Athenians, 2000 mercenaries: Diod. 18.11.3) even reached him, and the Athenians were keenly recruiting other allies (Diod. 18.10.3, 5; Plut. *Dem.* 27.2; for inscriptional evidence of such additional alliances, see IG ii³ 1 376 with Oikonomides (1982); IG ii³ 1 378.10-13). At the same time Alexander's erstwhile regent in Macedon, Antipater, was able to mobilise only 13 000 Macedonian infantry and 600 cavalry (so Diod. 18.12.2; cf. 18.12.4: the Greeks 'far outnumbered' the Macedonians). At Opis, Alexander had ordered Antipater to send from Macedonia replacements for his 10 000 discharged veterans (Arr. 7.12.4), and the latter was clearly at a disadvantage at the outbreak of Lamian War; the stratagems which Polyaeus (*Strat.* 4.4.2-3) ascribes to him in this conflict show him grappling with his relative lack of manpower (on which see also Walsh (2015) 14-15).

⁴ At 18.10.2, Diodorus documents the Athenian decree ordering the preparation of 240 vessels at the start of the war, but there is doubt that a fleet of this scale was ever actually deployed by the Athenians (cf. Diod. 18.15.8): Engels (1989) 322; Sekunda (1992) 351-54; Burckhardt (1996) 137; Green (2003) 1; Bosworth (2003) 14-15; but see also below, n.22. (Given Athens' many evocations of the Persian wars in the Lamian War (cf. below, n.69), the ambition to mobilise 200 triremes might perhaps stem from a desire to match the scale which contemporary Athenians (e.g. *Dem.* 18.238) thought Athens had contributed during the Persian Wars; the declaration of the Lamian War speaks explicitly of Athens' prior defence of Greece *by sea*: Diod. 18.10.3.) Diodorus' account of this decree presents a number of issues. His text — with 200 of the ships to be quadriremes, and only 40 triremes — is problematic, and (with the exception of Morrison (1987)) scholars tend to reverse the respective numbers of ship-types to reflect better the proportions attested in the Athenian naval inventories (IG ii² 1629.783; IG ii² 1631.167-74). His use of παρασκευάζειν in reference to these ships has also provoked debate: see Bosworth (2003) 15, who argues that the equipping (and launching) of existing vessels is intended, against Morrison's suggestion that a construction of an entirely new set of 240 ships is meant.

⁵ Wrightson (2014) 520-24 provides a useful overview and critique of the key attempts to reconstruct the number, location and order of battles in the naval campaign.

The affairs of the Greeks were thus in thriving condition, but since the Macedonians had command of the sea, the Athenians soon made ready other ships in addition to those that they already had, so that there were in all one hundred and seventy.⁶ Cleitus was in command of the Macedonian fleet, which numbered two hundred and forty. Engaging with the Athenian admiral Evetion he defeated him in two naval battles and destroyed a large number of the ships of enemy near the islands that are called the Echinades. (Diod. 18.15.7-9; trans., Geer)

In addition, Attic inscriptions, though poorly preserved, betray the loss of Athenian ships (and by implication possibly an Athenian defeat) at the Hellespont, while the *Marmor Parium* and anecdotes in Plutarch indicate the Athenian naval defeat at Amorgos.⁷ The fact of Athenian defeats, then, is not at issue. I do wish to argue, however, that

(1) the scale of Athens' naval losses is far from clear;

(2) discussions of the aims of the naval theatre and its relationship with the land campaigns have been predicated on unwarranted assumptions, and that other constructions are possible (and perhaps preferable); and, finally

(3) that we need not look to the naval campaign to explain the outcome of the Lamian War, because Diodorus offers an alternative and credible explanation of it.

i. The scale of Athens' losses

Let us begin with the question of the severity of Athens' naval defeats. The complexity of assessment is best illustrated in connection with the battle of Amorgos. This is a clash which our chief narrator of the Lamian War, Diodorus, does not see fit to mention by name at all. Instead, the supposed importance of the Amorgos clash to the ultimate outcome of the war is predicated in part on the conjecture that it was the last, and thus decisive, naval engagement — a conjecture nowhere explicitly supported in our sources — and in part on the fact that it is the only naval encounter deemed important enough for acknowledgement on the *Marmor Parium*, where Amorgos appears in the entry for the archon year 323/2.⁸ In reality, all we can take from the *Marmor* is that Amorgos was the most significant naval clash of that archon-year, which was not the final year of the war. The same entry documents the siege of Lamia: that was a dramatic event, and gave its name to the treatment of the war in an epic by the apparently lamentable poet Choerilus (and thence to the war more generally in later literature⁹), but militarily Lamia was inconsequential. Amorgos may have been

⁶ IG ii² 505.17-19 refers to the sending out of an 'initial expedition' under Evetion, which may pertain to the fleet here mentioned as already in existence before its strength was raised to 170 vessels.

⁷ IG ii² 398a + 438.7-10 (c. 320/19 BCE, mentioning a *naumachia* at the Hellespont); IG ii² 493.19-23, honouring Nikon of Adybus in 302 BCE for his assistance to shipwrecked Athenians in 'the former war'; the location of the battle is not specified, but the honorand's residence in Abydus is suggestive. (IG ii² 505 and 506 also allude to naval conflicts in this war, but without preserving the locations.) For Amorgos, see *Marmor Parium* FGrH. 239 B9; Plut. *Demetr.* 11.3-5, *de fort. Alex.* 338a.

⁸ As the final battle, see (e.g.) Ashton (1977) 1 n.7; Morrison (1987) 93-94; Sekunda (1992) 350; Bosworth (2003) 20; *contra*, Schmitt (1992) 136-37; Wrightson (2014) 529.

⁹ See Ashton (1984); Walsh (2011). For its contemporaries, the Lamian War was the 'Hellenic War': see below, n.69.

likewise. Overall, the *Marmor* is an unreliable index of significance: it documents no specific battles for the next year (322/1), in which the war ended, thus ignoring the final clash at Crannon (in which the Macedonians had the better of the fighting); contrast Plutarch, who in his *Demetrius* (10.2) dates the liberation of Athens in 307 as being ‘in the fifteenth year from the time of the Lamian War and the battle of Crannon’ (my emphasis).

Plutarch, meanwhile, mentions Amorgos in two anecdotes, but in these he gives rather different impressions of the Athenian losses.¹⁰ In one (*Demetr.* 11.3-5), Amorgos is described as a disaster (ἥσσαν) (the very term used by Thucydides of the crushing Athenian defeat at Syracuse), while in the other (*de fort. Alex.* 338a) the Macedonians are credited with sinking a mere ‘two or three triremes.’¹¹ Both anecdotes are polemical and clearly the product of literary shaping: the first serves as a vehicle for the denigration of the Athenian politician Stratocles, who is accused of duplicitously concealing news of a crushing defeat from the Athenians, while the second mocks the pretensions of the Macedonian admiral Cleitus, who styled himself as the ‘new Poseidon’ on the basis of his trivial victory.¹² Neither, it may be ventured, allows a secure judgment on the severity of the defeat, although it might further be noted that in the ‘catastrophizing’ version in the *Demetrius* a mention of the repatriation of damaged hulls — a gesture generally not associated with outright defeats — has led some to suspect exaggeration of the scale of the loss in this anecdote.¹³

As a brief aside, Plutarch’s story about Stratocles, which he in fact tells in two places (thus also *Prae. ger. reip.* 799f) might even conceal within it a vague trace of an Athenian naval victory. The anecdote revolves around Stratocles’ announcement of a naval victory, with concomitant celebratory sacrifices at Athens, and then the revelation of a naval defeat three days later; Stratocles’ two reports supposedly pertain to Amorgos, so that Stratocles’ initial announcement of victory is an act of deliberate deceit. In the version in the *Demetrius* 11, it is explicitly claimed that the two reports concerned the same battle, named as that at Amorgos. The version at *Prae. ger. reip.* 799f, however, is more ambiguous, and may point to the basis of the story in fact being the receipt, in quick succession, of news from two *different* theatres: the first legitimately a success, but overshadowed by the subsequent news of a loss at Amorgos.¹⁴ Such a scenario would fit well with the vision of Athens during the war found in Plutarch, who attests elsewhere to a flurry of battle reports and multiple celebrations in

¹⁰ Landucci Gattinoni (2008) 92-95 canvasses the scholarship on this contradiction, in particular Sordi (1987).

¹¹ Cf. Thuc. 7.72.4.

¹² For Plutarch’s purpose with the Stratocles material, see Monaco (2013) 120-21; see also below, n.14. Stratocles’ close association with Demetrius Poliorcetes and his apparent domination of the Athenian political scene from 307/6 BCE (see Tracy (2000) 228 on his prolific authorship of decrees) made him a contentious figure; the traditions on him, both from his own lifetime and subsequently (such as in Plutarch), are generally negative, and imbue him with the traits of Aristophanes’ Cleon. On Stratocles’ career, see particularly Paschidis (2008) 78-106; Bayliss (2011) 152-86; on the parallels between Cleon and Stratocles, and on the importance of comedy in the shaping of the traditions around Stratocles, see Marasco (1981) 63-64; O’Sullivan (2009) 64-75; Xenophontos (2011) 609-11; Monaco (2013); Luraghi (2014).

¹³ Morrison (1987) 93-94 cf. Schmitt (1992) 138.

¹⁴ Bayliss (2011) 158-59 suggests instead that Stratocles here was behaving analogously to other generals who withheld news of defeats in order to preserve the morale of their troops (compare for example Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.10-14). Such analogies falter, however, on the grounds that Stratocles was not (supposedly) duping fighting men on the eve of another clash but deceiving a home population for a brief interlude in which they were not themselves at a battle front. Luraghi (2014) 193 doubts Stratocles’ role in this anecdote, but still assumes that the two reports pertained to the same battle.

the city.¹⁵ On this reading, Stratocles will have been guilty of voting celebrations before news had come in from all the various theatres of conflict; his supposed response, that he was glad that the Athenians had been happy if only for a short period, will not have had the brazen insolence that the shaping of the story by Plutarch, who is notoriously hostile to Stratocles, bestows upon it.

Returning to the question of the losses incurred at Amorgos, there is also the inscribed Athenian naval inventory for the year in which the *naumachia* there occurred. On this account of Athenian ship numbers taken at the close of the archon-year, the naval *epimeletai* catalogued some 315 triremes and (likely) 50 quadriremes.¹⁶ This is indeed a reduction on the numbers recorded for the year 325/24, when some 360 triremes and 50 quadriremes were logged, but trireme numbers had been falling in the period prior to the Lamian War (records show 399 of them in 330/29, for example), and the tally of 315 for 323/22 scarcely marks a catastrophic collapse of the Athenian force; there remained enough hulls for a vast fleet.¹⁷ (To appreciate this scale of remaining infrastructure, it is worth recalling that the great expedition against Sicily had initially seen a mere 134 ships sent.¹⁸) In an attempt to reconcile these naval records with the supposedly disastrous nature of the loss at Amorgos, Ashton suggested that the battle took place so late in the archon-year that notification of the losses did not reach Athens in time for the naval curators to register them in their count of the ships; on this reconstruction, the decline that is present in the numbers for 323/22 is the product of a more realistic assessment by the *epimeletai* of the numbers of *sea-worthy* vessels at Athens' disposal, rather than capturing a less absolute defeat at Amorgos.¹⁹ A more scrupulous assessment of the naval stocks may well have contributed to the reduction of the listed total, but it is certainly unwarranted to exclude the impact of Amorgos given the lack of any definitive evidence of the true scale of the Amorgos defeat.

In addition to the total figures, the naval records document the numbers of ships still at sea at the time the record was being compiled. Attempts have been made to use these data too to evaluate Athens' naval performance, and such discussions again betray a tendency to assume severe naval defeats.²⁰ The data are in fact incomplete. In particular, the number of

¹⁵ Plut. *Phoc.* 23.4. A deme decree from Kollytos had formerly been taken as the voting of an extravagant sacrifice to Agathe Tyche in celebration of a momentous event in the Lamian war (see Tracy (1994) 242, cf. (1995) 26-27), but in his recent edition of the inscription Matthaïou (2008) 91-93 disputes that the deme's revenue raising was connected to Tyche and suggests the decree belongs to 327 BCE. Might there, however, be a hint of optimism in frustratingly lacunose IG ii² 505, which indicates that its honorands were awarded golden crowns for their repeated support of Evetion's multiple missions?

¹⁶ IG ii² 1631.167-74.

¹⁷ For ship numbers in 330/29, IG ii² 1627.266-78; for 323/22: IG ii² 1629.783ff. On the issue of manpower losses (as distinct from loss of hulls), see below, n.55.

¹⁸ Thuc. 6.43, of which 100 were Athenian and 34 allied ships; an additional 83 were sent subsequently (Thuc. 7.16.2, 7.42.1). For discussion of the figures, Hornblower (2008) 1061-66.

¹⁹ As not reflecting the loss at Amorgos, see Ashton (1977) 7-8; *contra*, Bosworth (2003) 20 n.49. If the engagement(s) at the Hellespont (above, n.7) preceded Amorgos (and therefore also took place in 323/22, which some deem likely), the numbers lost here too will be captured in the naval tally published at the end of this archon year.

²⁰ See for example Schmitt (1992) 140-41, who takes it as almost certain that the inscription recorded 143 ships at sea, marking a loss of 27 ships (based on an original fleet of 170, the figure drawn from Diod. 18.15.8); he then uses this figure as a basis for positing further that, in a subsequent battle in 322/21, the Athenians lost about the same number of ships, thus bringing the total lost to 50-60 ships.

triremes still at sea (IG ii² 1631.172) is partially lost: it may be 94, 144, 184 or 234.²¹ There is, moreover, no certainty of the full scale of mobilisation against which any of these reconstructed numbers should be evaluated. Diodorus seems to imply at 18.15.8 that 170 ships marked the fullest mobilisation from Athens, but even if this figure is accepted as a maximum deployment in the whole naval realm and not just as a figure for the fleet under Evetion, Diodorus gives no indication of how many of these were triremes.²² Less attention gets paid to the more secure figure in IG ii² 1631.174, which indicates that, at the close of 323/22, 49 of Athens' total of 50 quadriremes were still at sea, with the remaining one present in the dockyard.²³ Given the shifting preference for these heavier vessels in this period,²⁴ it is hard to imagine that the 49 had seen no active engagement — and difficult, on this basis, to see the naval curators' records as evidencing significant Athenian defeats to date.

Diodorus himself names only one naval theatre: a clash near the Echinades where, he says, Cleitus destroyed a large number of the ships of the enemy. This at least seems to betoken a serious loss, but even here there are problems for the evaluation of the loss for Athens: the ships are not directly said to be Athenian, and Diodorus' phrasing might indicate a distinction between the Echinades clash and the formal *naumachiai* waged between Cleitus and the Athenian commander Evetion, leaving open the possibility that this was some other kind of engagement (on which, see further below).²⁵ So in terms of evidence for a destruction of Athens' fleet, there is far from a compelling case.

ii. The strategic objectives of the naval campaign

There is a second angle from which Athens' naval performance has been adjudged a telling failure, and that is a strategic one. Prevalent in the modern scholarship is a belief that the fundamental aim of Athens' naval endeavor was to prevent the crossings of Leonnatus and then Craterus to aid the beleaguered Antipater — and, concomitantly, an assumption that Cleitus' key purpose was to ferry across Craterus' troops from Cilicia.²⁶ Bosworth raised a rare

²¹ On the possible restorations, see Ashton (1977) 4, 7.

²² So too Ashton (1977) 7. It should be recollected, in this context, that Diodorus reports the commissioning of a fleet of 240 — of which 200 were to be triremes — in the initial Athenian decree for war at 18.10.2 (on which see above, n.4). If such numbers *had* been mobilized (and Just. 13.5.8 does make a claim that 200 triremes were launched, although this is widely dismissed), then *exempli gratia* the possibility cannot be excluded that the naval record listed 184 triremes as still at sea at the close of 323/22. Such a fleet would have been outnumbered by Cleitus' 240 vessels but would still have been a fleet to reckon with, and a fleet that would not betoken a collapse of Athenian naval potential.

²³ The number 49 is also only partially preserved, but of the restorations possible given the space of the lacuna the lowest possible restored figure is 49: see Ashton (1977) 5.

²⁴ The massive armada commissioned by Alexander at the end of his life was to be of ships heavier than triremes: so Diod. 18.4.4.

²⁵ Morrison (1987) 94-95; Sekunda (1992) 351; Wrightson (2014) 533; *contra* Bosworth (2003) 16-17, who insists that Diodorus intends the Echinades to be one of the two defeats that he says the Athenian admiral Evetion suffered at Cleitus' hands.

²⁶ See for example Morrison (1987) 94; Wrightson (2014) 526; Worthington (2020) 25. Cleitus is sometimes also presumed to have transported Leonnatus' troops, although this is rightly questioned by Wrightson. It is in fact unclear how many troops crossed with Leonnatus. Diod. 18.14.2, 5 gives him only 4000 infantry and 2000 horse in Thrace, and has him arriving to aid Antipater in Thessaly with more than 20 000 infantry and 1500 horse; the second figure was reached after Leonnatus had enlisted 'many additional' soldiers from Macedon itself. When Antipater had hastened from Macedonia at the outbreak of war, he had left his

voice of dissent when he questioned whether such a blockade could ever have been seriously contemplated by the Athenians, given that both sides of the Hellespont were in Macedonian hands at the start of the war, and Athens' cleruchy in the Chersonese was likely long gone.²⁷ In fact in the assessment of the objectives we are again on shakier ground than is often recognized. Cleitus' assumed co-ordination with Craterus is a case in point. While Cleitus was among those sent homewards with Craterus by Alexander from Opis in 324, it need not be assumed that the major fleet subsequently constructed in Cilicia and commanded by him in the Lamian War was intended primarily as an instrument for Craterus' repatriation of Alexander's veterans. It is never explicitly designated thus in the sources, and Alexander himself had had other ambitious plans for naval conquest in the west.²⁸ Cleitus' own grandstanding after the Lamian War — not only masquerading as Poseidon, but conducting business while walking on purple tapestries — hints at significant independent ambitions (to which his subsequent securing of a satrapy at the conference of Triparadeisos also speaks), and his connection to Craterus was not so absolute as to prevent him subsequently aligning himself with Craterus' arch-rival, Perdiccas, in the latter's attempt on Egypt.²⁹ The problematic nature of Cleitus' supposed subordination to Craterus is further evident in the fact that the only naval locations with which Cleitus is explicitly linked in any sources are Amorgos and the Echinades, neither obviously key to the movements of Craterus from Cilicia.³⁰ The transfer of troops across the Hellespont (both those of Leonnatus and of Craterus) could as well have been effected by the 110 vessels that Antipater had had at his disposal from the start of the war, without any necessary involvement of Cleitus' fleet.³¹

In reality, the interplay between land and naval actions may have been far more fluid and nebulous than is generally allowed. It may be observed, in particular, that all three of the known theatres of naval activity in the Lamian War — the Hellespont, Amorgos and the Echinades — sit on Athenian trade routes.³² The significance of the Hellespont for Athenian grain supply is too well-known to need discussion here, although it may be further observed that in *IG ii² 398a + 438* the honorand not only aided Athenian survivors from the *naumachia*

subordinate, Sippas, with instructions to levy as many troops as possible (so Diod. 18.12.2); Leonnatus may well have garnered these soldiers in transit. The strategic imperative of blocking Leonnatus at the Hellespont is thus not as obvious as often assumed.

²⁷ Bosworth (2003) 20. The status of the Chersonese is, admittedly, difficult to ascertain: see Anson (2012) 54.

²⁸ Only Just. 12.12.8 seems to imply that Cleitus (among others of Alexander's *philoï*) was a subordinate of Craterus when Alexander dismissed his veterans at Opis; Arr. 7.12.4 does not mention Cleitus at all. For Alexander's vast fleet building and ambitions in the west, see Diod. 18.4.4, Bosworth (1988) 209-210.

²⁹ Grandstanding: Plut. *de fort. Alex.* 338a; Athen. 12.539b-c, citing Phylarchus and Agatharchides. Such gestures equal the pretensions of Craterus' monument at Delphi, on which see Dunn and Wheatley (2012) 43-44. For his later association with Perdiccas: Just. 13.6.16. For his satrapy, Diod. 18.39.6, Arr. *FGrH*. 156 F9.37.

³⁰ It is often assumed that the *naumachia* at the Hellespont involved Cleitus, and that it concerned the transit of troops. As Heckel (1992) 185 has observed, however, no evidence directly links Cleitus to this arena (he is named in neither *IG ii² 398a + 438*, nor *IG ii² 493*); he is named in *IG ii² 506.12*, but this inscription does not specify the Hellespont as the site of the *naumachia*. See also Wrightson (2014) 525, who believes that Cleitus was not the commander at Abydos.

³¹ For this fleet, see Diod. 18.12.2; it had been sent by Alexander to transport money to the royal treasury in Macedonia. Relevant here are the arguments of Schmitt (1992) 132-34 that Antipater's fleet will not have remained in the vicinity of Lamia during the siege.

³² Bosworth (2003) 20-21 was already inclined to understand the Lamian naval conflicts in the Hellespont as grain-related; Wrightson (2014) 533 notes too that the Echinades sit on the western grain routes, and Schmitt (1992) 136-37 that Amorgos is on a shipping route.

near the Hellespont (presumably in the Lamian War) but subsequently sent grain to Athens when there was a shortage;³³ it is tempting to believe that this might support the connection, here suggested, between this battle and the passage of Athenian grain ships. The grain route from Egypt and Cryene, on which Amorgos lies, had become increasingly important to Athens from the 330s. Into the 320s there was intense interest in sources to the west, including the Po Valley, to the extent that Athens had sent out a colony to the Adriatic for the protection of this trade in 325/4; hence, perhaps, the action near the Echinades, off the Acarnanian coast.³⁴ The distinction, noted earlier, that some see in Diodorus between Cleitus' formal battles with the Athenian fleet and his action at the Echinades perhaps derives from the latter being a less formalized skirmish with grain transport vessels and their protective convoys (which latter may itself have included an Athenian squadron);³⁵ something of a parallel, in a near-contemporary context, for more informal engagements around grain fleets in a broader military setting is afforded by the interplay between the Rhodians and the Antigonids in 305-304, in which merchant and pirate fleets, raider tactics and light skirmishing vessels rather than formal *naumachiai* were important components of the naval conflict.³⁶

Control of the Aegean routes and the policing of piracy were themselves intrinsic not only to the immediate needs of Athens (food supply remained a pressing issue³⁷) but also to the Athenians' status.³⁸ The safety of the seas may have featured in Athens' imperial rhetoric already in the fifth century: it has been seen as implicit in Thucydides' discussion of the thalassocracy of Minos and his clearing of the sea of pirates (1.4), which may be intended as a precursor of the Athenian empire.³⁹ Naval guardianship is also notably present in the much-

³³ On this decree see Engen (2010) 311-12.

³⁴ For Egypt, Cyrene, and Amorgos: Rutishauser (2012) 33, 185, 203, who observes that the strategic significance of Amorgos to this grain route was such that the Athenians installed a garrison there during the Social War. For the Adriatic colony: *IG ii³ 1 370*. For trade with Italy, including the Po region, see Rhodes and Osborne (2003) 525; Moreno (2007) 342-43; Athens' concerns for its trade in the west are evidenced also in speeches about the Etruscans by Hyperides and Dinarchus, in an expedition led by the Athenian general Diotimus against Etruscan pirates in 335/34 (*IG ii² 1623.276-285*, with Verdejo-Manchado and Antela-Bernárdez (2021); for the apparent success of the mission, [Plut.] *Vit. x. orat.* 844a), and even in the depiction of Dionysus harrying Etruscan pirates in the relief adorning the choregic monument of Lysicrates of 335/34 (with the choice of decoration reflecting the subject matter of the winning dithyramb: so the notes on *IG ii³ 4 460* on *AIO* (<https://www.atticinscriptions.com/inscription/IGII34/460>)).

³⁵ For the use by Athens of military squadrons to escort grain convoys, see Potts (2008) 48-9; Gabrielsen (2015) 188-89.

³⁶ Diod. 20.82.2; 20.84.5-6; 20.93.2-5; 20.97.5. For the use of raider tactics as a complement to formal sea battles, see further Gabrielsen (2013) 146.

³⁷ Although some shipments were clearly reaching Athens in the mid-320s (see Dem. 56.9 for one instance), supply remained an ongoing issue: see Garnsey (1988) 151-54; Tracy (1995) 32-33. Issues with the food supply are documented largely through inscriptions, as (so Lambert (2012) 97) is the focus of Athenian diplomacy on grain trade issues.

³⁸ Harding (1995) 113 sees Athens' imperialism as expressed in the economic sphere in the fourth century. In fact, the 'sale of protection' by Athenian triremes and the privateering by Athenian trierarchs (both widespread, if not publicly condoned, in the fourth century) served as a source of revenue in place of imperial tribute: see Gabrielsen (2021) 68-69.

³⁹ Hornblower (1991) 21-22. As Hornblower further observes, Thucydides himself pays little further attention to this theme in his subsequent narrative, beyond noting the harassment of trade vessels by the Spartans at 2.69.1; Plutarch, by contrast, links Cimon's campaigns on Skyros with the suppression of piracy (Plut. *Cim.* 8.3) (although see Dawe (2008) for doubts about the pirate claim). More tangibly, we might note the

debated 'Congress Decree' of Plutarch's *Pericles* 17, a document which indicates at the least that the patrolling of the Aegean was being portrayed in the fourth century (when some believe this text was fashioned) as a concern of their fifth century forebears.⁴⁰ Further, military and economic interests at sea had become increasingly intertwined in the fourth century, and control of trade routes and the safety of the seas had increasingly become the focus of contention among the Aegean powers.⁴¹ In the 350s and 340s, Athenian orators complain that Philip of Macedon sought to challenge Athens' position as protector of the seas and to undermine Athens' own security by dominating the grain trade routes; Athens was even moved to vote war in response.⁴² The value of sea control had not diminished for players subsequently: mastery of the grain routes was clearly a concern for all sides in the Persians' so-called Aegean War against Alexander, and Athens' own naval mobilisations remained predominantly for the protection of grain convoys.⁴³ Strikingly, an element of imperial rhetoric remains present in these later Athenian activities: thus the choice, as leader of the colonizing expedition sent to the Adriatic in 325, of Miltiades, a descendant of the Miltiades who had led an Athenian colonizing expedition to the Chersonese in the sixth century, has been seen as 'reflect[ing] a historical consciousness and an aspiration to reconnect with [Athens'] imperial past.'⁴⁴

This backdrop of pronounced interest in, and competition for, mastery of the sea as a goal in its own right — and not merely as an adjunct to a land campaign — may offer another

presence of Athenian 'guardians of the Hellespont' charged with controlling the grain supply at some time after 430: *IG* i³ 61.36.

⁴⁰ For a useful overview of scholarship on the Congress Decree, see Tronson (2000) 359-62. Seager (1969) 132-33 sees the reference in the decree to the freedom of the seas as an indication of the decree's fourth century provenance, on the basis that 'of the freedom of the seas as a theme for diplomatic discussion there is no trace until the fourth century.' This may be so, but this has no impact on the point being advanced here: that for fourth century Athenians, the safety of the sea had become an element of Athenian hegemony and could be imagined by them (rightly or wrongly) as being a facet of the Athenian empire in its hey-day.

⁴¹ The complex interplay of military and commercial behaviours in general (some of them predatory) has been extensively illuminated in the works of Gabrielsen, esp. Gabrielsen (2015) cf. (2021) 68-71.

⁴² At [Dem.] 7.14-15, Philip's proposal to work with the Athenians against piracy is seen by the speaker (Hegesippus) as a threat to Athenian supremacy; earlier (at 7.2) the Athenians are urged not to accept Halonessus from Philip, because to do so would be to concede to him an authority over the seas that belonged rightfully to Athens itself. In Dem. 18.87 (330 BCE), it is claimed that Philip had 'proposed to get control of the shipping trade in grain', having noted Athens' reliance on importations (cf. 18.241, 301-2), and a decade earlier he had indeed captured Athenian merchant vessels (so Dem. 4.34), and seized vast numbers of grain ships in 340 BCE (Didymus *Dem.* cols. 10.34-11.5; Philoch. *FGrH.* 328 F162; Theop. *FGrH.* 115 F292). For the vote of war, Diod. 16.77.2-3; on the causation of this war (the siege of Byzantium, according to Diodorus, but the seizure of Athenian grain vessels according to Didymus), see the summary of scholarship in Harding (2006) 211. Against this backdrop, it is interesting that Bosworth (1971) sees the Congress decree (on which, see above n.40) as a product of Philip's rhetoric post-Chaeronea, and as a document designed to show Philip as the inheritor of Athens' mantle; we would again have here, then, an indication of the contestation of sea control between Athens and Macedon.

⁴³ Gabrielsen (2015) esp. 188-92; cf. Burke (2010) 398-99. Of note are Dem. 18.301-302, *IG* ii² 1623.276-85 and *IG* ii² 1628.37-42; it is believed that Athens consistently had vessels patrolling the trade routes throughout the 320s. For the Aegean War, see esp. [Dem.] 17.19-20, with Rutishauser (2012) 201-3; Ruzicka (1988) 139, 142; note also *IG* ii² 1627.241-65, documenting for 330/29 a number of Athenian horse-transport triremes agreed by legal review to have been rendered useless because of enemy action which, in temporal terms, might fit with action in the Aegean War.

⁴⁴ For Miltiades as leader, *IG* ii³ 1 370 col. 1.2; on the significance of the choice, see the commentary in AIO (<https://www.atticinscriptions.com/inscription/IGII31/370>). For the earlier Miltiades' colonising, see Hdt. 6.36.

way to understand the naval activities during the course of the Lamian War. The ‘domination of the sea’ by the Macedonians, the statement of which opens Diodorus’ brief excursus, will have been a situation to which Athens, in line with that city’s traditional aspirations, will have needed to respond; the resurgence of Athens’ panhellenic rhetoric around the Lamian War itself will only have intensified that imperative. Cleitus, too, may have been contending for such control of the seas and for the profits that could accrue thereby, objectives that will have made Athens his prime adversary.⁴⁵ We might think of him not so much as a tool of Craterus as an independent agent, and his navy a forerunner of the non-state-based fleets (usually castigated in the traditions as pirate fleets) which became important players elsewhere in early Hellenistic period, particularly under the Antigonids.⁴⁶ Naval dominion for him will have been a means of securing his own status as a power-player in the contests of the Diadochoi, just as Rhodes’ emergence as *prostates* of the Aegean and leader of the war against piracy in the vacuum left by the collapse of Athenian power significantly elevated the political importance and economic standing of that island.⁴⁷

On this understanding, the conflicts at sea were not integrally aligned with the land war as such, but rather represented a second, distinct front on which the Athenians were engaged. The separateness of the two theatres may explain the difficulties that have beset modern attempts to align the naval realm in Diodorus’ account with the land war. Scholars have posited a variety of reconstructions of the order, location and objectives of the naval clashes, all underpinned by an assumed relationship with the land campaigns:⁴⁸ witness in particular the attempts to correct the ‘Echinades’ of Diodorus 18.15.9 to ‘Lichades’, and thus place that engagement more conveniently in the vicinity of a besieged Antipater at Lamia.⁴⁹ A fundamental distinction between the two spheres, rather than some failure of understanding on his part, may also explain Diodorus’ paucity of attention to the naval campaign and his own lack of integration of it with his land campaign narrative. In this connection, it may not be coincidental that Diodorus’ brief excursus on naval affairs has no place within the elaborate ring structure in which, so Walsh has recently argued, Diodorus has constructed his Lamian War narrative, and in fact sits alongside material on Perdiccas’ campaigns in Cappadocia which Walsh deems a digression; it is again as though the naval realm did not feature in Diodorus’ thinking about the trajectory of the land campaign.⁵⁰ One might suggest instead that, with his insertion of a couple of lines about the naval sphere in his account of 322 BCE, Diodorus intends rather to give his reader a sense of a fight evenly-poised at that point: the Greeks had had the best of it by land, the Macedonians, by sea, and neither realm had seen a decisive engagement.

⁴⁵ For the raiding of merchantmen by naval commanders, Athens itself yields much evidence: compare the action of the Athenian Diopieithes in the northern Aegean in 342 (Dem. 8.9), and, on a widespread level, [Dem.] 51.13-14 with schol. Dem. 21.80 (cf. Gabrielsen (2015) 193-95, with further examples). For the political and financial gains associated with the exercise of dominion of the seas (including through the market for protection against pirates) see also Gabrielsen (2001) 232-37.

⁴⁶ For early Hellenistic piracy, see Gabbert (1986).

⁴⁷ Diod. 20.81.3 for Rhodes’ assumption of leadership in the protection of the seas.

⁴⁸ Wrightson (2014) reviews the key scholarship and evaluates the reconstructions.

⁴⁹ Landucci Gattinoni (2008) 92 gives a convenient summary of the scholarship. The case for retaining the Echinades has been most forcefully argued by Bosworth (2003) 17-18, cf. now also Wrightson (2014) 530-31.

⁵⁰ For his part, Walsh (2018) 313 cf. 315 suggests that Diodorus was forced to omit any proper treatment of the naval campaign because of the difficulty of integrating this ‘much more complex’ realm into his ring composition framework.

iii. *The reasons for the Athenians' capitulation after Crannon*

In the light of such factors, we might reappraise whether Diodorus is in fact guilty of obscuring the different 'reality' of the modern construct of the war's conclusion, namely that the Athenian losses at sea quashed all their chances in the war. Serious consideration may be given instead to Diodorus' explanation of the final demise of the Greek effort against Antipater, about the trajectory of which he is quite explicit. Diodorus refers to the deliberations of the Greek generals in the wake of Crannon, and his account indicates their belief that, despite their recent defeat, the war had not yet been decided. The crux was the absence, at that time, of allied contingents from the land campaign, most notably the Aetolians whose contingent had been the most numerous in the Greek alliance: Leosthenes had some 7000 Aetolians serving with him early in the war.⁵¹ They had been granted permission, while Antipater was under duress and contained in Lamia, to 'go home for the present because of some national business'; Diodorus thereafter mentions the continued absence not only of the Aetolians but also of 'not a few of the other Greeks' in the clash that saw the death of Leonnatus, with the result that the Greek force that faced the combined Macedonians after the arrival of Craterus in Thessaly were 'far inferior in numbers' to their foe.⁵² The perception that it was the missing allies who were key is not confined to Diodorus: it is there in Plutarch, and it was still circulating when the Suda was compiled, where it is claimed that Antipater was saved 'when the Aetolians withdrew, and then the others.'⁵³ This again strongly suggests that it was not the decisive fate of the naval war that determined the Greeks' deliberations.

As an explanation, the absence of key allies is legitimate and sufficient. Athens' own citizen resources were already significantly committed: Diodorus affirms that all citizens up to the age-class of 40 were enrolled for the land offensive, and on Sekunda's calculations of the Athenian population, the totals of mobilized Athenians mentioned by Diodorus closely approximate the total citizen figure for these age-groups predicted by his life tables.⁵⁴ The Athenians will not have had the capacity themselves to compensate for the temporary withdrawal of their most numerous ally, which will have had a serious impact on the short-term viability of the land campaign regardless of the outcome of clashes on the naval front.⁵⁵

⁵¹ Diod. 18.9.5 for the Aetolians. For the total of the Greek army (30 000), see Just. 13.5.8, cf. Burckhard (1996) 135.

⁵² Diod. 18.13.4; 18.15.2; cf. 18.17.1, with Diodorus yet again noting that 'many of [the Greeks], despising the enemy because of their former good fortune, had gone away to their own cities to look after their private affairs.' Diodorus gives the Greek army at Crannon at 25 000 infantry and 3 500 cavalry.

⁵³ Plut. *Phoc.* 26.1; Suda sv Antipatros (A2704).

⁵⁴ Diod. 18.10.2; at 18.11.3 it is recorded that, from the seven tribes allocated to campaigning outside Attica, a force of 5000 infantry and 500 horse was amassed, giving by extrapolation a mobilization of 7857 from all ten tribes. On this figure and its relationship to the total citizen population, see Sekunda (1992); *contra*, Hansen (1994) 308-10, who continues to argue for a higher Athenian citizen population figure.

⁵⁵ Sekunda's model has the striking corollary that the Athenians will have needed to withdraw citizens from the land front to man the ships (so Sekunda (1992) 348-55). On this premise, Athenian naval losses will have had an impact on the numbers they were able to (re)supply to the land front, but this impact will be nowhere near that of the absences of the Aetolians and others. Apart from the fact that we do not know how many ships the Athenians lost, it needs to be noted that the crews of Athenian ships could be 70% non-Athenian (see Gabrielsen (2021) 52 n.4 on *IG I³* 1032.3, 50, 172, 305 with its demarcations of citizens, *xenoi* and slaves among the crews of four triremes in the late fifth / early fourth centuries). While *IG ii²* 493 lauds Nikon of Abydos for

Leosthenes' successors at Crannon believed, moreover, that the Greek position might be redeemable should the missing allies return:⁵⁶

τῇ δ' ὕστεραία Μένων μὲν καὶ Ἀντίφιλος οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμόνες συνεδρεύσαντες ἐβουλεύσαντο πότερον ἀναμείναντες τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων συμμαχούς καὶ καταστάντες ἀξιόμαχοι περὶ τῶν ὄλων διακρίνωνται ...

On the next day [after Crannon] Menon and Antiphilus, the leaders of the Greeks, came together and took counsel whether they should wait for the allies from the cities and then, when they were in a position to fight on equal terms, seek a final decision... (Diod. 18.17.6; trans, Greer)

If Diodorus is right that the Aetolians soon afterwards deployed an army of over 10 000 against Antipater and Craterus, this optimism was not unfounded.⁵⁷ We need not assume, then, that Diodorus has failed to apportion blame for the ultimate demise of the war correctly on the naval failures of the Athenians, whose *demos* he elsewhere does not hesitate to present in a hostile fashion.⁵⁸

The absence of any decisive impact from the naval campaign is further evident in the still-undecided nature of the military situation after Crannon, to which the ensuing developments attest. In Menon and Antiphilus' contemplations, the alternative to awaiting the return of the allies was not abject surrender, but the sending of envoys concerning an ending of the war (περὶ διαλύσεως);⁵⁹ they felt even strong enough to reject Antipater's initial response, which was an insistence that the cities come to terms one by one rather than *en masse*. This confidence may have stemmed from an apprehension of the fact that the continuation of direct military hostilities after Crannon was not necessarily in the interests of either side. Against their own temporary manpower crises, the Greeks were also surely reckoning on pressures on Antipater and Craterus to end hostilities in Greece so that they might themselves engage with the turmoil to the east. Relationships between the Diadochoi,

assisting 'many Athenian citizens' in the wake of a *naumachia*, the honorary nature of this text cautions against taking from this that the crews were largely Athenian; the Athenian navy of the Lamian War will surely have drawn on such other pools of manpower in addition to citizen sailors. Burckhardt (1996) 137-38 (cf. more generally Burckhardt (2018) 157) posits the hiring of some 10 000 mercenaries for the ships (to mirror the number hired by Athens for the land campaign). Further, drawing upon the census figures recorded under Demetrius of Phalerum (Ctesicles *FGrH*. 245 F1), Bosworth (2003) 15 suggests that Athens may have had around 10 000 metics available for the fleet; these same census data put the Athenian slave figure at 400 000.

⁵⁶ A pause in hostilities will also have allowed Athens' own manpower to be replenished; in both *IG* ii² 493 and *Agora* XVI 104 the honorands (from Abydos and Heracleion respectively) are praised for providing supplies to facilitate the repatriation of Athenian citizen survivors of a sea battle (so too possibly the honorand of *IG* ii² 492), and presumably these men did eventually return.

⁵⁷ Diod. 18.24.1-2. An even greater force (of 12 000) deployed soon afterwards: so Diod. 18.38.1-3, who notes that with the addition of Thessalian allies, this force was bolstered to 26 500. Westlake (1949) argues that these numbers must include significant numbers of mercenaries. Just how soon the first Aetolian force was redeployed depends upon the contentious reconstruction of the chronology of this period, but it will belong to late 322 (thus only months after Crannon) or (more likely) 321: see Anson (1986) 215-16 (cf. Anson (2002/3) and Boiy (2007) for further discussions of the broader chronological reconstruction.

⁵⁸ For Diodorus' hostile presentation of the Athenian *demos* see for example Diod. 18.10.4 (where Diodorus implicitly agrees with the 'Greeks of superior understanding' who urged against the war), and further Burckhardt (1996) 132, 134; for Diodorus' anti-Athenian shaping of other kinds see Walsh (2018) 309-10.

⁵⁹ Diod. 18.17.6-7. On Diodorus' terminology, compare Thuc. 4.19.1, where the Spartans in 425 invite the Athenians to end the war (λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ὑμᾶς προκαλοῦνται ἐς σπονδὰς καὶ διάλυσιν πολέμου) and offer 'peace and alliance and the most friendly and intimate relations.' Sparta had been discomfited by events at Pylos but neither side had won a conclusive victory and both had reason to countenance an end to the fighting.

while superficially amicable, were tense: Diodorus claims that once Perdiccas had gained the guardianship of the kings and control of the royal armies at Babylon, his friendship with Antipater was only feigned, and that his marriage to Antipater's daughter, Nicaea, which Perdiccas contracted in the months after the Lamian War, was but a temporary measure to ensure Antipater's acquiescence; Diodorus also explicitly attests to the ambition of Craterus at least to return to Asia after the settlement of the Greeks.⁶⁰

Further, the Athenians were now aware that they might achieve what had been their underlying objective in the war — the exemption of Samos from Alexander's 'Exiles decree', on which see also below⁶¹ — by appealing over Antipater's head to the authority of the kings, thus in reality to Perdiccas.⁶² Notable in this context is Walsh's contention that the Athenians from the very start of the war had 'aimed at forcing a political, rather than a purely military, settlement through an act of aggressive posturing.'⁶³ Perdiccas ultimately proved no friend of Athens and decided in favour of the Samians, but an Athenian gamble on him was not completely unrealistic: later, the Aetolians were indeed saved by the diversion of Antipater and Craterus to deal with Perdiccas, whose ambitions had finally been revealed to them by Antigonos, and with whom the Aetolians themselves had made a compact against Antipater.⁶⁴ There are tantalizing hints of such remaining Athenian ebullience in fragments from Dexippus' *Ta met' Alexandron*, in which Dexippus imagines an exchange between Athenian envoys and Antipater after Crannon. Dexippus' Athenians are strikingly uncowed; they announce their intentions to send envoys to the kings and seem to demand concessions from Antipater, provoking rebukes from that Macedonian on their ill-founded confidence.⁶⁵ For all its late, rhetorical nature, Dexippus' portrayal of the dynamic at this meeting may not be completely unfounded.⁶⁶

⁶⁰ Diod. 18.23.1-3 on Antipater, Nicaea and Perdiccas; 18.18.7 for Craterus' preparations to return to Asia.

⁶¹ Diod. 18.8.6-7 cf. Just. 13.5.2 for the Exiles Decree as the motive for war; Diodorus' framing of the Lamian military narrative with passages concerning the Samian cleruchies (Diod. 18.18.6, with Amendola (2022) 171 n.629) underscores the centrality of that issue to the war. In our thinking about the naval campaign, then, we should also countenance the likelihood that Athens directed naval resources to the prevention of the Samians' reclamation of their island. *IG* XII.6.43 and XII.6.42 refer to πόλεμος between Samian exiles at Anaia and Athenian cleruchs; the date is unspecified but the context suits the Lamian War and its immediate aftermath. Related also to this conflict over Samian control may be *Agora* XVI 100: so Tracy (1995) 19-20, Amendola (2022) 182-83. See further Errington (1975); Habicht (1997) 31-33.

⁶² Demades sought to undermine the relations between Perdiccas and Antipater, and to mobilise Perdiccas against Antipater in Greece (an attempt for which he ultimately paid a heavy price): Diod.18.48.2, Plut. *Dem.* 31.5 cf. *Phoc.* 30.6 (wrongly identifying the target of Demades' overtures as Antigonos), Arr. *FGrH.* 156 F 9.14; *PBerol.* inv. 13045 D II.3-8; for the location of this solicitation see Amendola (2022) 139-40.

⁶³ Walsh (2015) 5.

⁶⁴ Judgment against Athens: Diod. 18.18.6. Amendola (2022) 172-73 argues that Perdiccas' involvement in the Samian issue came about not (as is often assumed) because Antipater deferred the decision to him, but because of the Athenian embassy; he further (184-87) discusses the likelihood, based on *PBerol.* Inv. 13045 FII.15-19, that this embassy brought an honorary crown to Perdiccas. For Perdiccas and Aetolia: Diod. 18.25.1-5; 18.38.1.

⁶⁵ See Dexippus *FGrH.* 100 F33g-k, with the readings suggested by Martin (2005) 302; Antipater chides the Athenians ἐν τῷ σφετέρῳ θάρσει δοξάζετε ἐπισχύσ[ειν].

⁶⁶ There are certainly resonances between Dexippus and other traditions (see Martin (2005) 303), suggesting that his account is not divorced from the wider tradition. There is, moreover, a trace of similar Athenian ebullience in an anecdote about Demetrius of Phalerum in what may be the same context: see Demetr. *De elocutione* 289 = Demetr. 12 SOD.

The situation in the aftermath of Crannon was, then, still fluid, not one in which the fate of Athens had already been conclusively determined by a collapse in their military position. It was only Antipater's ensuing military action against individual cities of the Greek alliance, and his bestowal of generous terms on their capitulation, that ultimately isolated the Athenians to the point that they were forced into submission; even then, on the point of capitulation, the Aetolians and Athenians consulted once more with their generals about pressing on with the conflict.⁶⁷

On this reading, the failure of the Lamian War was in the first instance diplomatic — a faltering of the Hellenic alliance — rather than military, with a misapprehension of Antipater's willingness to strike a deal compounding this diplomatic failure. This crumbling of the alliance under Athens' leadership is itself perhaps not surprising. While it was the death of Alexander that had ultimately triggered the outbreak of war, it had been the threat posed by Alexander's 'Exiles Decree' to the particular vested interests of Athens (on Samos) and Aetolia (at Oeniadae) that had really provided the impetus, and these two players had struck an early alliance; Diodorus goes so far as to claim that many other states, by contrast, welcomed the Exiles Decree.⁶⁸ The Athenians' harking back to long-standing panhellenic themes of freedom in their rhetoric at the subsequent outbreak of what they styled an 'Hellenic war' — note for example at the start of the war the promises to 'free Greece from garrisons' — may have been designed to appeal to a broader swathe of Greek *poleis*, but perhaps did little to disguise the more narrowly Athenian ambitions at play, and may even have stirred suspicions around a revival of Athens' own imperialism.⁶⁹ Low has recently shown just how Athenocentric the formulation of panhellenism within Athenian discourse had become in the period between Chaeronea and the Lamian War, and in the war itself Diodorus directly links the Athenians' assertion of liberty and their venturing to claim 'the leadership of the Greeks' through their declaration of hostilities in 323.⁷⁰ It is hardly surprising, then, that some of the allies found their own domestic interests more pressing than their commitment to Athens' war, particularly when the military situation was still strongly in the Greeks' favour. It is the absence, at a critical juncture, of the Aetolians that is the most perplexing element of the campaign: Diodorus is frustratingly opaque about the 'domestic issues' (διὰ τινὰς ἐθνικὰς χρείας) that prompted their untimely withdrawal home.⁷¹

⁶⁷ Diod. 18.17.7-8.

⁶⁸ Diod. 18.8.6-7; for the alliance, see *IG* ii³ i 381 with Worthington (1984). For caution about accepting Diodorus' claims about wider Greek receptivity to the restoration of exiles, however, see Worthington (2015) 98-99; note too the mention of embassies (unfortunately of unspecified origins and numbers) appealing the Decree at Diod. 17.113.3-4.

⁶⁹ For the revival of Athenian-led panhellenism, see the decree crafted at the start of the war by the Attic orators and reported in Diod. 18.10.2-3. For the casting of the war as a Hellenic War for freedom, and thus in the tradition of the Persian Wars, see further *IG* ii² 467 + Add. p. 661.6-8; *IG* ii² 448.43-44; *IG* ii² 505.17; *IG* ii² 506.9-10; Osborne (1981) D43.6-12; Hyp. 6.10, 12, 16, 19-22, 37 (with Hermann (2009) 23-24); cf. also *PHibeh* 1.15 (a rhetorical exercise c. 260 in which the Athenian Leosthenes on the eve of war exhorts his audience to remember Marathon and Salamis). Walsh (2015) 6 sees the Athenians' first move in the war — the occupation of Thermopylai (Diod. 18.11.5) — as a political gesture evoking the Persian Wars, with confirmation offered by Hyp. 6.12, 18.

⁷⁰ Low (2018) 460-65; Diod. 18.9.1. See also Low's interesting suggestion (465-66) of an Athenian reticence in their panhellenic rhetoric pre-Chaeronea, a reticence she links to an apprehension of the potentially negative, imperialist spectre which panhellenic rhetoric could raise.

⁷¹ Bosworth (2003) 17-19 links the naval clash at the Echinades with the Aetolian withdrawal and suggests that the Macedonian fleet had blockaded Oiniadai in order to lure away the Aetolians and open a second front. Wrightson (2014) 521 is right to see this as chronologically unfeasible. When referring to the

It was, however, by this withdrawal of the Aetolians and other Greek allies, and not by the performance of Athens' navy, that the outcome of the Lamian War was fundamentally determined.

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