Not *Stratēgos Autokratōr* (?)
Some notes on Clearchus' Rise to Power at Heraclea Pontica[*]

Marcaline J. Boyd

Abstract: It is generally believed that Clearchus I, tyrant of Heraclea Pontica (364/3–352 BCE) came to power as *stratēgos autokratōr* "general plenipotentiary." This widely held view is based upon a statement in Justin's epitome of Pompeius Trogus' *Historiae Philippicae* that says Clearchus was granted summum imperium by the demos. This paper shows that the equivalence of Justin's summum imperium with the Greek *stratēgeia autokrateira* is a modern construction. It will, furthermore, demonstrate that the ancient sources cannot support the certain correspondence between summum imperium and *stratēgos autokratōr*. Ancient literary testimony, however, describes Clearchus as an arbiter and paints a clear picture of stasiotic struggle preceding his tyranny suited to this role. Thus, while modern scholarship has tended to emphasize the military character of Clearchus' coming to power, this paper examines Clearchus through a new lens to call attention to the tyrant as a mediating figure. In this respect, Clearchus from the Black Sea turns out to be in good company among other Greek tyrants who exploited internal stasis to achieve personal power.

Keywords: tyranny, stratēgos autokratōr, summum imperium, arbiter, Justin, Black Sea

Sometime in 364 or 363 BCE on the southern shores of the Black Sea, Clearchus (391/90–353/2 BCE) rose to power at Heraclea after an especially turbulent bout of *stasis*. A joint foundation between Megara and the Boeotian League of the sixth century BCE (Ps.-Scymnus 1016–17, Diller; Ephorus, *FGrHist* 70 F 44b), Heraclea Pontica had endured factional strife before.[1] In fact, during the late Archaic and Classical periods, Heraclea experimented with both democratic and oligarchic government.[2] When Clearchus came of age in the first quarter of the fourth century BCE, an oligarchic regime, known as the Council of 300, exerted its dominance over Heracleote affairs and by the 360s tension with the demos had reportedly escalated with demands for the

---

[1] Burstein 1976, 12–22 and Erçiyas 2003, 1403–1404 discuss early Heraclea Pontica. For a review of stasiotic struggles at Heraclea, see Burstein 1976, 23–46; Saprykin 1997, 21–56; Gehrke 1985, 70–72; Avram 2009, 209–27.

[2] Ancient testimonia: Arist. *Pol.* 1304b31–39; 1305b2–13; Aen. Tact. 11.10, 12.5. For a political history of Heraclea Pontica, see Burstein 1972; Robinson 1997, 111–113, 2011, 157–59.

cancellation of debt and the redistribution of land (Just. *Epit.* 16.4.2).[3]

Historical reconstructions of Clearchus' rise to power usually run as follows. As a young man Clearchus studied with Plato and Isocrates at Athens; at some point upon his return, he was exiled from his native Heraclea and served as an officer in the mercenary army of Mithridates, the son of the neighboring Persian satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. When Heraclea became embroiled in *stasis,* Clearchus was recalled to mediate between the Council of 300 and the demos. At the behest of Mithridates, he was supposed to have handed the city over to Persian control and been appointed ruler in return, but Clearchus deviated from this plan, capturing Mithridates and ransoming him instead. At this point, Clearchus is said to have changed allegiance from the oligarchic Council of 300 to the demos, whom he instigated in the assembly and by whom he was given *summum imperium* for curbing the 300's power (Just. *Epit.* 16.4.16). In the end, Clearchus is said to have arrested, ransomed, and executed 60 members of the Council with the remainder having fled into exile. Members of the 300 who had escaped made a last-ditch attempt to regain power, but they were ultimately repelled by Heracleote forces. For the defeated and captured, there awaited torture and execution, leaving Clearchus now undisputed "tyrant" of Heraclea Pontica.[4]

Today, scholarly consensus holds that when the demos bestowed *summum imperium* onto Clearchus, they appointed him to what was known in the Greek world as *stratēgos autokratōr*, often translated as "general plenipotentiary," or commander with enhanced power.[5] In the classical Greek world, special executive power (*autokrateira*) was usually designated to a single *stratēgos* to deal with a serious military emergency or to lead a military campaign against an external foe.[6] Modern series on Greek tyranny, studies of the Clearchids, and histories of the Black Sea region regularly assign the title *stratēgos autokratōr* to Clearchus and adopt this reading of his becoming tyrant.[7] For example, Stanley Burstein's seminal study of Heraclea Pontica speaks of Clearchus as *stratēgos autokratōr*, as does Sian Lewis' monograph on Greek tyranny and Miles Lester-Pearson's and Stefania Gallotta's very recent treatments.[8] In this paper, I intend to demonstrate that the equivalence of Justin's *summum imperium* with the Greek *stratēgeia*

---

[3] Mandel 1988, 35–70 and Saprykin 1997, 131–141 have useful overviews of the sociopolitical and economic milieu before Clearchus.

[4] The fullest account of Clearchus' rise to power is Justin's epitome of Pompeius Trogus' *Historiae Philippicae* (16.4), but bits of the story are also enhanced by the *Suda* (s.v. Κλέαρχος). Photius' epitome of Memnon's local history (*FGrHist* 434 F 1) regrettably begins with Clearchus already in power.

[5] On the meaning of αὐτοκράτωρ, see Missiou-Ladi 1987, 336–39; Stephanus s.v. αὐτοκράτωρ; Chantraine s.v. αὐτοκράτωρ.

[6] Some representative studies include Scheele 1923; Bearzot 1988, 39–57, 1991, 79–87; Maronati 2007, 65–85.

[7] See, for example, Mossé 1969, 129; Burstein 1976, 52; Mandel 1988, 48–49; Saprykin 1997, 134; Bittner 1998, 28–29; Lewis 2009, 99; Davaze 2013, 146–49 mentions Clearchus' role as arbitrator against the backdrop of Heraclea's stasiotic conflict but equates Clearchus' later appointment of *summum imperium* with *stratēgos autokratōr* (160–61, 164); Harris 2017 (although Harris' focus is admittedly not on Clearchus as *stratēgos autokratōr* but as *prostatēs tou dēmou*, an interpretation first suggested by Lenk (see n. 15 below)); Lester-Pearson 2021, 143 (Lester-Pearson refers to Clearchus as "general with plenipotentiary power by the demos," a usual translation of *stratēgos autokratōr*); Gallotta 2021, 275–76. For a general emphasis on the military aspect of Clearchus' career, see Davies 1993, 240–42; Trundle 2006, 69; Tuplin 2018, 32.

[8] For these references, see n. 7 above.

autokrateira in historical interpretations of Clearchus' rise to power is a modern construction. This paper will also show that the ancient evidence cannot support the certain correspondence between the terms *summum imperium* and *stratēgos autokratōr*. Ultimately, I suggest that the historical circumstances surrounding Clearchus' recall from exile and the extant literary testimony about his becoming tyrant point to Clearchus achieving political preeminence at Heraclea Pontica as an arbitrator figure, just as a handful of other well-documented cases of tyranny.

Before beginning it should be noted that our sources for Clearchus' tyranny present no small set of challenges. They comprise fragmentary authors, such as the local historian Memnon[9] and Justin's epitome of Pompeius Trogus' *Historiae Philippicae*,[10] and a handful of references scattered throughout Isocrates' *Epistles*, Aristotle's *Politics*, Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch, and the *Suda*. With few exceptions, they also appear to derive from a hostile tradition, which likely originated with Clearchus' political enemies (i.e., the Council of 300) or the descendants of these political enemies.[11] It is also writ large that the sources are often colored by a discourse of anti-tyrannism in which the depiction of Clearchus as "tyrant" can carry with it pejorative connotations.[12]

Deconstructing the summum imperium/stratēgos autokratōr equivalence

This section tries to unpack how the *summum imperium/stratēgos autokratōr* parity came about and, specifically, how it has been applied to Clearchus. To my knowledge, the correspondence

---

[9] Drawing on earlier local histories, such as the one by Nymphis (see n. 11 below), Memnon composed a history of Heraclea sometime between the first century BCE and second century CE. What we can use of Memnon's history today is thanks to Photius' *Library* in the form of an epitome of books 9–16 of Memnon's original history. Naturally, the extent to which Photius accurately preserved the history of Memnon has long been a matter of contention among scholars. See, e.g., Treadgold 1980, 67–80; Wilson 1994, 5. For commentaries on Memnon's fragments, see *BNJ* 434 (Keaveney and Madden); Heinemann 2010; Davaze 2013.

[10] Pompeius Trogus was active in the late first century BCE. His work comprised a universal history in Latin under the title *Historiae Philippicae*. Although the original work is lost, it is usually agreed that Pompeius drew mostly on late Classical and Hellenistic authors as his sources. For the status quaestionis and for bibliography on Trogus' sources, see Borgna 2018, 131–33; 2019, XXV–XXVII, esp. XXVII n. 80. Of course, the degree of Justin's originality in the epitome of Pompeius Trogus' *Historiae Philippicae* is also disputed (e.g., Goodyear 1992, 210–33; Yardley and Heckel 1997, 1–19; Borgna 2018) as is Justin's date (e.g., Alonso-Núñez 1987, 56–72; Syme 1988, 358–71; Yardley 2003; Borgna 2018, 39–44), which ranges between the second and fourth centuries CE.

[11] Key to understanding the underlying hostility toward the Clearchid tyranny in the literary sources are the local fragmentary historians (i.e., Promathidas, Amphitheus, Nymphis, and Domitius Callistratus) upon whom Memnon and others likely drew. For discussion of the local historians, see Dana 2011, 243–46. Nymphis, especially, is worth mentioning as his family reportedly suffered exile at the hands of Clearchus himself (*BNJ* 432 (Billows), T 3) and his history of Heracleote affairs down to the fall of the Clearchid dynasty (281 BCE) served as a main source for Memnon, for which see Jacoby *Komm.* III.B.259–60, 269–70; Desideri 1967, 366–416, esp. 389–91, 1991, 7–24; Davaze 2013, 58–65; Gallotta 2014, 65–77; *BNJ* 432 (Billows), esp. T 3–4 and F 10. Still, the hostile position toward Clearchus and his successors need not have arisen in Nymphis' history exclusively. After all, a number of Clearchus' political enemies went into exile upon his accession to power and, according to the latest study of the politics of exile at Heraclea Pontica by Loddo 2022, 155–182 these exiles proved an enduring threat to the Clearchid regime.

[12] Bibliography on the archetypal figure of the tyrant is too extensive to list here in full. Some useful overviews include Lewis 2004, 2009, 2021; Mitchell 2013, 153–63; Luraghi 2013a, 2013b, 2014, 2015, 2018; Boyd 2016.

between this peculiar Greek magistracy and the Roman power title does not appear in scholarship predating the mid-twentieth century. For example, histories of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by Grote or Beloch make no such connection.[13] A 1910 doctoral dissertation by Apel dedicated to the Clearchid tyranny at Heraclea neglects to mention the *stratēgeia autokrateira* in connection with any stage of Clearchus' career.[14] Nor does Lenk's 1927 article on the tyranny at Heraclea Pontica.[15] The ascription of this office to Clearchus is also absent from the 1921 Pauly-Wissowa entry on the tyrant.[16] Scheele's 1923 monograph on the institution of *stratēgos autokratōr* in classical Greece does not assign this position to Clearchus nor to any other Heracleote tyrant for that matter.[17] A 1966 numismatic study by Franke on the coinage of Clearchus and his brother regent, Satyrus, is the first reference that I have been able to track down, which claims that Clearchus took up the office of *stratēgos autokratōr*, but Franke supplies testimonia to neither ancient nor modern sources from which he derived this detail.[18] It is only through a reference in a nearby footnote that Franke discloses his consultation of Berve's forthcoming book on Greek tyranny published in the following year.[19] In sum, it appears that until the middle of the twentieth century, scholarship offered no interpretation of Clearchus as *stratēgos autokratōr* or linked this magistracy with the Roman title of *summum imperium.*

All this, however, changed with Berve's magisterial volumes published in 1967, which is still regarded as an authoritative source on Greek tyranny.[20] There, Berve describes the moment of Clearchus' ascent to power as follows, "Die Versammlung, die auf seine Anregung darüber beriet, wählte ihn spontan zum Strategos autokrator."[21] In the corresponding section of his second volume devoted to notes, Berve cites Justin's passage at 16.4.16 where Clearchus is granted *summum imperium* and equates this Latin phrase with the Greek *stratēgos autokratōr*.[22] We shall consider momentarily on what philological grounds these two titles might be connected, but for now it is worth asking where Berve's correlation between Clearchus' obtaining of *summum imperium* and the *stratēgeia autokrateira* might have originated. The answer reveals itself as we continue to read Berve's reconstruction of the events which led to Clearchus' tyranny. Berve says that Clearchus followed the "derselbe Weg zur Tyrannis, den der ältere Dionysios beschritten hatte" and mentions some conspicuous modeling of Dionysius on the part of Clearchus by making his son the namesake of the Syracusan tyrant.[23] This suggestion by Berve,

---

[13] Beloch 1922 III.1.137; Grote 1869, 12: 462–63.

[14] Apel 1910, 24–30.

[15] Lenk 1927, 77–83.

[16] Lenschau, s.v. Klearchos (4), *RE* 11, 577–79.

[17] For the reference to Scheele, see n. 6 above. It is worth mentioning here that none of the other studies in n. 6 treat Clearchus as *stratēgos autokratōr* either.

[18] Franke 1966, 130–39 (*stratēgos autokratōr* at p. 131).

[19] Franke 1966, 131 n. 9.

[20] Berve 1967.

[21] Berve 1967, 1: 316: "The assembly, which deliberated on his suggestion, impulsively elected him *stratēgos autokratōr*."

[22] Berve 1967, 2: 680.

[23] Berve 1967, 1: 316: "same path to tyranny that the elder Dionysius had trodden… ." Apel 1910, 31 describes Clearchus' regime as "eine Militärmonarchie," which may also have influenced Berve's hypothesis.

in turn, likely originated in a remark made by Diodorus Siculus that Clearchus "imitated the path of the tyrant of Syracuse, Dionysius (I)" (ἐζήλωσε μὲν τὴν διαγωγὴν τὴν Διονυσίου τοῦ Συρακοσίων τυράννου, 15.81.5). But nowhere in his comparison of Dionysius and Clearchus does Diodorus mention the *stratēgeia autokrateira*. We might just as easily and perhaps more logically assume that when Diodorus (or a source he consulted in preparing book 15) referred to these tyrants' "path" (τὴν διαγωγήν, Diod. Sic. 15.81.5), he was speaking in broader terms about their shared "demagogic" practices rather than any specific office.[24] Be that as it may, it is now clear that Berve's drawing of a parallel between Justin's *summum imperium* and *stratēgos autokratōr* was his own conjecture. Admittedly, it was not an entirely poor guess, but it was nonetheless a guess without any firm grounding in the ancient literary evidence or testimony related to Clearchus. And yet, the degree to which Berve's suggestion has come to dominate subsequent historical reconstructions of Clearchus' rise to power is striking for it can be found in most scholarship starting with Franke in 1966 up until today.[25] So, now that we know likely where and with whom the *summum imperium*/*stratēgos autokratōr* equivalence arose, it is time to consider if there are philological reasons or other arguments for linking *summum imperium* with *stratēgos autokratōr*.

Summum Imperium

Imperium is "most commonly used to denote the authority of certain Roman civic and military office holders," although it is often noted that the term had a broader usage.[26] Romans, for instance, also used it to refer to the power of foreign kings and leaders.[27] In a recent study of *summum imperium auspiciumque*, Vervaet concluded that *summum imperium* is quite malleable indeed, signifying not "one specific *genus imperii*."[28] *Summum imperium* defines the *imperium* of the consul or dictator,[29] but also the authority of *tribuni militum consulari potestate* (Livy 5.14.1), of consular and praetorian proconsuls (Livy 28.27.12, Cic. *QFr.* 1.31), and it is even extended to propraetors and other officials *cum praetorio imperio* (Cic. *Verr.* 2.14; *Leg. agr.* 1.9, 2.34, 2.99).[30] Thus, *summum imperium* in a Roman context, at any rate, does not denote "the power of one particular category of official *cum imperio*, but rather serves to denote the authority of that official who in

---

[24] It has long been the consensus view that Diodorus consulted Ephorus for his history of Greece in books 11 through 16 of the *Bibliotheke*. Scholars, on the other hand, disagree about the other sources used by Diodorus. Timaeus, Philistus, *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, and Ctesias are among the usual list of candidates for books 14 and 15. My own view regarding Diodorus as an author in his own right and how he used his sources is closest to that of Harding (2021, XXXVI–XLIV).

[25] See n. 7 for a sample of bibliographic references.

[26] For the quote, see Lushkov, s.v. *Imperium*, *EAH* 6, 3433–3435. On the shades of *imperium*'s application and meaning, some definitive studies include Mommsen 1888; Brunt 1977, 95–116; Bleicken 1981, 1993, 117–33; Richardson, 2008.

[27] E.g., nn. 33–39 below.

[28] Vervaet 2014, 29.

[29] It is usually assumed that *summum imperium* was attached exclusively to consular power or that of a dictator (see, e.g., Badian 1965, 110–21; Giradet 1992, 177–88, 2000, 167–227, 2001, 153–209; Roddaz 1992, 189–211; Brennan 2000, 39, 261 n. 50; Hurlet 2006).

[30] For greater detail, see Vervaet 2014, 29–51.

a certain well-defined context holds the supreme command."[31] Considering the wide-ranging application of the power title in Roman political and constitutional history, it seems unlikely that Justin (or the historian Pompeius Trogus whose work he epitomizes) had one particular post, such as *stratēgos autokratōr*, in mind when he used it in relation to Clearchus.[32]

Still, it is worth investigating further if the historical sources which use this pairing confirm the versatility evinced in the world of Roman politics and administration. In the extant remains of Justin's epitome *summum imperium* is used on one other occasion to report Hannibal's appointment in 196 BCE as suffete, Carthage's highest magisterial office (32.4.10).[33] If we probe other Latin authors writing about non-Roman affairs, like Justin (and Pompeius Trogus), the *Lives* of Cornelius Nepos supply a handful of instances. Nepos avails himself of *summum imperium* to describe the power held by the Spartan king (*Them.* 4.2);[34] Eumenes' command over other high-ranking Macedonians (*Eum.* 7.1);[35] the chief position held by Tissaphernes among Persian satraps, (*Ages.* 2.3);[36] the generalship at Athens (*Phoc.* 2.4),[37] and the chief power entrusted by Lysander to ten men in cities formerly allied to Athens after the Peloponnesian War (*Lys.* 1.5).[38] Curtius Rufus also employs *summum imperium* in reference to Pharnabazus' command over the coast during Alexander the Great's conquest of Asia (3.13.14.2).[39] According to the use of this pairing by Latin-speaking authors writing about Greek and other non-Roman affairs, *summum imperium* does not easily graft onto one single magistracy and, therefore, should not necessarily be equated with *stratēgos autokratōr*.[40] As Vervaet astutely notes of the Roman administrative world, rather than referring to one particular *genus imperii*, *summum imperium* in non-Roman contexts also displays malleability. One question that remains is if Justin or Pompeius Trogus

---

[31] Vervaet 2014, 29.

[32] Of course, we know that Pompeius Trogus drew on late Classical authors in composing the *Historiae Philippicae* (see n. 10 above), who could have specified the office which was granted to Clearchus in 364/3 BCE, but even this likelihood cannot confirm that Trogus' original Greek source assigned the supreme generalship and not some other post to Clearchus. For some likely possibilities, see below pp. 8–11.

[33] Just. *Epit.* 32.4.10: *nec cum reversus Karthaginem summum imperium tenuit* ("not even when he had returned to Carthage and held the highest office").

[34] Nep. *Them.* 4.2: *Idque Eurybiadi, regi Lacedaemoniorum, qui tum summae imperii praeerat, fore affirmabat* ("and he asserted that it was so to Eurybiades, king of the Lacedaemonians, who held the chief command at that time"). N.B. Nepos' *summae imperii* in this passage is not precisely the same as *summum imperium*.

[35] Nep. *Eum.* 7.1: *si potius ipse alienigena summi imperii potiretur quam alii Macedonum* ("if he [Eumenes], a foreigner, should occupy the highest command rather than one of Macedonians").

[36] Nep. *Ages.* 2.3: *Tissaphernes, qui summum imperium tum inter praefectos habebat regios* ("Tissaphernes, who among the king's satraps at that time held the chief authority").

[37] Nep. *Phoc.* 2.4: *cum apud eum summum esset imperium populi* ("when he [Phocion] had the highest office from the people").

[38] Nep. *Lys.* 1.5: *quibus summum imperium potestatemque omnium rerum committeret* ("to whom he [Lysander] had entrusted the highest office and power over all matters").

[39] Curt. 3.13.14: *Pharnabazi quoque, cui summum imperium maritimae orae rex dederat* ("and Pharnabazus, to whom the King had given the highest command over the coast").

[40] Yarrow 2006, 193 has observed that αὐτοκράτωρ is a usual translation for two Roman power titles – *dictator* and *imperator*. However, she also presents Memnon's use of the term αὐτοκράτωρ as a case study of the fluidity of the Greek word for translating a variety of Roman magistracies (2006, 192–95). Yarrow's remarks concerning αὐτοκράτωρ thus resembles the versatility with which *summum imperium* is applied to a wide range of Greek and non-Greek positions.

used *summum imperium* in a generalizing sense to refer to the highest command at Heraclea Pontica, what might that office have been? For this we turn to the political and constitutional history of Heraclea.

High Office at Heraclea Pontica

The evidence for Heraclea's political institutions is rather thin on the ground. But luckily its status as a colonial foundation and its settlement of two further colonies on the Black Sea have allowed scholars to extrapolate, albeit not without caution, on the offices and institutions through the *mētropolis-apoikia* relationship.[41] At Chalcedon and Heraclea, inscriptional evidence shows that a *basileus* served as the eponymous official.[42] It is widely held that a *proaisymnon* mentioned in documents from Heraclea's colonies, Callatis and Chersonesus, also presided over a college of *aisymnētai* at Heraclea.[43] We hear of a body of judicial magistrates called *nomophylakes* at Chersonesus, usually considered likely at Heraclea Pontica as well.[44] Aristotle once refers to a board of *strategoi* (*Oec.* 1347b13) overseeing a naval campaign, but never to a *stratēgos autokratōr*.[45] Bearing in mind the evidence we have for the highest offices at Heraclea Pontica, then, it is certainly possible that when Justin says the assembly appointed Clearchus with *summum imperium* he had *basileus* or some other preexisting office, such as *proaisymnon/aisymnētēs*, in mind. The post of *aisymnētēs* is especially tempting, since we know of others, such as Pittacus of Mytilene, who also took up this position and were also associated with tyranny.[46] But even these possibilities still leave us with an *argumentum ex silentio*, and it is difficult to say if the office of the *aisymnēteia* worked in precisely the same way at Heraclea as it did in sixth-century Mytilene or elsewhere.[47]

---

[41] For an overview of Heraclea's institutions, see Avram, Hind, and Tsetskhladze 2004, 957; Burstein 1976, 20–21. For an in-depth study Robu 2014 is useful.

[42] I.*Kalchedon* 7, 8, 10, 19; I.*Heraclea* 2b, 4. For *basileus* as the eponymous official, Callatis (I.*Kallatis* 3, *SGDI* 3089 = I.*Kallatis* 7) and Chersonese (*IOSPE* I² 186–187) also provide inscriptional evidence.

[43] Callatis: *ISM* III, 10, l. 1–2, 35, l. 2–3; Chersonese: *IOSPE* I² 352, l. 57; *IOSPE* I² 690, l. 1–2. On this position see, Robu 2014, 387 n. 295, cf. n. 296 for an alternative interpretation.

[44] *IOSPE* I² 342, 343, 359 = *IOSPE* I³ 22, 51, 52.

[45] For a discussion of the college of generals at Megara and its colonies, see Robu 2014, 391–401.

[46] Aristotle presents Pittacus of Mytilene as the sole historical example of an elective tyranny (αἱρετὴ τυραννίς, *Pol.* 1285a31–32), which he claims was known as the *aisymnēteia* (*Pol.* 1285a31). Dionysius of Halicarnassus also calls Pittacus *aisymnētēs* (*A.R.* 5.73.2–3 = Theophr. F 631, Fortenbaugh). Nicolaus of Damascus (*FGrHist* 90 F 54) assigns an *aisymnēteia* to a shadowy seventh-century leader of Miletus named Epimenes. Gorman 2001, 92–5, however, argues that Nicolaus applied the term anachronistically. On Teos, *aisymnētēs* is used synonymously with "tyrant" (*Syll.*³ 38 = *ML* 30B; *SEG* XXXI.985). Other *aisymnēteia* are attested at Samos (Theodorus Metochites, *Miscell.* 668–669 names Phoebias, see also Carty 2015, 34–37), at Naxos (*Syll.*³ 955), and at Miletus and its colonies Olbia and Sinope, where the titles *stephanophori* are synonymous with *aisymnētai* of the *molpoi* (*Milet* III.122–128).

[47] For example, at Heraclea's *metropolis*, Megara, the *aisymnētai* are thought to have functioned in the same way as the *prytaneis* at Athens: they formed a smaller body of the council (Rhodes, s.v. *Aisymnetes*, *BNP* 1, 407–8).

Clearchus, the Arbiter

Another equally appealing possibility, and one for which we have more than one ancient source, is that when the demos endowed Clearchus with the highest command, they were simply reaffirming the post for which Clearchus had been brought back in the first place, namely that of arbiter. When *stasis* erupted in 364 BCE, the Council of 300's first step, even before recalling Clearchus, was to inquire after a mediator to arbitrate between them and the demos. Justin tells us that the Council first sought help from Timotheus, the Athenian leader, and next from Epaminondas the Theban (*Epit.* 16.4.3). Both candidates refused and consequently the Council "hastened" (*decurrent*) to Clearchus, whom they had previously banished (*Epit.* 16.4.4).

In Justin, the Council recalls (*vocarent*) Clearchus to take up the position of "arbiter of civil discord" (*arbiter civilis discordiae*, *Epit.* 16.4.8). Earlier, Justin describes the role Clearchus assumed upon his return as "the guardianship of his homeland" (*tutelam patriae*, *Epit.* 16.4.5). Later, Justin has Clearchus disingenuously volunteer to withdraw his support from the demos in the speech leading up to his appointment: "nor would he take part in their civil discord (pl.)" (*neque civilibus discordiis interfuturum*, *Epit.* 16.4.13). The *Suda* (s.v. Κλέαρχος) records that deteriorating into oppressive *stasis* (ἐκπίπτουσιν οἱ Ἡρακλεῶται εἰς στάσιν βαρεῖαν) the Heracleotes wished to return to amity and become reconciled (ἐπανελθεῖν εἰς φιλίαν καὶ συμβάσεις βουλόμενοι), and they chose Clearchus as "*ephor* for renewing civic harmony" (προαιροῦνται ἔφορον τῆς αὖθις ὁμονοίας τὸν Κλέαρχον). The *Suda* (s.v. Κλέαρχος), furthermore, speaks about Clearchus' power coming from the commons (ἐγκρατὴς δ'οὖν τῶν κοινῶν γενόμενος), which seems to allude to the moment in Justin when *plebs summum ad eum imperium defert* "the people grant him *summum imperium*" (*Epit.* 16.4.16).[48] Thus, both sources which report directly on Clearchus' rise to power give an account of his recall by painting a vivid picture of the internal upheaval besetting Heraclea Pontica at the time.[49] These sources also use language and titles with obvious ties to arbitration to describe Clearchus' special appointment. Perhaps by looking at Clearchus as a military figure, as most scholarship has tended to do since Berve, other aspects of Clearchus' immediate rise have been unduly neglected. I suggest that rather than speculate a military-style office for Clearchus in 364/3 BCE we ought to consider the duty for which Clearchus was originally summoned and the titles for which we have solid textual evidence. In other words, instead of interpretating *summum imperium* as *stratēgos autokratōr*, a magisterial office for which there is no evidence of its existence or deployment at Heraclea Pontica at any point in its history, a ready solution is that *summum imperium* represented the special appointment to which Clearchus had been designated as arbitrator. Indeed, most scholarly discussions pre-dating Berve by Grote, Lenschau, and Lenk also emphasize the element of mediation in Clearchus' early career.[50] This reading of Clearchus' path to the tyranny would mean that when Justin describes

---

[48] Although Aristotle does not specify a historical example, when he discusses the rise of tyrannies from oligarchies in the *Politics*, he describes one scenario, strikingly familiar from Heraclea Pontica, where a tyrant arises when mercenaries and "a neutral arbiter" (ἄρχοντι μεσιδίῳ) are entrusted with the maintenance of internal security, and the arbiter becomes master of both [disputing parties] (γίνεται κύριος ἀμφοτέρων, *Pol.* 1306a27–29).

[49] For modern accounts of this *stasis*, see Burstein 1976, 48–50; Gehrke 1985, 72.

[50] Indeed, works pre-dating Berve's study emphasize Clearchus' arbitrator position (e.g., Grote 1869, 12: 463; Lenschau, s.v. Klearchos (4), *RE* 11, 578; Lenk 1927, 79). See also, Davaze 2013, 146–49 who more recently draws attention to Clearchus as arbiter.

the soon-to-be tyrant shifting his allegiance from the Council of 300 to the demos, and the assembly bestowing *summum imperium* upon him, the people were in fact (re)confirming the role of arbiter for which Clearchus had been recalled in the first place.

Several factors contribute positively to this interpretation of the genesis of Clearchus' tyranny. The first is that Heraclea Pontica, as was already mentioned, had faced *stasis* before and on at least one of these documented occasions, exile for the oligarchic party had also been the solution (Arist. *Pol.* 1304b31–39).[51] Accordingly, when Clearchus took the steps that he did, after the demos had put their trust in him to resolve the political and social crisis, he was not undertaking any radically new maneuver or at least one that Heraclea had not experienced before.

Second, while it is acknowledged that a *stratēgos autokratōr* could wield wide, executive powers, not without civil implications, historical instances of this special magistracy usually take place in times of foreign military campaigns. Dionysius I of Syracuse was elected *stratēgos autokratōr* to carry out the war against an invading Carthaginian host (Diod. Sic. 13.94.5).[52] The Phocian tyrants, Philomelus, Onomarchus, Phayllus, Phalaecus, were similarly made *stratēgoi autokratores* in succession during the Third Sacred War.[53] Even the rare Athenian case of Alcibiades', Nicias', and Lamachus' appointments as *stratēgoi autokratores* arose on the occasion of a long-distance military expedition (Thuc. 6.8.2).[54] Naturally, it would be misleading to assert that no external pressure threatened the safety and autonomy of Heraclea, which would have made an able military commander highly desirable. In the years preceding Clearchus' ascent the satraps of western Anatolia had led a revolt against the Persian king Artaxerxes (404–359/58 BCE).[55] In fact, Ariobarzanes, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia and father of Mithridates, led this uprising and had strong incentive for bringing a city with Black Sea access under his control.[56] Nevertheless, despite the delicate situation in which Heraclea found its foreign policy in the 360s BCE, the account provided by the ancient sources, as we have already seen, is clearly one of internal turmoil and not the onslaught of an invading Persian army. The Heracleotes, then, stood more in need of an able administrator to oversee domestic issues and deal with external threats through the traditional means of diplomacy than a supreme general of warfare.[57]

Third, although once tyrant Clearchus' eccentric self-presentation and image management

---

[51] On this particular stasiotic episode, see Burstein 1976, 19, 23–24; Robinson 1997, 111–12, 2011, 157; Avram 2009, 219–21.

[52] Of course, there is a company of other Syracusan leaders, most of whom are also associated with tyranny, who were similarly appointed *stratēgos autokratōr* (e.g., Gelon (?), Hermocrates, Dion, Timoleon, Agathocles, and Hiero II). For a sampling of bibliography on the Sicilian cases of *stratēgos autokratōr*, see Scheele 1923, 19–51; Berve 1956, 73–4; Westlake 1969, 174–202; Caven 1990, 50–58; Zambon 2008, 179–90; De Angelis 2016, 218; De Lisle 2021, 15; Pownall 2022, 35–47.

[53] For a summary overview of the succession of the Phocian tyrants as *stratēgoi*, see D.S. 16.56.5. For scholarly discussion of the Phocian examples, see Scheele 1923, 10–12; Buckler 1989, 22, 47, 85, 98, 141; McInerney 1999, 199–204; Maronati 2007, 65–85; Pascual González 2018, 98.

[54] For Athens, see also M. Scheele 1923, 3–10; Bearzot 1988, 39–57.

[55] For these events, see Debord 1999, 287–301.

[56] Devaze 2013, 148.

[57] On Heraclea Pontica's long-standing history of diplomatic relations with Persia, see Debord 1999, 300; Briant 2002, 699.

drew a fair measure of censure from the ancient sources (i.e., Clearchus is said to have claimed to be a son of Zeus and appeared in public decadently attired),[58] these so-called peculiarities, when read from a different angle, can help to shed new light on Clearchus' leadership goals.[59] By evoking Zeus as a ruler whose regime, according to one prevalent tradition, was held to have brought with it order, stability, and justice, Clearchus may have been trying to align these same values with his own objectives as arbiter.[60]

Fourth and finally, Clearchus would be well in the company of other arbitrator tyrants, both tyrants who once in power mediated disputes, like Periander of Corinth,[61] and those who owed their power to a mediating role or to acting as a corrective force within an unstable political community (e.g., Pittacus of Mytilene, Cypselus I of Corinth, Gelon of Syracuse, Solon and Pisistratus of Athens, and Tynnondas of Euboea).[62]

One counter argument to this reappraisal of Clearchus might be that, while a handful of scholars have examined archaic arbitrator tyrants, tyrants as mediators are not a well-documented feature of the historical record during the Classical and Hellenistic periods. This putative shortfall of later arbiter tyrants, however, has much to do with conventional approaches to studying Greek history, some of which have been influenced by the ancient authors themselves. For instance, Aristotle's discussion of elective tyranny in the *Politics* lists only one historical example of an arbiter tyrant, Pittacus of Mytilene (1285a31–32). Some have pointed to the artificiality of Aristotle's treatment of tyranny and view his strict categorizing tendencies as contradicted by the historical evidence.[63] Moreover, work of the last two decades on Greek tyranny has challenged the conventional idea of an archaic age of tyrants and a Classical period devoid of them and sees tyranny as a political alternative resurfacing during the Archaic, Classical, and Hellenistic periods.[64]

One early Hellenistic example of a "tyrant" designated to set matters to rights in a war-torn

[58] Justin (*Epit.* 16.5.7–11), Memnon (*FGrHist* 434 F 1.1.1), Plutarch (*De Alex. fort.* 5 = *Mor.* 338b), and the *Suda* (s.v. Κλέαρχος) paint Clearchus' behavior as megalomania: he pretentiously claimed to be the son of Zeus, he wielded a thunderbolt, and he named his son Ceraunus "Thunderbolt." He wore make-up and luxurious dress, reminiscent of kings in tragedy. In the *Suda* (s.v. Κλέαρχος), Clearchus even demands *proskynesis*. For an analysis of Clearchus' literary portrait in Memnon (via Nymphis) which linked the tyrant to oriental despotism, see Heinemann 2010, 102–9.

[59] For a study of this aspect of Clearchus' public persona, see Boyd *forthcoming*.

[60] On this view of Zeus in Greek religion, see Lloyd-Jones 1971. For the motif of the tyrant as Zeus-nurtured ruler in epinician, see Morgan 2015, 36 *et passim*. On the continued importance of Zeus as a paradigm for Hellenistic kings in poetry, see Brumbaugh 2019.

[61] Hdt. 5.94–96, Strab. 13.1.38–39, Diog. Laert. 1.74. Page 1955, 152–53 suggests that Alcaeus' poems served as a source for this story in antiquity. The fragments of Alcaeus typically cited in support of this theory are F 167, 306 (f) Voigt.

[62] Fabbrini 2002, 265–267 emphasizes the figure of the tyrant as a mediator figure. Similarly, on the archaic tradition of tyrants who come to power as lawgivers and stabilizing forces in their communities, see Parker 2007, 13–39. I recognize that for some Solon of Athens might be a controversial figure to include in this group, but the latest work on the Athenian statesman has drawn affinities between him and other tyrants of his time (see e.g., Goušchin 1999, 14–23; Irwin 2005, 205–280; Parker 2007, 14, 24–8; Sagstetter 2013; Bernhardt 2022, 414–61).

[63] For Aristotle on Pittacus, see Romer 1982, 25–46; Schütrumpf 1991, 543. For a critical assessment of Aristotle's treatment of tyranny as "historical," see Sprawski 1999, 59; Lewis 2006, 8, 2009, 91.

[64] On this line of research, see Lewis 2006, 2009, 2021; Mitchell 2013.

and *stasis*-ridden city is Demetrius of Phalerum.[65] His appointment as *epimelētēs* of Athens and his efforts to institute legal reforms certainly suggest an effort to stabilize the city (Diod. Sic. 18.74.3).[66] It should be noted that despite Demetrius' many achievements in power, a hostile tradition in the sources assigns him a disillusioned sense of grandeur, similar to Clearchus, that is preserved infamously in anecdotes about statues erected throughout the city in his honor.[67]

Aratus of Sicyon is another case in point. Plutarch says that he was chosen as mediator plenipotentiary (αὐτοκράτωρ διαλλακτὴς, *Arat.* 14.2) and resolved the civil conflict brought about by the return of exiles to Sicyon with a 150-talent financial settlement from Ptolemy II. Aratus is not remembered as a tyrant in the extant literature, but recent opinion notes strong resemblances in his actions and conduct toward other tyrants, and his close working relationship with a handful of tyrants or former tyrants is certainly suggestive.[68]

Early Hellenistic Samos offers another instance of a tyrant as arbitrator. Scholars describe the atmosphere on Samos at the end of the fourth century BCE as one of intense factionalism largely thanks to shifting power dynamics in the eastern Aegean after the death of Alexander of the Great and the return of the exiled Samian population to their native island. When Perdiccas enforced Alexander's original decree to restore all exiles (322/321 BCE), it is agreed that property disputes, social upheaval, and all out violence on Samos attended the return of the Samians after a forty-year absence from the island.[69] Among the returning exiles was a young Duris, who would later succeed his father Kaios as tyrant of Samos. The sources do not reveal the precise details of how Kaios attained power, but it is usually thought, considering the fragile social situation on Samos at the time, that Kaios came to power as an arbiter figure who mediated this crisis.[70]

In early first-century BCE Athens, we hear about a certain Medeios holding an unprecedented three eponymous archonships in a row after a slave revolt and during a time of economic hardship — catalysts, no doubt, for *stasis*.[71] The sources do not record Medeios as tyrant, but the latest analysis of his career invites reconsideration of Medeios as a type of elective tyrant not dissimilar to Athens' sixth-century mediator (and perhaps also tyrant) Solon.[72] The political potency of acting as an arbitrator (διαλλακτήν) for one's community was recognized by Plutarch as one of the most important roles in which a statesman might serve (*bis* at *Mor.* 823B9 = *Praec. Ger. Reip.* 31 and at *Mor.* 825E2 = *Praec. Ger. Reip.* 32). Similarly, in *On the fortune and virtue of Alexander the Great* Plutarch says that Alexander fancied himself "a mediator

---

[65] The bibliography relating to Demetrius of Phalerum is too expansive to fully detail within this space. Some representative studies include Gehrke 1978, 149–93; Williams 1997, 327–46; Fortenbaugh and Schütrumpf 2000; Haake 2007, 60–82.

[66] On Demetrius in the role of lawgiver, see Dow and Travis 1943, 144–66; Gagarin 2000, 347–65; Tracy 2000, 331–45.

[67] For a sampling of this hostile tradition, see Ath. 12.542B–C, 542E–F, 13.593G; Diog. Laert. 5.76.

[68] Our impression of Aratus today might be very different indeed if Phylarchus' lost histories had survived, for whom Aratus was the antagonist of his work (*FGrHist* 81). On Aratus, see Gruen 1972, 609–25; Hillen 2012.

[69] Kebric 1977, 5–7.

[70] Barron 1962, 189–92. Kebric 1977, 7.

[71] Antela-Bernárdez 2021, 199–201.

[72] Antela-Bernárdez 2021, 201–202.

for all" (διαλλακτὴς τῶν ὅλων νομίζων) (*Mor.* 329C1). Clearly, in the historical record and in political discourse, arbitration continues to be presented as an effective platform for acquiring and legitimizing power long after the Archaic period. Some of the aforementioned rulers are called *tyrannoi* in the ancient sources and others are not. The increasingly prevalent binary in the Hellenistic period between democracy as "legitimate" government vs. tyranny/oligarchy as "illegitimate" and the individual author's leanings undoubtedly influenced the labels attached or not attached to these figures. What is more, there is good reason to study the connection between Hellenistic tyranny and mediation further, since in recent decades studies of the Greek polis have demonstrated not only the continuation of stasiotic conflict throughout the Hellenistic period, but have also used documentation of these crises as evidence for "the abiding relevance and vitality of the Hellenistic polis."[73] To summarize, then, these examples demonstrate first that arbiters associated with tyranny are in fact attested in the Greek world beyond the Archaic period and that that they continue to surface in moments of intense *stasis*, just as at Heraclea in 364/363 BCE.

Conclusion

At all events, it is now clear i) that Justin's *summum imperium* cannot *a priori* be equated with *stratēgos autokratōr* and ii) that this interpretation of Clearchus' rise to power, in fact, originated from a hypothesis made by Berve in his influential 1967 study of Greek tyranny. It is also now evident that an emphasis on Clearchus' beginnings as a warlord, although the prevailing interpretation in modern scholarship, has overlooked documented historical circumstances of Clearchus' ascent at Heraclea Pontica. Not only should we entertain possibilities for Clearchus other than *stratēgos autokratōr* because all other attested cases of these generals tend to occur in moment of *external* warfare, but also because our sources unanimously report that at the time of Clearchus' recall the foremost challenge facing the city was *internal* strife. The best option, then, is the one for which we have the strongest textual evidence, that is, Clearchus came to power as an arbiter (*arbiter civilis discordiae* (Just. 16.4.8); ἔφορον τῆς αὖθις ὁμονοίας (*Suda* s.v. Κλέαρχος)), appointed first by the Council of 300 to resolve the crisis afflicting Heracleote society and later reaffirmed by the demos for this same purpose.

By examining Clearchus through the lens of mediator we have gained fresh insights into his elevation to power, and we can appreciate Clearchus as one among a collection of tyrants who, in times of social and political instability, were placed in positions of power so as to reestablish justice and order. And, if longevity counts as one measure of stability, we can attribute some level of success to Clearchus. Afterall, the political preeminence he established in 364/3 BCE was passed on to successive generations of his descendants, the Clearchids, who ruled Heraclea Pontica for the next eight decades.[74] Finally, this reexamination of Clearchus' ascent also contains a broader methodological point. It reminds us of an important lesson about how hypotheses, when unquestioningly accepted, can inadvertently influence scholarship, and how these assumptions may transmit inaccuracies over time. Let the tyrant Clearchus from the Black

---

[73] On the Hellenistic Greek polis, see Gruen 1993, 339–54; Gauthier 1993, 211–31; Deininger 1993, 55–76; Zimmermann 2008, 9–21. For *stasis* in the Hellenistic polis, see Börm 2018, 53–83 and p. 56 (for the quote).

[74] See Lester-Pearson 2021, 141–60 for a recent study of the later Clearchids.

Sea serve as a welcome reminder of the importance of renewed curiosity, even for historical figures about whom we think we know all there is to know.

MARCALINE J. BOYD

UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE

MBOYD@UDEL.EDU

Bibliography

Alonso-Núñez, J. M. (1987) An Augustan World History. The *Historiae Philippicae* of Pompeius Trogus. *G&R* 34, 56–72.

Antela-Bernárdez, B. (2021) The Last Tyrants of Athens. In S. Lewis (editor). *Tyranny: New Contexts*, 199–213. Besançon.

Apel, H. (1910) *Die Tyrannis von Herakleia.* Diss., Halle.

Avram, A. (2009) Héraclée du Pont et ses colonies pontiques: antécédents milésiens (?) et empreinte mégarienne. In M. Lombardo et al. (editors). *Le fondazioni sub-coloniali greche tra colonizzazione e colonialismo*, 209–27. Galatina.

Avram, A., Hind, J. and G. Tsetskhladze. (2004) Herakleia. In M. H. Hansen et al. (editors). *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis*, 955–58. Oxford.

Badian, E. (1965) M. Porcius Cato and the annexation and early administration of Cyprus. *JRS* 55, 110–21.

Barron, J. (1962) The Tyranny of Duris of Samos. *CR* 12, 189–92.

Bearzot, C. (1988) Strategia autocratica e aspirazioni tiranniche. Il caso di Alcibiade. *Prometheus* 14, 39–57.

——. (1991) Gelone strategos autokrator tra storicità e propaganda dionigiana. *Hesperìa* 2, 79–87.

Beloch, J. (1912–1927) *Griechische Geschichte*². 4 vols. Strassburg.

Bernhardt, J. C. (2022). A Failed Tyrant? Solon's Place in Athenian History. In J. C. Bernhardt et al. (editors). *From Homer to Solon: Continuity and Change in Archaic Greece*, 414–61. Leiden.

Berve, H. (1956) *Dion.* Wiesbaden.

——. (1967) *Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen.* 2 vols. Munich.

Bittner, A. (1998) *Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft in Herakleia Pontike: Eine Polis zwischen Tyrannis und Selbstverwaltung.* Bonn.

Bleicken, J. (1981) *Zum Begriff der römischen Amtsgewalt.* Göttingen.

——. (1993). Imperium consulare/proconsulare im Übergang von der Republik zum Prinzipat. In J. Bleicken (editor). *Colloquium aus Anlass des 80,* 117–33. Kallmünz.

Borgna, A. (2018) *Ripensare la storia universale: Giustino e l'Epitome delle « Storie Filippiche» di Pompeo Trogo.* Hildesheim.

——. (2019) *Storie Filippiche: florilegio da Pompeo Trogo.* Santarcangelo di Romagna.

Börm, H. (2018) *Stasis* in Post-Classical Greece: The Discourse of Civil Strife in the Hellenistic World. In H. Börm et al. (editors). *The Polis in the Hellenistic World*, 53–83. Steiner.

Boyd, M. J. (2016) *Fashioning Tyrants: Models of Greek Tyranny and the Historian's Role in Tyrant-Making.* Diss., Tallahassee.

— —. (forthcoming) Clearchus of Heraclea Pontica as Stranger-King: Power, Religion and Tyranny on the Black Sea. In E. Nicholson, H. Anderson, and J. Guthrie (editors). *Stranger Kings in Antiquity*. London.

Brennan, T. C. (2000) *The Praetorship in the Roman Republic*. Oxford.

Briant, P. (2002) *From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire*. Translated by P.T. Daniels. University Park.

Brumbaugh, M. (2019) *The New Politics of Olympos: Kingship in Kallimachos'* Hymns. Oxford.

Brunt, P. A. (1977) Lex de imperio Vespasiani. *JRS* 67, 95–116.

Buckler, J. (1989) *Philip II and the Sacred War*. Leiden.

Burstein, S. M. (1972) *A Political History of Heraclea Pontica to 281 B.C.* Diss., Los Angeles.

——. (1976) *Outpost of Hellenism: The Emergence of Heraclea on the Black Sea*. Berkeley.

Carty, A. (2015) *Polycrates, Tyrant of* Samos. Stuttgart.

Caven, B. (1990) *Dionysius I: Warlord of Sicily*. New Haven.

Chantraine, P. (1968) *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque*. Paris.

Dana, M. (2011) *Culture et mobilité dans le Pont-Euxin: approche régionale de la vie culturelle des cités grecques.* Bordeaux.

Davaze, V. (2013) *Memnon, historien d'Héraclée du Pont: commentaire historique*. Diss., Le Mans.

Davies, J. K. (1993) *Democracy and Classical Greece*[2]. Cambridge, MA.

De Angelis, F. (2016) *Archaic and Classical Greek Sicily*. Oxford.

De Lisle, C. (2021) *Agathocles of* Syracuse. Oxford.

Debord, P. (1999) *L'Asie mineure au IVe siècle (412-323 a.C.): Pouvoirs et jeux politiques*. Paris.

Deininger, J. (1993) Krise der Polis?. In K. Dietz (editor). *Klassisches Altertum, Spätantike und frühes Christentum*, 55–76. Würzburg.

Desideri, P. (1967) Studi di storiografia eracleota I. *SCO* 16, 366–416.

— —. (1991) Cultura eracleota: da Erodoro a Eraclide Pontico. In B. Rémy (editor). *Pontica I. Recherches sur l'histoire du Pont dans l'Antiquité*, 7–24. Saint-Étienne.

Dow, S. and A. H. Travis. (1943) Demetrius of Phalerum and his Lawgiving. *Hesperia* 12, 144–65.

Erçiyas, D. B. (2003) Herakleia Pontica - Amatris. In D. V. Grammenos et al. (editors). *Ancient Greek Colonies in the Black Sea, Publications of the Archaeological Institute of Northern Greece 4*, 1403–31. Thessaloniki.

Fabbrini, F. (2002) Tiranni e poleis: questioni di metodo (appunti sulle tirannidi antiche quali regimi personali). *QCSAM* 1, 241–307.

Fortenbaugh, W. W. and E. Schütrumpf, eds. (2000) *Demetrius of Phalerum: text, translation and discussion*. New Brunswick.

Franke, P. R. (1966) Zur Tyrannis des Klearchos und Satyros in Herakleia am Pontos. *AA* 2, 130–39.

Gagarin, M. (2000) The Legislation of Demetrius of Phalerum and the Transformation of Athenian Law. In W. W. Fortenbaugh et al. (editors). *Demetrius of Phalerum*, 347–65. New Brunswick.

Gallotta, S. (2014) Appunti su Memnone di Eraclea. *Erga-Logoi* 2, 65–77.

— —. (2021) Rendere accettabile il cambiamento: il colpo di stato nelle poleis greche, esempi a confronto. In E. Poddighe et al. (editors). *Resisting and Justifying Changes: How to Make the New Acceptable in the Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern World*, 271–78. Pisa.

Gauthier, P. (1993) Les cités hellénistiques. In M. H. Hansen (editor). *The Ancient Greek City-State*, 211–31. Copenhagen.

Gehrke, H. -J. (1978) Das Verhältnis von Politik und Philosophie im Wirken des Demetrios von Phaleron. *Chiron* 8, 149–93.

— —. (1985) *Stasis. Untersuchungen zu den inneren Kriegen in den griechischen Staaten des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* Munich.

Giradet, K. M. (1992) *Imperium* und *provinciae* des Pompeius seit 67 v. Chr. *Cahiers du Centre Gustave Glotz* 3, 177–88.

— —. (2000). Imperium 'maius': Politische und verfassungsrechtliche Aspekte. Versuch einer Erklärung. In F. Paschoud et al. (editors). *Fondation Hardt pour l'étude de l'antiquité classique. Entretiens, Tome XLVI, La révolution romaine après Ronald Syme*, 167–227. Geneva.

— —. (2001) Imperia und provinciae des Pompeius 82 bis 48 v. Chr. *Chiron* 31, 153–209.

Goodyear, F. R. D. (1992) On the Character and Text of Justin's Compilation of Trogus. In K. Coleman et al. (editors). *F.R.D. Goodyear: Papers on Latin Literature*, 210–33. London.

Gorman, V. B. (2001) *Miletos: The Ornament of Ionia.* Ann Arbor.

Gouschin, V. (1999) Pisistratus' Leadership in *A.P.* 13.4 and the Establishment of the Tyranny of 561/0 B.C.. *CQ* 49, 14–23.

Grote, G. (1869) *A History of Greece.* Vol. XII. J. Murray.

Gruen, E. (1972) Aratus and the Achaean alliance with Macedon. *Historia* 4, 609–25.

— —. (1993) The Polis in the Hellenistic World. In R. Rosen et al. (editors). *Nomodeiktes. Greek Studies in honor of Martin Ostwald*, 339–54. Ann Arbor.

Haake, M. (2007) *Der Philosoph in der Stadt: Untersuchungen zur öffentlichen Rede über Philosophen und Philosophie in den hellenistischen Poleis.* Munich.

Hanell, K. (1934) *Megarische Studien.* Lund.

Harding, P. (2021) *Diodoros of Sicily*: Bibliotheke Historika, *Volume I, Books 14–15: The Greek World in the Fourth Century BC from the End of the Peloponnesian War to the Death of Artaxerxes (Memnon).* Cambridge.

Harris, J. (2017) Scholarship and Leadership on the Black Sea: Clearchus of Heraclea as (Un)enlightened Tyrant. *CHS Research Bulletin* 5.2.

Heinemann, U. (2010) *Stadtgeschichte im Hellenismus. Die lokalhistoriographischen Vorgänger und Vorlagen Memnons von Herakleia.* Munich.

Hillen, A. J. (2012) *Strategies of Unity within the Achaean League.* M.A. thesis, Salt Lake City.

Hurlet, F. (2006) *Le proconsul et le prince d'Auguste à Dioclétien.* Bordeaux.

Irwin, E. (2005) *Solon and Early Greek Poetry: The Politics of Exhortation.* Cambridge.

Kebric, R. B. 1977. *In the Shadows of Olympus: Duris of Samos.* Wiesbaden.

Lenk, B. (1927) Die Tyrannen von Herakleia am Pontos. *Mitteilungen des Vereins Klassischer Philologen in Wien* 4, 77–83.

Lenschau, T. (1921) Klearchos. *RE* 11, 577–79.

Lester-Pearson, M. (2021) Tyranny under Alexander the Great and the Diadochi: The Clearchids of Heraclea Pontica. In S. Lewis (editor), *Tyranny: New Contexts*, 141–60. Besançon.

Lewis, S. (2004) Καὶ σαφῶς τύραννος ἦν: Xenophon's Account of Euphron of Sicyon. *JHS* 124, 65–74.

— —., ed. (2006). *Ancient Tyranny.* Edinburgh.

— —. 2009. *Greek Tyranny.* Exeter.

— —., ed. 2021. *Tyranny: New Contexts.* Besançon.

Lloyd-Jones, H. (1971) *The Justice of Zeus.* Berkeley.

Loddo, L. (2022) Between Tyranny and Democracy: Political Exiles and the History of Heraclea Pontica. *Erga-Logoi* 2, 155–82.

Luraghi, N. (2013a) Ruling Alone: Monarchy in Greek Politics and Thought. In N. Luraghi (editor), *The Splendors and Miseries of Ruling Alone*, 11–21. Stuttgart.

— —. (2013b) To Die like a Tyrant. In N. Luraghi (editor), *The Splendors and Miseries of Ruling Alone*, 49–71. Stuttgart.

— —. (2014) The Cunning Tyrant: The Cultural Logic of a Narrative Pattern. In A. Moreno and R. Thomas (editors), *Patterns of the Past*, 67–92. Oxford.

— —. (2015) Anatomy of the Monster: The Discourse of Tyranny in Ancient Greece. In H. Börm (editor). *Antimonarchic Discourse in Antiquity*, 67–84. Stuttgart.

— —. (2018) The Discourse of Tyranny and the Greek Roots of the Bad King. In N. Panou et al. (editors). *Evil Lords: Theories and Representations of Tyranny from Antiquity to the Renaissance*, 11–26. Oxford.

Lushkov, A. H. (2013) *Imperium. EAH* 6, 3433–35.

Mandel, J. (1988) The Uniqueness of the New (Later) Tyranny in Heraclea Pontica. *Euphrosyne* 16, 35–70.

Maronati, M. (2007) Gli strateghi focesi nella terza guerra sacra: Filomelo. *Aevum* 8, 65–85.

McInerney, J. (1999) *The Folds of Parnassos*. Austin.

Missiou-Ladi, A. (1987) Coercive Diplomacy in Greek Interstate Relations. *CQ* 37, 336–39.

Mitchell, L. (2013) *The Heroic Rulers of Archaic and Classical Greece*. London.

Mommsen, T. (1888) *Römisches Staatsrecht*[2]. Leipzig.

Morgan, K. A. (2015) *Pindar and the Construction of Syracusan Monarchy in the Fifth Century B.C.* Oxford.

Mossé, C. (1969) *La Tyrannie dans la Grèce antique*. Paris.

Page, D. L. (1955) *Sappho and Alcaeus*. Oxford.

Parker, V. (2007) Tyrants and Lawgivers. In H. A. Shapiro (editor), *The Cambridge Companion to Archaic Greece*, 13–39. Cambridge.

Pascual González, J. (2018) Commanders and Warlords in Fourth Century BC Central Greece. In T. Ñaco del Hoyo et al. (editors). *War, Warlords, and Interstate Relations in the Ancient Mediterranean*, 89–112. Leiden.

Pownall, F. (2022) The Making and Unmaking of the Memory of Gelon of Syracuse. In M. De Marre et al. (editors). *Making and Unmaking Ancient Memory*, 35–47. London.

Rhodes, P. J. (2002) Aisymnetes. *BNP* 1, 407–8.

Richardson, J. (2008) *The Language of Empire: Rome and the Idea of Empire from the Third Century BC to the Second Century AD*. Cambridge.

Robinson, E. W. (1997) *The First Democracies: Early Popular Government Outside Athens*. Stuttgart.

— —. (2011) *Democracy beyond Athens: Popular Government in Classical Greece*. Cambridge.

Robu, A. (2014) *Mégare et les établissements mégariens de Sicile, de la Propontide et du Pont-Euxin: Histoire et institutions*. Bern.

Roddaz, J. -M. (1992) Imperium: nature et compétences à la fin de la République et au début de l' Empire. *Cahiers du Centre Gustave Glotz* 3, 189–211.

Romer, F. E. (1982) The *Aisymnēteia*: A Problem in Aristotle's Historic Method. *AJP* 103, 25–46.

Sagstetter, K. (2013) *Solon of Athens: The Man, the Myth, the Tyrant?* Diss., Philadelphia.

Saprykin, S. J. (1997) *Heracleia Pontica and Tauric Chersonesus Before Roman Domination*. Amsterdam.

Scheele, M. (1923) ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΟΣ ΑΥΤΟΚΡΑΤΩΡ: *Staatrechtliche Studien zur griechischen Geschichte des 5. und 4. Jahrshunderts*. Diss., Leipzig.

Schütrumpf, E. (1991) *Aristoteles, Politik, Buch III. Aristoteles Werke in Deutscher Übersetzung*, IX.2. Berlin.

Sprawski, S. (1999) *Jason of Pherae: A Study on History of Thessaly in Years 431–370 BC. Electrum* 3. Kraków.

Stephanus, H. (1954) *Thesaurus Graecae linguae*. Graz.

Syme, R. (1988) The date of Justin and the discovery of Trogus. *Historia* 37, 358–71.

Tracy, S. (2000) Demetrius of Phalerum: Who was He and Who was He Not? In W. W. Fortenbaugh et al. (editors). *Demetrius of Phalerum*, 331–345. New Brunswick.

Treadgold, W. T. (1980) *The Nature of the Bibliotheca of Photius*. Washington.

Trundle, M. (2006) Money and the Great Man in the Fourth Century BC: Military Power, Aristocratic Connections and Mercenary Service. In S. Lewis (editor). *Ancient* Tyranny, 65–75. Edinburgh.

Tuplin, C. (2018) Mercenaries and Warlords in the Achaemenid Empire. In T. Ñaco del Hoyo et al. (editors). *War, Warlords, and Interstate Relations in the Ancient Mediterranean,* 17–35. Leiden.

Vervaet, F. (2014) *The High Command in the Roman Republic: The Principle of the summum imperium auspiciumque from 509–19 BCE*. Stuttgart.

Westlake, H. D. (1969). *Essays on Greek Historians and Greek History*. Manchester.

Williams, J. (1997) Ideology and The Constitution of Demetrius of Phalerum. In C. D. Hamilton et al. (editors). *Polis and Polemon: essays on politics, war, and history in ancient Greece in honor of Donald Kagan*, 327–46. Claremont.

Wilson, N. G. (1994) *The Bibliotheca: A Selection*. London.

Yardley, J. C. (2003) *Justin and Pompeius Trogus: A Study of the Language of Justin's "Epitome" of Trogus*. Toronto.

Yardley, J. C. and W. Heckel. (1997) *Justin: Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus, Books 11-12, Alexander the Great*. Oxford.

Yarrow, L. M. (2006) *Historiography at the End of the Republic: Provincial Perspectives on Roman Rule*. Oxford.

Zambon, E. (2008) *Tradition and Innovation: Sicily between Hellenism and Rome*. Stuttgart.

Zimmermann, M. (2008) Stadtbilder im Hellenismus – die hellenistische Polis in neuer Perspektive. In A. Matthaei et al. (editors). *Stadtbilder im Hellenismus*, 9–20. Berlin.